

NATALIIA POHORILA
Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw

YURIY TARAN
Educational Research Institute

Religiosity, Authoritarianism, and Nationalist Views in Poland

Abstract: This study investigates the relationship between religiosity, authoritarianism, and nationalism in Poland in 2023, drawing on theories of religious nationalism and authoritarian personality. Building on the insights from the literature on religious nationalism, moral traditionalism and right-wing authoritarianism, we hypothesize that religiosity positively influences nationalist views, operating indirectly through authoritarian predispositions that channel religious commitments into nationalist attitudes. Nationalism was operationalized as a multidimensional construct encompassing attitudes toward national pride, perceived threats to identity, and resistance to the European Union’s cultural influence. Using data from the 2018, and 2023 waves of POLPAN,¹ a long-running Polish panel survey, we examined both cross-sectional and longitudinal dynamics. Results demonstrate that religiosity exerts a strong direct effect on nationalism, while authoritarianism functions as a mediating orientation that independently reinforces nationalist attitudes. Lagged regression models confirm the temporal stability of nationalism, yet also reveal that religiosity and authoritarianism contribute to its intensification over time. These findings contribute to debates on the intersection of religiosity, authoritarianism, and nationalism, highlighting the enduring relevance of theories of religious nationalism and authoritarian predispositions in contemporary Poland.

Keywords: religiosity, nationalism, religious nationalism, authoritarianism, moral traditionalism

Introduction

Religiosity and nationalism, together with their associated political orientations, have long been examined by psychologists, philosophers, and historians, with sociologists entering the discourse comparatively late. In recent years, these topics have attracted renewed attention due to the rise of rightwing populism, intensifying religious and ethnic tensions, and the efforts of institutionalized religion to adapt to, reinterpret, or influence political developments.

Despite a noticeable decline in church attendance, the relevance of religiosity is being reassessed in light of its enduring role in ethnic conflicts (Fox 2008), its influence

¹ POLPAN is a longitudinal survey conducted in Poland every five years since 1988. Each wave since 1993 includes both returning participants and new respondents to ensure quasi-representativeness. For the purposes of this study, only data from the 2018 and 2023 waves are considered. The POLPAN-2018 dataset is referenced as follows: Kazimierz M. Słomczyński, Irina Tomescu-Dubrow, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences 2021, "Polish Panel Survey POLPAN". The POLPAN-2023 is to be released on 06.2026; this project is funded by the National Science Centre, Poland, grant number 2022/45/B/HS6/04090. The data are available from the authors K.M. Słomczyński, and I. Tomescu-Dubrow, <https://polpan.org>.

on electoral dynamics in the United States (Jelen & Wilcox 2002; Green 2007; Smidt & Penning 2010; Stewart 2020), and its impact on the radical transformation of political systems in postcommunist Eastern Europe (Grzymala-Busse 2015; Kunovich & Hodson 1999; Loizides 2009; Porter-Szűcs 2011; Żuk & Żuk 2019). The recurring intersection of religiosity with nationalist and rightwing ideologies has prompted social philosophers, historians, and scholars of religion to develop the concept of *religious nationalism*—a constellation of beliefs in which national religion is employed within nationalist rhetoric, often accompanied by authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and intolerance (Brubaker 1996; Calhoun 1997; Friedland 2001; Juergensmeyer 2006; Kinnvall 2004; Smith 2000).

Individual religiosity is only loosely connected to the official positions of clergy and nationalist politicians, as it is shaped by familial and educational background and influenced by evolving media and social discourses. This raises the question: in Poland, under the influence of political transformation and the role the Church seeks to play in society, has individual religiosity contributed to the development of nationalist attitudes?

This paper seeks to address that question using data from POLPAN, the Polish Panel Survey, specifically the 2018 and 2023 waves. We employ three indicators—national pride, perceived threats to national identity, and attitudes towards the cultural influence of the European Union—to construct a “nationalism” scale. In this study, nationalism is operationalized for the first time. Although the survey was not originally designed to investigate nationalism or religiosity, preliminary results were obtained. “Religiosity” and “authoritarianism” are operationalized using more conventional approaches.

The paper proceeds with a review of the relevant literature, followed by a discussion of the newly developed scales for “nationalism,” “religiosity,” and “authoritarianism,” and concludes with a regression analysis.

Theoretical Framework

Since the pioneering work of Adorno and colleagues (Adorno et al. 1950), numerous studies have demonstrated that religious practice and belief in God shape individuals’ mental constructs of the modern world. Early studies explored the associations between religiosity and constructs such as conservatism, traditionalism, and prejudice (Allport & Ross 1967; Altemeyer 1981). Subsequent research in psychiatry and psychology has highlighted the positive effects of religious practice, including enhanced coping mechanisms, a strong work ethic, and healthier lifestyle choices (see Federico et al. 2021; Ellison & Levin 1998).

Many scholars have argued that individual religiosity may be incompatible with democratic values and secular education (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992; Lipset 1981; Stark 2001), and that religious institutions often resist pluralism and marginalized voices (Gibson 1992; Stouffer 1955; Hunsberger 1995). Increasingly, research has identified a correlation between religiosity and authoritarianism, culminating in the conceptualization of *rightwing authoritarianism* (RWA). This ideology, often associated with farright political movements, encompasses themes such as law and order, antiimmigration, antifeminism, and antiglobalism (Altemeyer 1981; Wald et al. 1988; Duckitt et al. 2010; Mudde 2000; Ivarsflaten 2008).

Historically, religion has served as means of reinforcing and legitimizing nationalist claims by presenting the desired social order as both the “will of the people” and the “will of God” (Smith 2000). In contemporary contexts, it has become increasingly difficult for institutional churches to maintain their role as architects of national identity, as this function has largely shifted to secular education and other state institutions such as mass media, political socialization, and civic activism. Nevertheless, in situations marked by internal ethnic or social conflict, external military threats, or systemic transformation, religion has reemerged as a guardian of national identity—particularly in postoccupied territories, stateless nations, and societies undergoing political transition (Grzymala-Busse 2015; Merdjanova 2000; Odak & Cehajic-Clancy 2021).

