

NATIONAL AND POLITICAL IDENTIFICATIONS

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Of Love and Hate. Origins and Effects of Positive and Negative Party Identification in Poland

Abstract: The nature and effects of party identification in post-communist democracies have been an object of disputes, as the existing research does not lead to conclusive results. The present paper contributes to the discussion with analyses of four-fold typology of partisans (Rose, Mishler 1998), who either have a positive or negative party identification, or both, or none. We embed this typology in a contemporary Polish context. Using the PNES data for the 2005–2019 elections, we examine the proportions of each type of partisanship and their stability in time. We also verify what their determinants are and what their influence on electoral participation is. Our results demonstrate that positive and negative party identifications are of rational origin, although since 2015, expressive partisanship is also developing. We also prove that positive, negative, and combined motivations make Poles more prone to vote, contributing to the stability of democracy on a behavioral level.

Keywords: turnout, electoral behavior, party identification, negative party identification, partisanship

Introduction

In their prominent work, Angus Campbell and colleagues define party identification as an “individual’s affective orientation to an important group-object in his environment” (1960: 121–122). The authors of the concept admit party identification may be positive and/or negative, but only the former gained popularity in political science research. There is a broad theoretical literature on its nature (see for example Budge 2009; Cerovac 2019; Converse and Pierce 1992; Druckman et al. 2012; Durand and Eckart 1976; Holmberg 2003; Pierce and Hagner 1982; Weinschenk 2010), supported by empirical evidence on its influence. Numerous studies confirm that positive partisan attachment affects opinions (Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992), values (Goren 2005) and behaviors, voting behavior included (Bassili 1995; Michael McGregor, Caruana, and Stephenson 2015; Smets and van Ham 2013). The interest in negative party identification is much lower, although its importance for voting behavior has been empirically confirmed (Caruana, McGregor, and Stephenson 2015; Maggiotto and Piereson 1977; S. Mayer 2014; S. J. Mayer 2017; Medeiros and Noël 2014; Michael McGregor, Caruana, and Stephenson 2015; Rose and Mishler 1998). Few papers look simultaneously at both sides of partisanship. The existing ones confirm their independent influence on vote choice (Maggiotto and Piereson 1977; S. Mayer 2014; S. J. Mayer 2017; McGregor et al. 2015) and turnout (Michael McGregor,

Caruana, and Stephenson 2015). Only one paper looks more closely at the interplay between positive and negative partisanship (Rose and Mishler 1998).

There is an ongoing debate on the indispensability of positive and negative party identification for the functioning of democracy. The initial dispute, which has its origins in the third wave of democratization focused on the relationship between the party system and democratic consolidation. Some researchers claimed that high levels of partisanship are vital for a democratic system to consolidate (Klingemann and Wattenberg 1992; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Morlino 1995). Others stated that high levels of party identification are not necessary, as the role of political parties in creating democracies is limited (Toka 1997). The debate has its continuation as the development of mass media changed the relationship between parties and voters, causing the decline of partisanship. The former gained access to masses of voters, the latter easy access to information unmediated by party channels (Barnes et al. 1988). Some state that dealignment is detrimental for democracy as it weakens political parties and reduces civic engagement leading to a lack of legitimacy for party-based democracy (Dalton 2002).

As such, we propose to go beyond the debate on whether the lack or presence of party identification matters for democracy. We base our analyses on a typology proposed by Richard Rose and William Mishler (1998), according to which there are four types of partisans who either have only a positive or a negative party identification (named open and negative partisans respectively), or both (closed partisans), or neither (apathetic partisans). We claim each of the above-mentioned types of partisanship has its consequences for party competition and democracy. Apathetic partisans are either more prone to switch their vote or to abstain. Their lack of clear positive or negative preferences leads to “a profound lack of political accountability” (Klingemann and Wattenberg 1992: 149). Also, negative partisans demonstrate high electoral volatility, which weakly contributes to democratic stability (Rose, Mishler 1998). On the other hand, closed partisans who are strongly polarized may pose a threat for governments formed by other parties. Only open partisans who steadily support one party and reduce hostility toward others contribute to the stability of the party system and democracy.

The present paper draws on Rose and Mishler’s research embedding it in the contemporary context (we analyze the 2005–2019 elections in Poland). We use the same typology of partisans to find out what is the proportion of the four kinds of party identifiers, what are their determinants, and what is the influence of each type of partisanship on electoral participation. The knowledge enables us better understanding of the party-voters relationship: its stability, direction of changes, and its rational or emotional origin. It also provides an answer to a question about how each type of partisanship contributes to democratic stability on a behavioral level.

Our data confirm that in Poland there are four types of partisans who hold either positive or negative party identification, or both, or none. Both positive and negative partisanship are of rational nature, rooted in ideology and correlated with political knowledge. However, the results suggest that since 2015 the Poles have developed also expressive partisans identity.

What is more, our findings provide strong support for the hypotheses related to the influence of all kinds of party identification on vote. While positive, negative, and combined

motivations make Poles more prone to cast a ballot, the joint effect of positive and negative partisanship results to be the strongest.

Two Faces of Partisanship

There is a broad psychological literature on differences in reception, processing, and influence of positive and negative information. Researchers agree that the latter receives more processing, is better remembered and contributes more strongly to the final impression than the former (Carlson et al. 2009). The negativity bias, as psychologists refer to it, has a powerful effect on people lives, relationships, social network patterns, interpersonal interactions and learning processes (Baumeister et al. 2001; Grabe et al. 2000; Taylor 1991). It impacts also political choices, vote choice included (Vlachová 2001).

Researchers disagree how positive and negative evaluative processes should be perceived. Some claim that they are either unipolar (either positive or negative) or bipolar (ambivalent—de Liver, van der Pligt, and Wigboldus 2007), others argue they should be analyzed separately, as the positive and negative evaluation can be activated reciprocally, non-reciprocally, or independently, depending on the conditions (Cacioppo and Berntson 1994). We assume that the latter is true for positive and negative party identification. Some incentives may trigger positive or negative or combined assessments of political parties. At the same time, positive assessments may trigger negative ones or vice versa. Social Identity Theory states that positive evaluation of a group precedes negative one, as the identification with a group is prior to out-group derogation (Allport 1954; Karniol 2003; Tajfel 1979). Others claim that both affirmative and negational categories produce similarly meaningful social identities, as some people identify based on who they are and others based on who they are not (Zhong et al. 2008).

In the present paper, we assume that both approaches are plausible in the political context. We claim that positive identification with a party defines the “we” and “they” categories (which is the case of open and closed partisans, following Rose and Mishler typology), but there are also groups which have only negative identification with a party they dislike, or they would never vote for (negative partisans). The literature supports our assumptions. Although the positive party identification is in the scientific spotlight, there is a common belief (supported by empirical results) that negative party identification completes the overall image, influencing perceptions and behavior to a similar extent (Maggiotto and Piereson 1977; Rose and Mishler 1998).

Party Identification in Poland

The studies of partisanship in Poland are scarce. They focus on the distribution of positive party identification, its determinants and influence on voting behavior (Batorski and Bartkowski 2003; Grzelak and Markowski 1999; Markowski 2013; Markowski, Czeźnik, and Kotnarowski 2015; Żerkowska-Balas 2015; 2017).

They show age and socioeconomic status are key determinants of party identification in Poland (Grzelak 1999; Markowski 2013; Markowski, Cześnik, Kotnarowski 2015). While the positive relationship between partisanship and age is well known (for a review see: Dassonneville, Hooghe, and Vanhoutte 2012), the performance of status variables reveals the difference between Eastern and Western democracies: in the former variables related to the acquired status, such as income and place of residence play more important role, while in the latter the permanent resources such as level of education are stronger determinants of party identification (Markowski, Cześnik, Kotnarowski 2015). Furthermore, party identification in Western Europe depends more on rational factors such as level of political knowledge and political efficacy, in CEE it is more emotional, based on party likes and dislikes (Grzelak, Markowski 1999; Markowski 2013; Markowski, Cześnik, Kotnarowski 2015). Still the party-voter ideological and issue proximity positively enhances chance to develop party identification (Banaszkiewicz 1995; Markowski 2013; Markowski, Cześnik, Kotnarowski 2015; Żerkowska-Balas 2017).

Studies on political consequences of partisanship do not lead to clear conclusions. Although there is a strong relationship between lack of party identification and non-voting (Grzelak 1999), the effect of this variable on vote choice has not been fully confirmed. It turns out that voters tend to identify with bigger parties (which suggests strategic behavior). What is more their loyalty is questionable as they often switch their vote (Grzelak 1999; Markowski, Cześnik, Kotnarowski 2015). Party identification has an indirect effect on vote choice: it makes voters immune to the influence of short-term determinants of vote choice: manifestos, policies, issues, party evaluation (Banaszkiewicz 1995; Batorski, Bartkowski 2003; Żerkowska-Balas 2015). It also affects the perception of political facts (Markowski, Cześnik, and Kotnarowski 2015; Tworzecki and Markowski 2014).

The existing knowledge on the influence of negative party identification in Poland is scarce. The negative party identification is used only as a control variable in models explaining turnout and vote choice. Its influence on both turnout and choice is confirmed: negative attitude towards political party makes people more prone to vote (Żerkowska-Balas 2017, 2019); negative attitude towards the incumbent makes people less prone to support him (Żerkowska-Balas, Sroka, forthcoming). To our best knowledge, there are no studies of the combined influence of positive and negative partisanship in Poland.

Even though on surface positive/negative partisanship in Poland looks the same way as in Western democracies, studies reveal actual differences. For a long time, the percentage of positive partisans in younger democracies was lower compared to established Western democracies (Markowski 2013; Markowski, Cześnik, Kotnarowski 2015). This was true despite ongoing process of dealignment (for a discussion see: Thomassen 2005), followed by the recent disintegration of party systems in several Western European countries (see for example Lisi 2018; Enyedi and Bértoa 2020). The researchers explained this discrepancy with general aversion towards political parties and party politics, resulting from Communist party performance (Rose, Mishler 1998) or lack of favorable conditions (weak civil society and an unstable party system, especially in the very first years after transition—Markowski, Cześnik, and Kotnarowski 2015; Miller and Klobucar 2000; Rose, Tikhomirov, and Mishler 1997; Vlachová 2001; Tworzecki 2002; Anderson, Lewis-Beck, and Stegmaier 2003). However, in the recent years we observe clear consolidation of the party system in Poland

system and decreasing voters' volatility (Markowski 2020) which seems to serve well the formation of party identification. As data reveal (table 1), the number of negative identifiers remains high, the proportion of positive partisans significantly increased since there is a stable set of parties.