In Eastern Europe during the 19th and early 20th centuries, as struggles for sovereignty intensified, the Roman Catholic Church in Croatia, Poland, Lithuania, and Slovakia, along with the Greek Catholic Church in Western Ukraine, played a prominent role in sustaining national identity (Kunovich & Hodson 1999; Tischner 1992; Tatur 1991). It is important to note, however, that these identitybuilding efforts were not always successful. In the Balkans, attempts by religious leaders to act as “peacemakers” or “reconciliators” in ethnic conflicts often exacerbated polarization (Loizides 2009; Odak & Cehajic-Clancy 2021). By contrast, such effects were not observed in Croatia (Kunovich & Hodson 1999). In Ukraine, informal vernacular religious practices and weak institutionalization of the Church fostered horizontal solidarity and politics of belonging, thereby diminishing the influence of official religious institutions (Wanner 2022).

In Poland, the Church’s interventions in education, personal freedoms, and identity formation have been particularly contentious (Borowik 2010; Grzymala-Busse 2015; Karpov 2002; Porter-Szűcs 2011; Szmyd 1993). Sociological and historical analyses have characterized Polish clerical policy as exhibiting authoritarian tendencies, marked by xenophobia (Mandes 2012), intolerance (Marody et al. 2019), resistance to social change, antisemitism (Mandes 2012; Zubrzycki 2019), and electoral support for the rightwing nativist party Law and Justice (PiS) (Skarzyńska 2020; Donovan 2020; Żuk & Żuk 2019).

However, the universality of the correlation between religiosity and rightwing ideology has been repeatedly questioned. While several studies have documented links between religiosity and political intolerance (Beatty & Walter 1984), RWA (Duckitt et al. 2010), and rightwing voting behavior (Donovan 2020; Smidt & Penning 1982; Campbell et al. 2011), others have produced more nuanced findings. For instance, controlling for economic factors has rendered the correlation between religiosity and political tolerance statistically insignificant (Goff & Trawick 2017; Sullivan et al. 1993; Malka et al. 2014), as has the relationship between religiosity and support for authoritarian leaders (Miller 2017). Cross-national survey data further reveal substantial variation among religious denominations in their propensity toward attitudinal authoritarianism and rightwing ideology (Goff & Trawick 2017; Norris & Inglehart 2011; Leak & Randall 1995; Jelen & Wilcox 1990).

Scholars have posited that the role of religious faith in shaping worldviews depends on the nature of religious attachment. *Intrinsic religiosity*—motivated by a desire for understanding, consolation, and acceptance of an unjust world—is associated with openness, forgiveness, and humility. In contrast, *extrinsic religiosity*—rooted in insecurity, fear of the unknown, and socialization within familial and religious communities—is thought to foster

intolerance, withdrawal, and xenophobia (Jennings 2016; Beatty & Walter 1984; Ellison & Levin 1998).

A related theoretical concern disentangles nationalism from authoritarianism and religiosity: *patriotism*. Unlike nationalism, patriotism is neither inherently religious nor authoritarian. It is grounded in responsibility (Nussbaum 1994), civic loyalty (Haller 2001), and civic virtue (Viroli 1995), rather than in aggressive exclusionary nationalism.

Another alternative to religious nationalism is *moral traditionalism*, which emphasizes loyalty to values and identity over obedience and authority (Haller 2001; McPherson 2017; Stenner 2005). Research conducted in Denmark revealed a negative correlation between moral traditionalism and authoritarian political choices: religious individuals supported a Christian rightwing party that was not authoritarian, whereas nonreligious authoritarians voted for an explicitly authoritarian rightwing party (De Koster & Der Waal 2007). These findings suggest that, under certain conditions, religiosity may foster civic cohesion rather than reinforce authoritarian tendencies, thereby challenging the hypothesis of religious nationalism.

Empirical attempts have also been made to distinguish the dimension of *authoritarianism–libertarianism* from *moral traditionalism–moral progressiveness* (Pless & Houtman 2020). Analysis based on the 2008 European Values Survey found no consistent international correlation between these two dimensions in Eastern Europe.

Taken together, the literature on religious nationalism emphasizes the authoritarian and exclusionary potential of religious attachment, while traditional nationalism theory and psychological studies highlight conditions under which religiosity may foster civic cohesion without authoritarian consequences. This ambivalence is particularly relevant in the Polish context, where the Catholic Church continues to exert influence over education, identity formation, and political discourse, yet where individual religiosity is also shaped by diverse familial, cultural, and generational experiences. Building on these insights, our study asks whether, under conditions of political transformation and the Church's contested role in society, individual religiosity in Poland has contributed to the development of nationalist attitudes. Because POLPAN is a panel study, it allows us to examine the causes of changes in nationalist attitudes between 2018 and 2023.

Hypothesis: Religious Nationalism in Poland

This theoretical review enables us to formulate the hypotheses of the present study and to elaborate on the operationalisation of *nationalism*, *authoritarianism*, and *religiosity* in the subsequent section.


First hypothesis. We expect a positive and significant correlation between religiosity and nationalism in Poland, rooted in the historical convergence of the Catholic Church and nationbuilding.

Second hypothesis. This effect may be mediated by personal authoritarianism.

Alternative hypothesis. Religiosity does not necessarily reinforce nationalism, or if it does, the effect is weak. Religious individuals may be motivated by moral and spiritual values (e.g., compassion, tolerance) that do not align with authoritariannationalist agendas. Consequently, a “moral traditionalism” pathway may exist, whereby high religiosity either

mitigates xenophobic or strictly nationalist tendencies, or remains unrelated to such worldviews.

Although previous literature has not connected these three components within a causal framework, our review allows us to establish at least three premises concerning the direction of correlation, as presented in [Figure 1](#).