Table 1
Distribution of positive and negative party identification

	2005	2007	2011	2015	2019
Positive party identification	20.8%	61.3%	47.1%	39.1%	56.2%
No positive party identification	79.2%	38.7%	52.9%	60.9%	43.8%
Negative party identification	48.3%	45.0%	47.3%	49.3%	38.3%
No negative party identification	51.7%	55.0%	52.7%	50.7%	61.7%
N	2402	1817	1919	1733	2003

Source: PNES 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019.

The growing number of positive partisans can be also attributed to other factors. The research from the USA shows that increasing polarization of party system accompanied by the cultural polarization (so called culture war between traditional, conservative and modern, liberal values) strengthen the role of party identification: the greater the differences between political parties, the easier it is to identify with one of them (Holmberg 2007).

Positive party identification reveals significant variation over time. The highest increase took place in 2007 as an effect of Law and Justice (PIS) opponents' mobilization after two years of PIS rule (the analysis of party identification among electorates indicates the same: the percentage of positive partisans increased for all parties except PIS—see table 2). In subsequent years, change proportion of positive partisans fluctuates to a lesser extent (changes do not exceed 15 percentage points). This instability is related mainly to changes in the number of Civic Platform (PO) supporters and the increase of Law and Justice (PIS) partisans in 2015 and 2019. We suppose that also appearance and disappearance of several parties have an impact (for example, Self-defense of the Republic of Poland (Samobrona RP) in 2005 or Palikot's Movement (Ruch Palikota) in 2011 managed to gain significant numbers of partisans who were left unattended once these parties ceased to exist).

Although the number of negative partisans remains stable, the object of antipathy is changing as voter's reaction to party performance (table 3). The increase of negative identifiers of Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) in 2005 (after a term in office full of scandals), PIS in 2007 (after unsuccessful rule and negative electoral campaign), and PO in 2015 (after raising the retirement age and overall alienation from voters) are the most salient examples. Since 2011, negative sentiment has been directed towards two main parties: PO and PIS, even if the proportion of their negative partisans varies in time.

High numbers of negative partisans suggest that it is necessary to look not only at positive party identification but also negative partisanship, which could better explain the electoral behavior of Poles.

The importance of antipathy towards political parties is also confirmed by findings from previous studies on the party-voter relationship. As table 4 shows, the choice of lesser evil was the first reason to vote for the selected party for every third Pole and second for

Table 2

Distribution of positive party identification (PPID) for electorates

Positive party identification with	2005	2007	2011	2015	2019
PIS	33.8%	27.6%	27.2%	42.7%	52.1%
PO	26.3%	50.2%	44.0%	25.6%	25.3%
PSL	4.8%	9.0%	8.4%	5.6%	5.2%
SLD	8.1%	9.4%	7.1%	6.5%	7.6%
Nowoczesna Ryszarda Petru				5.6%	
Samoobrona	14.8%	1.2%			
Ruch Palikota/Ruch Poparcia Palikota			9.4%		
Kukiz 15				6.3%	1.4%
Wiosna					4.2%
Other	12.2%	2.7%	3.8%	5.6%	4.3%
N	1555	1158	1056	1052	1125

Source: PNES 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019.

Table 3

Distribution of negative party identification (NPID) for electorates

Negative party identification with	2005	2007	2011	2015	2019
PIS	3.2%	38.2%	54.7%	42.9%	57.3%
PO	3.4%	4.9%	15.7%	29.8%	30.2%
PSL	0.2%	1.1%	1.1%	3.7%	0.4%
SLD	39.5%	16.8%	2.9%	6.3%	2.7%
Nowoczesna Ryszarda Petru				0.2%	
Samoobrona	23.5%	24.9%			
Ruch Palikota/Ruch Poparcia Palikota			24.3%	1.3%	
Kukiz 15				3.1%	1.1%
Wiosna					5.3%
KORWIN				12.1%	
Liga Polskich Rodzin	23.8%	11.4%			
Other	6.3%	2.7%	1.3%	0.7%	3.7%
N	1175	818	907	855	732

Source: PNES 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019.

every fifth. Even though some surveyed mentioned other voting decision drivers, for 25% it was the only choice. This suggests that negative motivation plays an important role at the ballot. This finding is confirmed by the qualitative data gathered within the same study. Its results reveal common aversion towards political parties, which are perceived as dishonest, corrupt, inconsequential in their ideological stances and performance, alienated from people's problems, and unable (or unwilling to) fulfill their promises. All these suggest that Poles are more prone to establish negative party identification instead of a positive one.

The study further supports our expectations as it reveals that in Poland party-voter relationship is of transactional nature. Direct benefits and party performance are key drivers of the party-voter relationship. Voters are not loyal to political parties. Their relationship is limited to elections (citizens do little to support their parties, politicians become active during the electoral campaign when they promise the moon and the stars). The party

Table 4
Reason for vote for the party

	1 st most important reason	2 nd most important reason
I choose the lesser evil	34 ^c %	20%
Party manifesto	21%	21%
Positive previous experience	10%	12%
Party efficacy	9%	12%
I always vote for this party	7%	10%
Politicians	8 ^c %	9%
I feel emotionally attached to this party	5%	6%
Charismatic leader	4%	5%
Flagship proposal	3%	3%
Electoral campaign	3%	2%
N	1705	924

Source: Political Branding Survey 2019.

system does not support positive bonding, either. The political parties appear and disappear; politicians change party labels, making it hard to build loyalty or at least identification.

We go beyond the separate analyses of positive and negative party identification to examine the combined influence of positive and negative partisanship in Poland. We look at the interplay of the two variables to provide better insight into the analyzed problem by following Rose and Mishler's (1998) four-fold typology (table 5).

Table 5
Types of partisanship

		Positive party identification (PPID)	
		Yes	No
Negative party identification (NPID)	Yes	Closed partisans	Negative partisans
	No	Open partisans	Apathetic partisans

Source: Rose, Mishler (1998).

We believe this four-fold approach to partisanship provides better explanation of people's real-life opinions, attitudes, and behaviors (voting behavior included). What is more, understanding the nature and origins of partisanship enables us to assess the divisions in Polish society and their consequences, such as increasing polarization, inter-group hostility, and unwillingness for compromise or acceptance of the other side's point of view—all detrimental for the democracy.

Hypotheses, Data, and Methods

The present paper has several objectives. First, we are interested to know what kinds of partisanship exist in Poland, what is the proportion between them, and how it changes with time. Rose and Mishler's (1998) research show that a) post-communist democracies demonstrate a high level of negative partisans b) that negative partisans are not much likely

to develop positive party identification c) the shift from negative to the apathetic group is more plausible. We believe that the ongoing process of democratic consolidation and relatively stable set of parties functioning on Polish political scene in the analyzed period have influenced the model of party voter relationship, effecting in 1) the increase of the stability of positive loyalties (both open and closed) and 2) decrease of the number of negative and apathetic partisans (as parties managed to align groups of voters they appeal to). Assuming the rational nature of negative partisanship we expect high volatility between negative and apathetic partisans. We also expect that high polarization and the presence of a dividing party discourse have enhanced the development of both positive and negative sentiments towards parties (the former will precede the latter). Hence 3) the closed partisans should become a dominant group.

Second, want to find out what are the origins and nature of positive and negative partisanship. In other words, we move beyond Rose and Mishlers analyses as we investigate to what extent party identifications are emotional (rooted in social structure) or rational (based on knowledge and ideology). The existing literature reveals that positive party identification is of emotional nature. It is connected to group identity as it originates from traditional cleavages (church-anticlerical movements; rural-urban, middle class-working class, belonging to a nationality) and ethnicity. Negative party identification is in turn rational and rooted in ideology (Medeiros and Noël 2014). Similarly, we assume that positive party identification in Poland should be rooted in social structure and related to sociopolitical cleavages hence open partisanship and closed partisanship will be determined by socioeconomic variables such as level of education, income, place of residence, and religious attendance). At the same time, negative partisanship will be rational, determined by the level of political knowledge and ideological self-placement (which makes these variables determinants of closed and negative partisans).

Third, we want to learn whether positive and negative party identification influence propensity to vote. According to the literature cited above, both positive and negative party identification increase the chance to vote, therefore we expect all kinds of partisanship to be positively related to turnout. We believe that partisanships composed of positive party identification (closed and open) will have a bigger influence on vote choice than other types of partisanship as party identification simplifies vote choice, especially difficult in multiparty systems (Mayer 2014). Last but not least, we hypothesize the influence of closed partisanship will be the greatest as we believe there is some synergic effect from the combination of positive and negative motivations to cast the ballot.

We conduct analyses using the Polish National Election Study Data collected after the 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, and 2019 parliamentary elections. The PNES provides measures of positive and negative party identification which we further use to construct variables measuring the four types of partisanship. We measure positive party identification with three questions: two questions recognizing whether there is any party a respondent feels close to (“Do you usually think of yourself as close to any particular political party?” and “Do you feel yourself a little closer to one of the political parties than the others?”), followed by an open-ended question identifying the party (“Which party is that?”). Using these questions, we created a dummy variable describing positive partisans who feel close or closer to a party and can name this party. Negative party identification is a dummy

variable created on a basis of the open-ended question of whether there is a party to which a respondent feels dislike or anger and which party that is. We combined the two dummies to get the four types of partisanship (see [table 5](#)).