1. Religiosity → Authoritarianism. Prior studies provide evidence of a correlation between religiosity—especially in its extrinsic, fundamentalist, and collectivistic forms—and rightwing authoritarianism. The literature suggests that the causal direction flows from religiosity to authoritarianism ([Adorno et al. 1950](#); [Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992](#); [Duckitt et al. 2010](#); [Saroglou 2002](#)). The Church, as an institution seeking survival, often adopts authoritarian policies, which may spill over to believers. In societies under crisis, external threat, or radical socioeconomic transformation, this correlation may be even stronger due to ontological insecurity: the search for security leads individuals toward religiosity and authoritarian solutions ([Canetti-Nisim & Beit-Hallahmi 2007](#); [Karpov 2002](#)).
2. Religiosity → Nationalism. Religiosity predicts stronger nationalism. Although both religiosity and nationalism perform bonding functions by building “weidentities,” religiosity is a relatively stable trait, whereas nationalist attitudes fluctuate in response to political context ([Anderson 1983](#); [Todosijević 2001](#)), regime type ([Tudor & Slater 2021](#)), and periods of conflict or perceived external threat ([Aktürk 2022](#)). This suggests that nationalist attitudes are latent dispositions that become activated during mobilisation ([Todosijević 2001](#); [Tudor and Slater 2021](#)).
3. Religiosity → Authoritarianism → Nationalism. We hypothesize a mediating role for authoritarianism. Historical analyses ([Porter-Szűcs 2011](#); [Todosijević 2001](#)) show that the Catholic Church’s struggle for survival led to authoritarian moves and the development of antisemitic, conservative, and politically interventionist tendencies in Poland. In the postYugoslav context, religiosity mobilized nationalist attitudes when filtered through authoritarian values ([Todosijević 2001](#)). [McFarland et al. \(1992\)](#) demonstrated how authoritarianism clustered with ethnocentrism in Communist Russia. Findings from the World Values Survey indicate that authoritarianism strengthens the relationship between religiosity and political attitudes, particularly in societies with high levels of human development ([Federico, Bai & Aguilera 2021](#)). In Poland, longitudinal panel data from Toruń reveal a significant relationship between personal religiosity and a preference for a traditional, isolationist, and nationalist model of society as the ideal framework for Poland ([Szafraniec 2022](#)).

To examine whether the effects of religiosity and authoritarianism on nationalism shifted between 2018 and 2023, we employed a lagged regression specification. In this

framework, nationalism in 2023 is regressed on nationalism in 2018 together with the independent variables of interest:

$$\text{Nationalism}_{2023,i} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Nationalism}_{2018,i} + \beta_n X_{n,i} + \varepsilon_i$$

This specification controls for baseline levels of nationalism, thereby isolating the predictors of residual change. Lagged regression is particularly well suited to longitudinal designs because it incorporates prior values of the dependent variable, mitigates noise that often arises from difference scores, and provides a clear interpretation of how religiosity and authoritarianism contribute to shifts in nationalism over time (Entringer et al. 2022, Orth et al. 2021).

Data and Variables

The data explored in this analysis come from two waves of POLPAN, the Polish Panel Survey that began in 1988 and has been conducted every five years by the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences with the most recent wave (Wave VIII) completed in 2023 (<https://polpan.org>). The core study group consists of panel respondents who have participated across waves, while each wave also incorporates renewal samples of randomly selected young adults. This design ensures that the age distribution of the Polish population is represented at each point in time, while also allowing for longitudinal analysis of individuals who remain in the panel. In 2018 the sample size was 2,161 respondents, and in 2023 it was 2,136 adults aged between 21 and 95. The panel subsample, consisting of respondents who participated in both waves, comprises 1,367 individuals, with the minimum age of this subsample being 26.

Dependent variable “nationalism”

The operationalization of nationalism in this study is distinctive, since nationalism is rarely conceptualized in mass survey analysis as a multidimensional construct containing the indicators we employ: the perceived need to strengthen national pride, fear of threats to national identity, and the aspiration to limit the cultural influence of the European Union on Polish traditions and culture. Most existing studies rely on single measures such as national pride, taken from the World Values Survey or the European Social Survey, or focus narrowly on criteria for national belonging, for example questions about what it means to be a [Pole]. In one notable case, Szafraniec (2022) introduced a more complex construct of “traditional nationalist society.” Given the lack of consensus in the literature regarding the appropriate measurement of nationalism, we propose a construct based on the forementioned three questions from the POLPAN questionnaire: the full wording of these items in both languages is presented in the [Appendix](#). These indicators are particularly relevant in the context of major sociopolitical transformations, including Poland’s accession to the European Union in 2004 and the subsequent right-wing nationalist turn associated with the rise of the Law and Justice (PiS) party, which has been an increasingly dominant political force since 2010 and has held power since 2015. The tension between a strong Polish national identity and openness to European integration has been a subject of sustained

public and political debate, and in this context, expressions of perceived threats to national identity and traditional ways of life have featured prominently in nationalist rhetoric.

According to the 2023 wave of POLPAN data, 28 percent of respondents strongly agreed that national pride among Poles should be strengthened, compared to 20 percent in 2018. Twenty-seven percent supported the view that the cultural influence of the European Union should be curtailed, compared to 18 percent in 2018. Eight percent agreed that concerns about losing national identity were meaningful, compared to 4.5 percent in 2018. At the same time, the overall sum of those who strongly agreed with nationalist statements did not change dramatically between the two waves; the significant growth occurred only in the group of “strongly agree” answers. For example, 29 percent of those who chose the option “somewhat agree” in response to the statement about strengthening national pride in 2018, within five years opted for “strongly agree.” The corresponding figures for the question on national identity threat is 10 percent, and for reducing the EU’s cultural influence it is 54 percent. These changes suggest that nationalism may have entered an awakening stage, which makes it an even more compelling subject of analysis.

In order to measure an underlying construct using multiple observed indicators, we used principal component analysis; the factor loadings are presented below.