In the first step, we present the distributions of the four new variables and their dynamics in time. Next, we test our hypotheses using two kinds of statistical models. First, we use multinomial regression to compare the determinants of various kinds of partisans. Our dependent variable includes closed, open, and negative partisans (apathetic partisans are a reference category). We verify to what extent each type of partisanship is rooted in social structure using a range of socioeconomic variables such as gender (1—male, 0—female), age, level of education (primary, secondary, higher), place of residence (village, little town, medium town, big city) income (quartiles). We also control for the regularity of religious attendance (1—attends once a week or more often, 0—others), left and right self-placement (1–4 for the left and 6–10 for the right), and political knowledge (index of positive answers to political knowledge questions).

Finally, we use a logistic regression model to verify the influence of various types of partisans on turnout. The dependent variable is declared participation in the last parliamentary elections (1—voted, 0—others). The key independent variables are three types of partisanship (closed, open, and negative). We also control socioeconomic status (gender, age, level of education, place of residence, and income), religious attendance, ideological orientation, and political knowledge.

Empirical Analyses

Types of Partisans

The distribution of the four types of partisans reveals haphazard instability, which depends on political race dynamics. Several general findings can be drawn from [table 6](#): closed partisanship is the most subjected to fluctuations, the changes reach 20 percentage points between 2005–2007 and 2007–2011; since 2011 the variable seems to level off. It is worth noticing that till 2011, ups and downs of closed partisans has gone in line with changes in the percentage of negative partisans. Since 2011, the number of negative partisans is noticeably decreasing, while the number of closed partisans once increased in 2015 remains unchanged. The percentage of open partisans, enhanced in 2007, remains relatively stable, interrupted only by a decrease in 2015. This decline is an effect of the intensive negative campaign, which made Poles opt for or against PIS and join the ranks of closed partisans. The number of apathetic partisans, despite the downward trend in 2007 and 2011 stays very high (apathetic partisans constitute more than 1/3 of the sample).

The variation of levels of the four partisanships should be attributed to the dynamics of positive party identification in subsequent years (see [table 1](#)). In the analyzed period the negative party identification remains relatively stable until 2019. This finding is contrary to Rose and Mishler's claim that negative partisans are not prone to switch to positive partisans. In 2019, there is a noticeable 11-percentage points decrease of Poles with negative identification with a party other than PIS and PO ([table 2](#)).

Table 6
Four types of partisanship

	2005	2007	2011	2015	2019
Closed partisans	13.7%	34.7%	15.3%	27.0%	29.1%
Open partisans	7.1%	26.6%	31.8%	12.1%	27.1%
Negative partisans	34.6%	10.3%	31.9%	22.3%	9.2%
Apathetic partisans	44.6%	28.4%	21.0%	38.6%	34.6%
N	2402	1817	1919	1733	2003

Source: PNES 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019.

Determinants of Partisanship

To find out which variables make people prone to develop each kind of partisanship we run models with sociodemographic and political variables (with apathetic partisans as a reference category—[table 7](#)).

Almost all variables in the model influence closed partisanship. The socioeconomic profile of a closed partisan is the same as the one describing an active citizen: it is an older, better-educated male from bigger towns, with higher income, politically knowledgeable, and a regular churchgoer.

Closed partisanship is also related to both rightist and leftist views, although the latter were insignificant in 2005 and 2011. It makes us assume that the significance of ideological orientation depends on political competition dynamics. In 2005 after a term full of scandals, SLD raised negative emotions among voters. In the same year, two rightist parties: PIS and PO, dominated the political competition. The rivalry and mutual reluctance between these two parties was a leitmotif of the campaign. It enforced the effect of right orientation and weakened the influence of the left orientation on positive (open and closed) party identification.

Open partisanship is determined mainly by rightist views and political knowledge. Only in 2019 does the profile of open partisans change significantly, resembling the closed partisan profile (older, better educated with higher income). The only difference is in the place of residence: open partisans live in smaller towns and villages. Open partisans used to be right-oriented. Only in 2019, the leftist ideology is a statistically significant determinant of this kind of partisanship. One possible explanation could be that the 2019 campaign emphasized cultural issues (such as traditional family or gender issues). At the same time the coalition of leftist parties increased support for the left, enhancing development of identification both sides of ideological dimension.

The profile of negative partisans is the most indefinite and changeable. There is no single variable that would describe negative partisans in all analyzed years. What is more, the profile seems to vary according to the traits of the political race. In 2005 and 2007, negative partisanship was politically driven (dependent mainly on ideological stance) and related to higher social status). In 2011, only the place of residence matters which makes negative partisans close to apathetic ones. In 2015 and 2019, ideological orientation matters again, although in 2015, right-oriented and 2019, left-oriented Poles present more negative attitudes towards parties, which again is an effect of the left parties coming back to the

Table 7
Determinants of four partisanship—multinomial regression (ref. category—apathetic partisans)

	2005			2007			2011			2015			2019		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)
Closed partisans															
Intercept	-4.17***	0.40		-3.71***	0.34		-3.48***	0.45		-4.88***	0.57		-4.57***	0.63	
Gender	0.39*	0.17	1.48	0.11	0.14	1.12	0.07	0.18	1.07	0.58***	0.19	1.79	0.54***	0.18	1.72
Age	0.02***	0.01	1.02	0.01*	0.00	1.01	0.03***	0.01	1.03	0.01*	0.01	1.01	0.03***	0.01	1.03
Education	0.17*	0.08	1.18	0.29***	0.07	1.33	0.19	0.14	1.12	0.27*	0.14	1.31	0.55***	0.16	1.73
Place of residence	0.13**	0.05	1.14	0.19***	0.04	1.21	0.12*	0.05	1.13	0.16***	0.05	1.18	-0.13	0.08	0.88
Income	0.05	0.08	1.05	0.13*	0.06	1.14	0.17*	0.09	1.19	0.05	0.10	1.05	0.13	0.09	1.14
Religious attendance	0.00	0.17	1.00	0.19	0.14	1.20	-0.07	0.19	0.93	-0.61***	0.19	0.54	0.11	0.23	1.12
Left	0.25	0.28	1.29	1.41***	0.22	4.11	0.48	0.28	1.62	0.70*	0.31	2.02	0.75***	0.25	2.12
Right	1.22***	0.18	3.39	1.31***	0.15	3.69	1.3***	0.2	3.65	0.92***	0.19	2.51	1.77***	0.22	5.86
Political knowledge	0.59***	0.08	1.81	0.58***	0.07	1.79	0.49***	0.09	1.64	1.42***	0.25	4.12	0.45***	0.11	1.57
Open partisans															
Intercept	-1.96***	0.46		-2.63***	0.33		-3.04***	0.49		-3.15***	0.67		-4.17***	0.64	
Gender	0.26	0.21	1.30	0.25	0.14	1.28	-0.09	0.20	0.92	0.21	0.23	1.23	0.27	0.19	1.31
Age	-0.01	0.01	0.99	0.01**	0.00	1.01	0.02**	0.00	1.02	0.00	0.01	1.00	0.03***	0.01	1.03
Education	0.02	0.10	1.02	0.11	0.07	1.12	0.47**	0.15	1.59	-0.06	0.18	0.94	0.50***	0.17	1.65
Place of residence	-0.04	0.06	0.96	0.06	0.04	1.06	0.01	0.06	1.01	0.10	0.07	1.10	-0.19*	0.08	0.83
Income	-0.14	0.10	0.87	0.20***	0.06	1.23	0.11	0.1	1.11	0.05	0.12	1.05	0.19*	0.09	1.21
Religious attendance	0.40*	0.21	1.48	0.28*	0.14	1.32	0.29	0.20	1.34	0.07	0.23	1.08	0.50*	0.23	1.65
Left	0.28	0.33	1.32	0.43	0.24	1.53	0.09	0.31	1.1	-0.35	0.52	0.71	0.76***	0.26	2.14
Right	0.57***	0.22	1.76	0.80***	0.14	2.22	0.86***	0.21	2.37	0.78***	0.23	2.19	1.76***	0.23	5.82
Political knowledge	0.37***	0.10	1.45	0.31***	0.07	1.37	0.32***	0.09	1.38	0.79***	0.29	2.21	0.31***	0.11	1.37

Continued on next page

Table 7 (continued)

	2005			2007			2011			2015			2019		
	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)	B	SE	Exp(B)
Negative partisans															
Intercept	-1.87***	0.29		-2.01***	0.41		-1.53**	0.5		-3.28***	0.58		-2.58***	0.84	
Gender	0.19	0.13	1.20	0.05	0.18	1.05	-0.28	0.23	0.75	-0.28	0.20	0.76	0.39	0.25	1.47
Age	-0.01	0.00	0.99	0.00	0.01	1.00	-0.01	0.01	0.99	0.00	0.01	1.00	0.02	0.01	1.02
Education	0.07	0.06	1.07	0.13	0.09	1.14	0.30	0.17	1.35	-0.08	0.15	0.92	0.21	0.23	1.23
Place of residence	0.16***	0.04	1.18	0.17***	0.05	1.19	0.12*	0.06	1.12	0.04	0.06	1.04	-0.27***	0.11	0.77
Income	0.15**	0.06	1.17	-0.01	0.07	0.99	0.01	0.11	1.01	0.15	0.10	1.16	0.07	0.12	1.07
Religious attendance	-0.01	0.13	0.99	-0.25	0.19	0.78	0.06	0.23	1.06	-0.48**	0.20	0.62	-0.86*	0.41	0.43
Left	0.49**	0.19	1.63	0.79***	0.28	2.21	-0.23	0.35	0.8	0.55	0.32	1.73	0.71*	0.31	2.02
Right	0.67***	0.14	1.95	0.45*	0.19	1.57	-0.01	0.25	0.99	0.59***	0.20	1.81	0.55	0.31	1.74
Political knowledge	0.47***	0.06	1.60	0.14	0.09	1.15	0.18	0.11	1.19	1.48***	0.26	4.38	0.17	0.15	1.19
-2 Log Likelihood		3538.86			4253.74			2397.73			2365.71			2257.2	
Chi-Square (27)		354.288			406.473			213.143			213.286			203.536	
Sig.		.000			.000			.000			.000			.000	
Cox and Snell R2		0.196			0.203			0.194			0.197			0.192	
Nagelkerke R2		0.215			0.219			0.209			0.212			0.207	

Source: PNES 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019.

game. Also, less religious people are more prone to have negative feelings towards parties, which in turn indicates stronger negative feelings towards pro-catholic PIS.