Table 1

Factor loadings on nationalism scale in 2018 and 2023 years, panel sample only, N = 1367

	2023	2018
Need in strengthening national pride	0.736	0.710
National identity threatened	0.645	0.714
EU cultural influence to be reduced	0.701	0.618
Percentage of common variance	48.3%	46.5%

The correlations among the three indicators of nationalism were relatively modest. In the 2018 wave, the Pearson correlation coefficients ranged between 0.167 and 0.178, indicating only weak linear associations among the items. In the 2023 wave, however, these correlations increased slightly, falling within the range of 0.182 to 0.269. Although the intercorrelations remained low, principal component analysis demonstrated that all three variables nonetheless loaded strongly onto a single latent dimension, as the factor loadings presented below suggest. This outcome confirms that the items capture a common underlying construct despite their limited pairwise associations. The saved factor scores derived from the analysis were subsequently employed as the operational measure of nationalism and served as the dependent variable in Model I.

Independent variable “Religiosity”

In this study, we conceptualize religiosity as a multifaceted construct reflecting both the personal and institutional dimensions of religious commitment in Poland. Drawing on established approaches in political psychology and sociology of religion (Allport and Ross 1967; Stark 2001; Norris and Inglehart 2011), we sought to capture three core aspects of individual religiosity: (a) self-assessment of one’s religious faith, (b) frequency of church at-

tendance, and (c) support for the Church’s influence on government decisions (i.e., a “theocratic credo”)² (full wording is in the [Appendix](#)). These three indicators align with theoretical distinctions between personal spirituality, practices and institutionalized religious involvement ([Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992](#); [Goff and Trawick 2017](#)). Although diverse dimensions of religiosity could, in principle, diverge—for example, some individuals might report high personal faith but infrequent attendance—the bivariate correlations among these three items proved relatively high.

Table 2
Factor loadings on religiosity scale, PCA, panelists, N = 1358

Indicator	2023	2018
Religiosity self-assessment	0.792	0.824
Catholic church has too little influence in politics	0.683	0.657
Church attendance	0.828	0.833
Percentage of common variance	59.3%	60.1%

By modelling religiosity in this way, we address two key concerns. First, we avoid relying solely on one item—for example, attendance—thereby reducing measurement error and acknowledging that in Poland, identification with the Church may extend beyond weekly practice ([Grabowska 2018](#)). Second, we recognize a potential institutional dimension through the measure of whether respondents believe the Church should influence governmental decisions. This item is theoretically significant in contexts where religion may intersect with nationalist and authoritarian values ([Duckitt et al. 2010](#); [Grzymala-Busse 2015](#)).

Mediating variable “Authoritarianism”

In keeping with seminal theories of authoritarianism ([Adorno et al. 1950](#); [Altemeyer 1981](#); [Duckitt et al. 2010](#)), we operationalize this construct as an attitudinal orientation emphasizing deference to authority figures, conformity to traditional norms, and the belief in strict obedience. In the 2018 wave of the POLPAN survey, three items from the questionnaire tap these core dimensions:

1. Obedience is the most important thing to teach children.
2. It is wrong to do things differently from how our forefathers did them.
3. One should always show respect to those in authority.

Respondents indicated their agreement or disagreement with each statement on a Likert-type scale ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree.” While short, this triad of questions captures the authoritarian ethos in line with prior research on “right-wing authoritarianism” ([Altemeyer 1996](#)) and the emphasis on childrearing, tradition, and social hierarchy ([Stouffer 1955](#); [Hunsberger 1995](#)).

² Several international and Polish studies include a question on whether respondents believe that the [Catholic] Church should have greater influence over political matters, a perspective often referred to as the “theocratic credo.” It has been hypothesized that the aspiration for the leading role of religion in political affairs is not an aspect of spiritual religiosity, but a social attitude correlated with authoritarianism of some believers ([Karpov 2002](#); [Kunovich & Hodson 1999](#)). Furthermore, it was found that “theocratic credo” is correlated with church attendance ([Grzymala-Busse 2015](#)) that is why this item is used to compose ‘religiosity’ indicator.

To combine these items into a single measure, we conducted a principal component analysis. Results show that all three items load onto a single dimension with an explained variance of approximately 50% (Table 3). The saved factor scores—labelled “Authoritarianism”—served as the mediating variable in our models, allowing us to examine whether and how deference to established authority structures intensifies or mediates the relationship between religiosity and nationalist attitudes.

Table 3
Factor loadings on authoritarianism scale, panelists, N = 1319

	2023	2018
Obedience is the most important issue to teach children	0.807	0.777
It is wrong to do something differently than our fathers did	0.726	0.688
One should always show respect to those in authority	0.627	0.673
Percentage of common variance	52.4%	51.0%

The regression analysis

Through the regression models we test whether religiosity influences nationalism directly and when authoritarianism controlled. Nationalism as dependent variable is measured in Models II-III; while model IV answers the question of which variables are responsible for the increase of nationalism in 2018–2023.

The Model I examines the direct impact of religiosity on an individual’s authoritarianism. More precisely, it shows whether more religious respondents exhibit higher levels of authoritarian views (Table 4). This step is crucial for evaluating our “religious nationalism hypothesis,” which posits that religiosity can foster stronger authoritarian orientations—potentially leading, in further steps, to nationalist attitudes. This set of predictors explains 22.1% of the variance in authoritarianism—relatively substantial for attitudinal data. The strong coefficient on religiosity and the significance of demographic factors affirm that religious beliefs, and to some extent older age, lower education, rural environment, coincide with more authoritarian outlooks.

Shifting the focus to nationalism as the dependent variable, Model II examines whether religiosity alone contributes significantly to nationalism and how its influence changes once authoritarianism is accounted for. Model II detects that religiosity is a significant predictor of nationalism on its own, and it remains significant even when the authoritarianism is controlled. Models II and III, demonstrate that both direct effect of religiosity and the mediated through the authoritarianism are significant: people with nationalist views are more religious, as are people with stronger authoritarian orientations, and additionally respondents with higher nationalism scores are more authoritarian. The coefficient for authoritarianism is almost three times weaker than that of fore religiosity in Model III, indicating that the effect of religiosity is much stronger. Demographic traits like being male, older, less educated, and living in smaller communities also contribute to higher nationalism.