Political consequences of partisanship

Let us now turn to examining the influence of various kinds of party identification on turnout as the second part of the analysis. The model reveals that all three kinds of party identification motivate people to cast a ballot, but the influence of negative partisanship is significantly weaker than open or closed partisanship. These findings lead to a conclusion that a positive attitude toward one party is a more powerful driver of voting than the negative one, nevertheless, there is some synergic effect between the two kinds of attitudes as the closed partisanship performs the best (except for 2005).

It is worth looking in more detail at the models for the 2015 elections, where negative party identification did not affect the propensity to turn out to vote. This result suggests that parties managed to align even those voters who had negative feelings towards a party (either with their electoral promises or appealing to mutual reluctance).

In 2015 and 2019 the models fit relatively well the data (still leaving some space for other, possibly rational determinants of voting decision).

Discussion

Although much of the literature is concerned with party identification, its vast majority concentrates on positive partisanship. There are few studies devoted to negative party identification. Those looking at both sides of partisanship are even less frequent. Therefore, our knowledge of the phenomenon under scrutiny is incomplete. Our understanding of the subject is lower as analyzing positive and negative partisanship, researchers treat them as separate variables, forgetting about the fact that the relationship between the two sides of partisanship may be more complex. As psychologists state, people may have positive, negative, or combined sentiments towards political parties.

Based on the above-discussed theory, we claimed that there are not only positive and negative partisans, as these two variables may appear in various combinations. Our data confirm that in Poland there are four types of partisans who hold either positive or negative party identification, or both, or none. Contrary to our expectations, their proportions are changing in time in different directions. This should be attributed primarily to changes in levels of positive party identification, increases, and decreases of which cause the flux between negative and open or closed partisans. This finding is contrary to what previous research revealed, that negative partisans are not prone to develop positive identity, they are more disposed to become apathetic partisans (and vice versa).

The political competition dynamics explain the varying number of partisans. Since 2005 the political scene has been dominated by two parties: PIS and PO, rotating in power. The political message they send to their electorates influenced attitudes towards these parties, which was reflected in proportion their positive and negative partisans. It is worth emphasizing that PO based its campaigns on threatening people with “PIS coming back

Table 8
Partisanship and voter turnout—logistic regression

	2005			2007			2011			2015			2019		
	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)	B	S.E.	Exp(B)
Closed partisans	0.93***	0.18	2.54	1.63***	0.16	5.08	1.24***	0.19	3.47	0.99***	0.23	2.69	2.85***	0.25	17.26
Open partisans	1.06***	0.22	2.89	1.48***	0.16	4.39	1.16***	0.22	3.18	0.95***	0.28	2.59	2.11***	0.22	8.24
Negative partisans	0.39***	0.13	1.47	1.11***	0.20	3.05	0.53*	0.23	1.70	0.35	0.22	1.42	0.78***	0.27	2.18
Gender	0.18	0.12	1.19	0.37***	0.13	1.45	-0.02	0.16	0.98	0.28	0.18	1.33	0.02	0.18	1.02
Age	0.01***	0.00	1.01	0.02***	0.00	1.02	0.02***	0.02	1.02	0.03***	0.01	1.03	0.00	0.01	1.00
Education	0.24***	0.05	1.26	0.52***	0.06	1.68	0.3**	0.12	1.34	0.90***	0.14	2.46	0.61***	0.16	1.85
Place of residence	0.02	0.03	1.02	0.07*	0.03	1.07	0.01	0.04	1.00	0.08	0.05	1.08	-0.21**	0.08	0.81
Income	0.13*	0.05	1.13	0.10*	0.05	1.10	0.09	0.07	1.1	0.24***	0.09	1.27	0.14	0.08	1.15
Religious attendance	0.90***	0.12	2.46	0.68***	0.13	1.98	0.76***	0.16	2.14	0.82***	0.19	2.27	0.46*	0.23	1.59
Left	0.25	0.18	1.29	0.31	0.19	1.36	0.28	0.24	1.32	0.56	0.32	1.74	0.63**	0.23	1.88
Right	0.43***	0.12	1.54	0.58***	0.13	1.78	0.259	0.16	1.3	0.55***	0.18	1.74	0.96***	0.21	2.61
Political knowledge	0.25***	0.05	1.28	0.28***	0.06	1.33	0.35***	0.07	1.42	1.38***	0.23	3.98	0.19	0.10	1.21
Constant	-2.73***	0.27	0.07	-4.16***	0.32	0.02	-2.73***	0.38	0.07	-6.67***	0.61	0.00	-2.71***	0.58	0.07
-2 Log Likelihood		1960.78a			1743.05a			1104.409a		877.98a				849.19a	
Chi-Square (12)		289.562			539.892			198.697		310.013				346.261	
Sig.		0			0			0		0				0	
Cox and Snell R2		0.163			0.261			0.183		0.276				0.304	
Nagelkerke R2		0.218			0.362			0.249		0.389				0.426	

Source: PNES 2005, 2007, 2011, 2015, 2019.

to power” message, which was a successful strategy in 2007 and 2011. Since then, this party has been perceived as reactive and lacking own propositions. It caused the decrease of its partisans since 2011. PIS has been clearly defining boundaries of the “we-ness” and “they-ness” enriching the message with (fulfilled) promises of generous social policies. The strategy led to a gradual increase of positive partisans (visible especially in 2015 and 2019). At the same time, these two parties’ activities brought about increasing polarization of the society, resulting, *inter alia*, in higher numbers of negative partisans of both parties. These results suggest that party identification in Poland may be of expressive (group identity) or instrumental (evaluation of party performance and policies) nature. The analysis of determinants of four partisanship sheds more light on this problem.

Based on previous findings, we assumed that open and closed partisanship are expressive and rooted in social cleavages, while negative partisanship is more rational, related to knowledge and ideology. Overall, we found out that the open partisanship, contrary to what we expected, is (or has been) not emotional but rational, as it is determined mainly by political knowledge and ideology. Also, the negative partisanship is of rational origin. In case of the closed partisanship, place in the social structure, as well as the ideological stance and political knowledge are significant determinants. The socioeconomic profile of the closed partisan corresponds to the profile of an active citizen. We conclude that partisanship, similarly to political participation, requires resources (knowledge, time, and money) necessary to receive and process the political message.

We would like to point out that models explaining the origins of partisanship do not fit well the data, which means that our results should be treated with caution. The question arises what determines party adherence/animosity then. As our findings suggest that both positive and negative party identification are of rational origin, we hypothesize that other short-term factors, such as evaluation of proposed policies, party performance, its effectiveness, opinions about party leaders could explain the remaining variance. Still, this part requires further study.

With regards to the influence of party identification on the propensity to vote, the findings confirm our hypotheses. As we assumed, both positive and negative partisanship have positive effect on electoral participation, the influence of positive one is stronger (open and closed partisans are more prone to vote than negative ones). This shows that party identification works as a filter through which voters perceive other elements of the political environment (politicians, policies, other parties). It facilitates vote choice, decreasing the costs of voting. The additional disinclination towards the other parties, urge to prevent their victory increase motivation to act, reflected in the significant, positive effect of closed partisanship. This leads us to conclusion that a combination of positive and negative partisanship generates synergies, being more than just a sum of positive and negative sentiments and evaluations.

The overall results indicate that the partisanship of the Poles has changed since 2015. The decrease of negative partisans in 2015 and 2019 followed by an increase of open partisans in 2015 and closed partisans in 2019 suggests that parties have successfully aligned significant groups of voters (either by better performance or change in policies). Since 2015 there has also been a significant change in the nature of partisanship supporting our realignment conclusion. Open partisanship became driven not only by knowledge and

ideology but also by place in the social stratum. It suggests that voters have developed expressive party identification, originating from the cleavages in Polish society. Especially PIS was successful in creating its partisan identity. Its political message enhanced the development of strong group identity and triggered hostility towards predefined out-groups, appealing to economic and cultural divisions existing in Polish society (division into losers and winners of transformation which goes in line with attitude towards redistribution, community inclusiveness, and conservative/liberal views—see for example Czeńnik, Kotnarowski 2011; Kitschelt, Rehm 2014). On the other hand, the same activity results in the aversion of PIS opponents and increases support for other parties (often rationally chosen lesser evil).

At the same time, there is a significant (and increasing) number of apathetic partisans, who are either apathetic or knowledgeable skeptics who “are cognitively alert to what is happening politically and sufficiently educated to evaluate political issues by themselves without needing party labels as cues” (Rose, Mishler 1998: 231). Our analyses indicate the former is true. They reveal that apathetic partisans are less sophisticated than other partisans, have lesser resources that facilitate political participation, and are less prone to participate. The knowledgeable skeptics’ characteristics better describe the open or negative identifiers, whose partisanship is determined mainly by ideological orientation and political knowledge. Especially the latter fits the concept, as Rose and Mishler observe that skeptics will be more likely “to name a party they would never vote for than to identify positively with a party” (1998: 231). The confirmed positive effect of negative partisanship on turnout implies that more sophisticated Poles reluctant towards political parties chose voice option, while less sophisticated (apathetic) ones abstain. As an effect, their interests are unexpressed and thus underrepresented.

Overall, we cautiously claim that the quality of Polish partisan democracy is improving. The increasing number of positive partisans and decreasing number of negative ones should reduce electoral volatility and improve the quality of political accountability, which is still a problem in post-communist democracies. Yet confirmation of our hypothesis requires more time to pass, especially in the light of increasing numbers of closed partisans, narrow-minded and unwilling to compromise, should be alarming.

Funding

The author worked on this text within the framework of research grants no. 2016/21/ D/HS5/03846 (Political branding: new approach to party–voter relationship) and 2018/31/B/HS5/03403 (Polish National Election Study 2019) funded by National Science Centre Poland, conducted at the Institute of Social Sciences, SWPS University of Social Sciences and Humanities in Warsaw.

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