In Model IV, which controls for the lagged effect of nationalism in 2018, the prior level of nationalism emerges as the strongest predictor ($\beta = 0.257$, $p < .001$), underscoring the temporal stability of nationalist attitudes. Nevertheless, religiosity and authoritarianism

Table 4

OLS regression on nationalism 2023, standardized coefficients

	Model I Dependent: au- thoritarianism 2023 (N = 1310)	Model II Dependent: nationalism 2023 (N = 1357)	Model III Dependent: nationalism 2023 (N = 1310)	Model IV Dependent: nationalism 2023 (N = 1141)
Constant	-0.409**	0.343**	0.390**	0.240*
Religiosity	0.236**	0.389**	0.358**	0.282**
Authoritarianism	—	—	0.109**	0.110**
Gender: male = 0; female = 1	0.019	-0.056*	-0.058*	-0.051*
Age	0.160**	-0.030	-0.049*	-0.017
Low education (primary and basic vocational)	0.207**	0.063	0.053*	0.058*
Size of locality ('1'—rural; 5—town over 500,000)	-0.134**	-0.075**	-0.060*	-0.027
Nationalism 2018	—	—	—	0.257**
R ²	22.1%	17.5%	18.4%	24.0%

*significant at $p < 0.05$ level **significant at $p < 0.01$ level

retain independent effects, suggesting that these orientations reinforce nationalism beyond simple continuity. The observation that introducing nationalism in 2018 reduces the coefficient for religiosity, but does not influence the coefficient for authoritarianism means that religiosity partly overlaps with prior nationalist dispositions, whereas authoritarianism exerts an additional and distinct effect that is not explained by baseline nationalism. In other words, religiosity appears to amplify existing nationalist tendencies, while authoritarianism contributes independently to the persistence and intensification of nationalist attitudes.

Summary

The data reveal a statistically significant positive association between religiosity and nationalism, measured through indicators such as the perceived need to strengthen national pride, feelings of threatened identity, and hostility toward the European Union's cultural influence. This supports the premise that Catholic heritage and traditional faith remain aligned with certain nationalist attitudes in Poland. Our analysis demonstrates that religiosity and authoritarianism are robust drivers of nationalism in Poland, both crosssectionally and longitudinally. While nationalism exhibits strong temporal stability, authoritarian and religious orientations contribute to its reinforcement and growth across time, underscoring their enduring relevance in shaping political culture.

Poland's historical backdrop, in which the Catholic Church has long been intertwined with national struggles, helps explain why religiosity correlates with authoritarianism and nationalism to a notable degree. At the same time, the moderate strength of the correlation suggests that not all deeply religious individuals endorse exclusionary or strongly patriotic agendas. For some, religiosity may be oriented more toward personal morality or universal compassion, distancing them from a purely nationalist stance. The Catholic Church's moral teachings and its selective engagement in political life may produce mixed signals, leaving devout individuals to navigate between universalist religious values and nationalist commitments. This ambivalence highlights the complexity of religiosity as both a spiritual and sociopolitical force.

In addressing the limitations of the study, it is important to note that POLPAN surveys only adults, and the panel analysis includes individuals aged 26 and above. Yet the formative years of childhood and adolescence are crucial for shaping values and political orientations. The absence of data on early socialization and parental influences constrains conclusions about the direction of causality between religiosity and authoritarianism. It remains possible that authoritarian predispositions precede or shape religious commitments, rather than the reverse. Only longitudinal studies of adolescents and their parents can help to rule out the possibility of reversed causation and clarify the developmental pathways through which religiosity, authoritarianism, and nationalism become intertwined.

Appendix

Nationalism scale

Please, tell about each of these statements: are you strongly agree, somewhat agree neither agree, nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree.

Question 1: Poles should put more effort into strengthening national pride.

Question 2: Those who talk about losing national identity usually exaggerate

Question 3: Poland should act to reduce EU influence on our traditions and national culture

Polish original question: O każdym z tych twierdzeń proszę powiedzieć, czy zdecydowanie się Pan/Pani z nim zgadza, raczej się zgadza, ani się zgadza, ani się nie zgadza, raczej się nie zgadza, czy też zdecydowanie się Pan/Pani nie zgadza. Please, state whether you agree or disagree with these statements.

Polish original question 1: Polacy powinni włożyć więcej wysiłku, aby umacniać swoją dumę narodową.

Polish original question 2: Ci, którzy mówią o zagrożeniu tożsamości narodowej, zwykle przesadzają.

Polish original question 3: Polska powinna, czy nie powinna dążyć do ograniczenia wpływu Unii Europejskiej na nasze obyczaje i kulturę narodową?

Table 1a

Distribution of answers for the analytical sample, N = 1367, 2023

	1. Poles should put more effort into strengthening national pride*		2. Those who talk about losing national identity usually exaggerate		3. Poland should act to reduce EU influence on our traditions and national culture*	
	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent	N
Strongly agree (1)	28.3	387	9.7	133	27.0	369
Somewhat agree (2)	43.1	589	32.4	443	23.8	325
Neither agree nor disagree (3)	15.8	216	22.5	307	14.4	197
Somewhat disagree (4)	8.3	114	24.3	332	21.7	297
Strongly disagree (5)	3.1	43	7.8	107	10.5	144
Refusal (Missing cases)	0.1	1	—	—	0.1	2
Don't know (Missing value)	1.2	17	3.3	45	2.4	33
Total	100.0	1367	100.0	1367	100.0	1367
Average	2.14		3.05		2.64	
Standard deviation	1.01		1.12		1.37	

Authoritarianism scale

Please, tell about each of these statements: are you strongly agree, somewhat agree neither agree, nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree.

Question 4: One should always show respect to those in authority.

Question 5: It is wrong to do something differently than our fathers did.

Question 6: Obedience is the most important issue to teach children.

Polish original question: O każdym z tych stwierdzeń proszę powiedzieć, czy zdecydowanie się P. z nim zgadza, raczej się zgadza, ani się zgadza, ani się nie zgadza, raczej się nie zgadza, czy też zdecydowanie się P. nie zgadza.

Polish original question 4: Zawsze powinno się okazywać szacunek tym, którzy sprawują władzę.

Polish original question 5: Niedobrze jest robić cokolwiek w inny sposób, niż robiły to poprzednie pokolenia.

Polish original question 6: Najważniejszą rzeczą, której trzeba uczyć dzieci, jest całkowite posłuszeństwo wobec rodziców.

Table 2a

Distribution of answers for the analytical sample, N = 1367, 2023

	4. One should always show respect to those in authority*		5. It is wrong to do something differently than our fathers did*		6. Obedience is the most important issue to teach children*	
	Percent	N	Percent	N	Percent	N
Strongly agree (1)	12.7	173	3.3	387	17.0	233
Somewhat agree (2)	41.4	566	16.8	589	27.5	376
Neither agree nor disagree (3)	22.2	304	21.6	216	17.8	243
Somewhat disagree (4)	16.1	220	34.5	114	23.9	327
Strongly disagree (5)	6.5	89	21.4	43	13.5	185
Refusal (Missing values)	0.1	1	—	1	—	—
Don't know (Missing value)	1.0	14	2.4	17	0.2	3
Total	100.0	1367	100.0	1367	100.0	1367
Average	2.62		3.55		2.89	
Standard deviation	1.10		1.11		1.31	

Religiosity: church attendance

Question 7: Besides special occasions like marriages and funerals, how often do you attend religious services and meetings? Never, once a month or less, less than once a week, about once a week, more than once a week.

Polish original question 7: Poza sytuacjami szczególnymi, takimi jak śluby czy pogrzeby, mniej więcej jak często bierze P. obecnie udział w mszach, nabożeństwach lub spotkaniach religijnych? W ogóle, nigdy, rzadziej niż raz w miesiącu, rzadziej niż raz w tygodniu, ale przynajmniej raz w miesiącu, przeważnie raz w tygodniu, czy częściej niż raz w tygodniu?

Table 3a
Distribution of answers for the analytical sample, N = 1367, 2023

7. How often do you attend church?		
	Percent	N
Never (1)	19.2	263
Once a month or less (2)	25.3	346
Less than once a week (3)	12.9	176
About once a week (4)	35.8	490
More than once a week (5)	5.6	76
Refusal (Missing values)	0.5	7
Don't know (Missing value)	0.7	9
Total	100.0	1367
Average	2.83	
Standard deviation	1.26	

Religiosity: self-assessment

Question 8: Besides participation in mess, religious services and meetings, do you consider yourself: deeply religious, religious, ambivalent, but attached to religious tradition, neutral, non-believer.

Polish original question 8: Niezależnie od tego, czy bierze P. udział w mszach, nabożeństwach lub spotkaniach religijnych, czy uważa się P. za osobę: głęboko wierzącą, wierzącą, niezdecydowaną, obojętną, niewierzącą?

Table 3b
Distribution of answers for the analytical sample, N = 1367, 2023

8. How do you consider yourself*		
	Percent	N
Deeply religious (1)	10.2	139
Religious (2)	73.6	1006
Ambivalent, but attached to religious tradition (3)	3.8	52
Neutral (4)	5.0	68
Non-believer (5)	6.8	93
Refusal (Missing value)	0.4	6
Don't know (Missing value)	0.2	3
Total	100.0	1367
Average	2.24	
Standard deviation	0.95	

Influence of church in politics

Question 9: Are you strongly agree, somewhat agree neither agree, nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree that Catholic church has too much influence in politics?

Polish original question 9: Proszę powiedzieć, czy zdecydowanie się P. zgadza, raczej się zgadza, ani się zgadza, ani się nie zgadza, raczej się nie zgadza, czy też zdecydowanie się P. nie zgadza z następnym twierdzeniem: Kościół katolicki ma zbyt duży wpływ na decyzje polityczne państwa.

Table 3c
Distribution of answers for the analytical sample, N = 1367, 2023

	9. Catholic church has too much influence in politics	
	Percent	N
Strongly agree (1)	34.5	471
Somewhat agree (2)	27.7	379
Neither agree nor disagree (3)	14	192
Somewhat disagree (4)	15.7	214
Strongly disagree (5)	5.9	81
Refusal (Missing value)	0.2	3
Don't know (Missing value)	2	27
Total	100.0	1367
Average	2.29	
Standard deviation	1.26	

*The answers to these questions were recoded in a way that higher values correspond to higher nationalist, authoritarian attitudes and higher religiosity.

Refusals, and "Do not know" answers coded as missing.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to Professor Kazimierz M. Słomczyński for his insightful comments, constructive suggestions, and valuable guidance.

References

- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., and Sanford, R. N. 1950. *The Authoritarian Personality (Studies in prejudice series, American Jewish Committee)*. New York: Harper.
- Aktürk, Ş. 2022. Nationalism and Religion in Comparative Perspective: A New Typology of National-Religious Configurations, *Nationalities Papers* 50(2): 205–218. <https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2021.17>
- Allport, G. W., Ross, J. M. 1967. Religious Orientation and Prejudice. Personal religious orientation and prejudice, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 5(4): 432–443.
- Altemeyer, B. 1981. *Right-wing Authoritarianism*. Winnipeg: University of Manitoba Press.
- Altemeyer, B. 1996. *The Authoritarian Specter*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Altemeyer, B., Hunsberger, B. 1992. Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, quest, and prejudice, *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* 2: 113–133.
- Anderson, B. 1983. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London: Verso.
- Batson, C. D., and Gray, R. A. 1981. Religious orientation and helping behavior: Responding to one's own or the victim's needs?, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 40(3): 511–520. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.40.3.511>
- Beatty, K. M., Walter, O. 1984. Religious preference and practice: Reevaluating their impact on political tolerance, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 48(1b): 318–29.
- Borowik, I. 2010. Why has religiosity in Poland not changed since 1989? Five Hypotheses, *Politics and Religion* 3: 262–275.
- Brown, S., Taylor, K. 2007. Religion and education: Evidence from the National Child Development Study, *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization* 63: 439–460.
- Brubaker, R. 1996. *Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. Los Angeles: University of California.
- Bruce, S. 2002. *God is Dead: Secularization in the West*. Oxford: Blackwell.

- Byrnes, T. 2002. The Challenge of Pluralism. The Catholic Church in Democratic Poland, in: T. G. Jelen and C. Wilcox (eds.), *Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: the One, the Few and the Many*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 27–46.
- Calhoun, C. 1997. *Nationalism*. Buckingham: OUP.
- Campbell, D. E., Green, J. C., Layman, G. C. 2011. The Party Faithful: Partisan Images, Candidate Religion, and the Electoral Impact of Party Identification, *American Journal of Political Science* 55(1): 42–58. JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25766253>.
- Canetti-Nisim, D., and Beit-Hallahmi, B. 2007. The Effects of Authoritarianism, Religiosity, and “New Age” Beliefs on Support for Democracy: Unraveling the Strands, *Review of Religious Research* 48(4): 369–384.
- CBOS. 2020. Religijność Polaków w ostatnich 20 latach. Available at https://cbos.pl/SPISKOM.POL/2020/K_063_20.PDF
- De Koster, W., Van Der Waal, J. 2007. Cultural Value Orientations and Christian Religiosity: On Moral Traditionalism, Authoritarianism, and Their Implications for Voting Behavior, *International Political Science Review* 28(4): 451–467.
- Donovan, T. 2020. Right populist parties and support for strong leaders, *Party Politics*: 1–12.
- Duckitt, J., Bizumic, B., and Krauss, S. W. 2010. A Tripartite Approach to Right-Wing Authoritarianism: The Authoritarianism-Conservatism-Traditionalism Model, *Political Psychology* 31(5): 685–715.
- Ellison, C. G., Levin, J. S. 1998. The religion–health connection: Evidence, theory, and future directions, *Health Education and Behavior* 25(6): 700–720.
- Entringer, T. M., Gebauer, J. E., Kroeger, H. 2022. Big Five personality and religiosity: Bidirectional cross-lagged effects and their moderation by culture, *Journal of Personality* 91(3): 736–752.
- Federico, C. M., Bai, H., and Aguilera, R. 2021. Individual and contextual moderators of the relationship between authoritarianism and religiosity, *British Journal of Social Psychology* 60: 1436–1463.
- Fox, J. 2008. *A World Survey of Religion and State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Friedland, R. 2001. Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation, *Annual Review of Sociology* 27: 125–152.
- Gibson, J. L. 1992. The political consequences of intolerance: Cultural conformity and political freedom, *American Political Science Review* 86(2): 338–356.
- Goff, B. L., Trawick, M. W. 2017. Preaching and politics: disentangling religiosity and political choice, *Journal of Economics and Finance* 41(3): 595–609.
- Green, J. C. 2007. *The Faith Factor: How Religion Influences American Elections*. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
- Grabowska, M. 2018. *Bóg a sprawa polska. Poza granicami teorii sekularyzacji*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
- Grzymala-Busse, A. 2015. Thy will be done? Religious Nationalism and Its Effects in East Central Europe, *East European Politics and Societies and Cultures* 29: 338–351.
- Haller, M. 2001. Edmund Burke’s Moral Traditionalism, *Swiss Political Science Review*.
- Hunsberger, B. 1995. Religion and prejudice: the role of religious fundamentalism, quest and right wing authoritarianism, *Journal of Social Issues* 51: 113–129.
- Ivaresflaten, E. 2008. What unites right-wing populists in Western Europe? Re-examining grievance mobilization models in seven successful cases, *Comparative Political Studies* 41(1): 3–23.
- Jelen, T. G., and Wilcox, C. 1990. Denominational preference and the dimensions of political tolerance, *Sociological Analysis* 51(1): 69–81.
- Jelen, T. G., and Wilcox, C. (eds.). 2002. *Religion and Politics in Comparative Perspective: The One, the Few, and the Many*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jennings, J. T. 2016. Mixed Reactions: How Religious Motivation Explains Responses to Religious Rhetoric in Politics, *Political Research Quarterly* 69(2): 295–308.
- Juergensmeyer, M. 2017. Nationalism and Religion, in: R. A. Segal (ed.), *The Blackwell Companion to the Study of Religion*, pp. 356–367.
- Karpov, V. 2002. Religiosity and tolerance in the United States and Poland, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41(2): 267–288.
- Kinnvall, C. 2004. Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security, *Political Psychology* 25(5): 741–767.
- Kunovich, R. M., Hodson, R. 1999. Conflict, religious identity, and ethnic intolerance in Croatia, *Social Forces* 78(2): 643–674.

- Leak, G. K., Randall, B. A. 1995. Clarification of the link between right-wing authoritarianism and religiousness: The role of religious maturity, *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 34: 245–252. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1386769>
- Lipset, S. M. 1981. *Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Loizides, N. G. 2009. Religious Nationalism and Adaptation in Southeast Europe, *Nationalities Papers* 37(2): 203–227.
- Malka, A., Soto, C. J., Inzlicht, M., and Leikes, Y. 2014. Do needs for security and certainty predict cultural and economic conservatism? A cross-national analysis, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 106: 1031–1051.
- Mandes, S. 2012. Religia i Naród: powikłane związki religii i nacjonalizmu, in: A. Jasińska-Kania (ed.), *Wartości i zmiany. Przemiany postaw Polaków w jednoczącej się Europie*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, pp. 165–190.
- Marody, M., Konieczna-Sałamatin, J., Sawicka, M., Mandes, S., Kacprowicz, G., Bulkowski, K., Bartkowski, J. 2019. *Spółczesność na zakręcie. Zmiany postaw i wartości Polaków w latach 1990–2018*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar.
- McFarland, S. G., Ageyev, V. S., and Abalakin, P. A. 1992. Authoritarianism in the former Soviet Union, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 63(6): 1004–1010. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.6.1004>
- McPherson, D. 2017. Traditional Morality and Sacred Values, *Analyse and Kritik* 39(1): 41–62. <https://doi.org/10.1515/auk-2017-0003>
- Merdjanova, I. 2000. In Search of Identity: Nationalism and Religion in Eastern Europe, *Religion, State and Society* 28(3): 233–262. <https://doi.org/10.1080/713694765>
- Miller, S. V. 2017. Economic threats or societal turmoil? Understanding preferences for authoritarian political systems, *Political Behavior* 39(2): 457–478.
- Mudde, C. 2000. *The Ideology of the Extreme Right*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Norris, P., Inglehart, R. 2011. *Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Nussbaum, M. C. 1994. Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, in: M. C. Nussbaum and J. Cohen (eds), *For Love of Country*. Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 3–17.
- Odak, S., Čehajic-Clancy, S. 2021. Religion and politics as a dangerous mix: Effects of religiosity on intergroup forgiveness and reconciliation in a post-conflict setting, *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology* 27(3): 497–507.
- Orth, U., Clark, D. A., Donnellan, M. B., and Robins, R. W. 2021. Testing prospective effects in longitudinal research: Comparing seven competing cross lagged models, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 120(4): 1013–1034.
- Pless, A., and Houtman, D. 2021. Moral Traditionalism and Authoritarianism in PostCommunist Eastern Europe: Converging Cultural Value Divides?, in: E. Hałas and N. Masłowski (eds.), *Politics of Symbolization Across Central and Eastern Europe*. Berlin: Peter Lang, pp. 187–204.
- Porter-Szűcs, B. 2011. *Faith and Fatherland: Catholicism, Modernity, and Poland*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Saroglou, V. 2002. Beyond dogmatism: The need for closure as related to religion, *Mental Health, Religion and Culture* 5: 183–194.
- Skarżyńska, K. 2020. *My. Portret psychologiczno-społeczny Polaków z polityką w tle*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo naukowe Scholar.
- Smidt, C., den Dulk, K., Froehle, B., Penning, J., Monsma, S., Koopman, D. 2010. *The disappearing God gap?: religion in the 2008 presidential election*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Smidt, C. E., Penning, J. M. 1982. Religious Commitment, Political Conservatism, and Political and Social Tolerance in the United States: A Longitudinal Analysis, *Sociology of Religion* 43: 231–245.
- Smith, A. D. 2000. The ‘Sacred’ Dimension of Nationalism, *Millennium* 29(3): 791–814. <https://doi.org/10.1177/03058298000290030301>
- Stark, R. 2001. Reconceptualizing religion, magic, and science, *Review of Religious Research* 43: 101–120.
- Stenner, K. 2005. *The Authoritarian Dynamic*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Stenner, K. 2009. Three Kinds of “Conservatism”, *Psychological Inquiry* 20(2–3): 142–159.
- Steward, K. 2020. *The Power Worshipers: Inside the Dangerous Rise of Religious Nationalism*. New York, London, Oxford, New Delhi, Sydney: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Stouffer, S. A. 1955. *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., Inc.

- Sullivan, J. L., Walsh, P., Shamir, M., Barnum, D. G., and Gibson, J. 1999. Why politicians are more tolerant: selective recruitment and socialization among political elites in Britain, Israel, New Zealand and the United States, *British Journal of Political Science* 23: 51–76.
- Szafraniec, K. 2022. Religijność a preferencje dotyczące narodowej wspólnoty i ustroju społecznego — kontekst zmiany ustrojowej, *Studia Socjologiczne* 4(247): 9–40.
- Szymyd, J. 1993. National history, culture, and the process of religious change, in: L. Martin (ed.), *Religious Transformations and Sociopolitical Change: Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, pp. 117–126.
- Tatur, M. 1991. Catholicism and modernization in Poland, *Journal of Communist Studies* 7(3): 335–349.
- Tischner, J. 1992. “A View from the Ruins,” in: G. Weigel (ed.), *A New Worldly Order: John Paul II and Human Freedom*. Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, pp. 165–168.
- Todosijević, B. 2001. Dimensions of Nationalism : Structure of Nationalist Attitudes in Hungary and Yugoslavia, *Central European Political Science Review* 2(6): 170–186.
- Tudor, M., and Slater, D. 2021. Nationalism, Authoritarianism, and Democracy: Historical Lessons from South and Southeast Asia, *Perspectives on Politics* 19(3): 706–722. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S153759272000078X>
- Viroli, M. 1995. *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism*. Oxford University Press.
- Wald, K. D., Owen, D. E., Hill, S. S. 1988. Churches as political communities, *American Political Science Review* 82: 531–548.
- Wanner, C. 2022. *Everyday Religiosity and the Politics of Belonging in Ukraine*. Cornell University Press.
- Zubrzycki, G. 2019 (2006). *The Crosses of Auschwitz: Nationalism and Religion in Post-Communist Poland*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.
- Żuk, P., Żuk, P. 2019. Dangerous Liaisons between the Catholic Church and State: the religious and political alliance of the nationalist right with the conservative Church in Poland, *Journal of Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe* 27(2–3): 191–212.

Biographical Notes:

Nataliia Pohorila (Ph.D.) is associate professor at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw, Poland. She teaches quantitative methods and social capital, political marketing and statistical analysis at the Big Data MA program. Her research focuses on political and social values, social capital, and ecological values. She has led several research projects on electoral behavior and the value orientations and practices of resourcedependent communities in Ukraine. Dr. Pohorila is the author of more than 30 scholarly publications; three of her publications are done on the POLPAN data.

E-mail: n.pohorila@uksw.edu.pl

ORCID iD: [0000-0001-8807-911X](https://orcid.org/0000-0001-8807-911X)

Yuriy Taran is political scientist and social research analyst with over fifteen years of experience in academic research, policy analysis, and evaluation studies. He holds an MA in Political Science and has been affiliated with research institutions in Poland and Ukraine, working on comparative studies of political attitudes, national identity, and social values. His research interests focus on nationalism, religiosity, authoritarianism, and political culture in Central and Eastern Europe. Methodologically, his work relies on advanced quantitative techniques. He is the author and co-author of peer-reviewed publications in international journals and edited volumes.

E-mail: yuriy.s.taran@gmail.com