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Sociology of/as Culture The Unfinished Methodology of Florian Znaniecki

Abstract: While Florian Znaniecki's work is best known through his joint work with William I. Thomas on *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, his most important work deals with the methodology and substance of sociology of culture, based on three origins: systems theory, the identification of cultural science along the Vico-Axiom (his culturalism), and his cultural realism. Of the major sources of specific sociology of culture, he analyses in *The Method of Sociology* (1934) as a system approach, types of cultural and sociological data, existing methodological tendencies and the development of *analytic induction* which means a conglomerate of logic principles and a principle based on exception rather than the rule of insight. His final work *Cultural Sciences* (1952) is an attempt to include data and their interpretation from a set of cultural sciences, whereby the functionality of sociology as a cultural specialty is increasing the sociologists specialize in the comparative studies of other cultural sciences.

Keywords: cultural reality, cultural sciences, methodology, system theory, Vico-Axiom, analytic induction

Introduction

The common account of Znaniecki's work and contribution in American sociology is most notably through his and Thomas' *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, and secondarily to his 1940 *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge*. The master piece of immigration and content-analysis is a heritage of sociology unchallenged, and his contribution to the sociology of knowledge is recognized in its influence on their own work by Coser (1977), Merton (1939) and Riesman (1953). For both works, however, it is worthwhile mentioning that Znaniecki, in his introduction to the *Polish Peasant* and later on even stronger, expresses via *attitudes* a critical clarification on matters of psychology as a matter of a "state of somebody," while attitude means "toward something" to distinguish the difference between psychology and sociology. Moreover, his uses of *attitude* already suggested that this element is a matter of culture.

Equally critical was Znaniecki, when he argues that the very term sociology of knowledge is "rather unfortunate for it suggests that knowledge as such is an object matter of sociological investigation" and, as one may add, it is not.

In line with Piotr Sztompka's conclusion that Znaniecki's "most lasting heritage for sociology ... (is in) ... his philosophy of the social sciences" (1986), I want to demon-

strate that it is sociology as/of culture as methodology for the field and in its substance. It was not *The Polish Peasant* that made a major contribution to sociology. Rather it is his continuous concern over methodology, and his understanding of sociology as culture throughout his work and in his *Cultural Reality* (1919), *The Method of Sociology* (1934) and *Cultural Sciences* (1952) that provide the most important scientific impact for sociology and its methodology.¹

Three Sources of Sociology of/as Culture

1. The first challenge and potential influence of Znaniecki's sociological methodology pertains to his understanding and development of systems theory. Among others from his studies there is every indication "I took the concept of closed systems from the French methodologists who were grouped around the *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale* about twenty years ago." (1934, 12). It conveys that Znaniecki is highly sensitive to these early system developments. While there is not a very broad discussion, his lines of thought on method appear to be well integrated into system theory and cybernetics. Already in his *Cultural Reality* he quite freely talks about systems and the inclusion of objects (1919: 63), and the dogmatically organized system of schemes such as politics, religion, a style of art (299). Moreover, the specificity of culture through sociology in Znaniecki's works implies modern social system theory. Through *The Method of Sociology*, he conveys quite a challenge for what thereafter developed through general system theory in sociology via Parsons (1951) and even more through modern European system theory in Luhmann (1984). As indicated already on *Action-Theory*, neither Parsons nor Luhmann and their disciples make any reference of Znaniecki's earlier work on systems theory.²

2. A second source of Znaniecki's sociological methodology and culture appears in the introduction and early references in *Cultural Reality* (1919). For the earlier engagement on the methodology of culture, he mentions that he tried "to clear the ground for my methodology... in Polish" (XI) and mentions that the source was "Polish historical idealism" (XIII). He then discusses "The thesis of culturalism" (15), and after introducing the *historical reality*, continues

History of culture is the only field in which we can follow directly and empirically at least in part of the evolution of the human (mind), and the only theory of mind which can be directly based upon empirical data is therefore which takes mind as a product of culture.

This is an extraordinary observation. It introduces the methodology of sociology of/as culture as distinguished from a natural science methodology, and, of course, for all cultural sciences.

¹ Neither Parsons, dealing with the same topic in his *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), nor anyone among his disciples (Münch 1994, II) acknowledged Znaniecki's earlier *Social Actions* (1936). And his 1919 *Cultural Reality*, regardless of its prominent publisher, was and is totally ignored in sociology.

² It is of some coincidence at the University of Illinois, when after his retirement, one of the leaders of cybernetics and system theory, including social science systems, became a colleague of Znaniecki in engineering and communication (von Foerster 1951, 1981). Whether there was any engagement between Znaniecki and von Foerster, the nephew of Wittgenstein, is not known.

But there is more to that account in what Ernesto Grassi called “the beginning of the modern thinking” through G. B. Vico in the 18th century (1968), that in the late developments of the 20th century on Vico-scholarship has become *The Vico-Axiom* (Fellmann 1976). It may now in logic and philosophy become a dogma, that elements of culture in human history are in contradistinction to Descartes through the *Nuova Scienza* (1744) the *verum-factum* of any science. While Bacon provided some insight concerning induction, it was through Vico that the basis of sociology as culture and any other cultural science could be established.

While Znaniecki’s position above (1919: 15) is quite strong and scholarly convincing, there is reason to pursue, why he did not recognize Vico’s position. In his earlier English publications, there is no mention of Vico, nor is there any further discussion concerning his own strong position in 1919 or earlier. Considering Znaniecki’s scholarship and his impression of a learned man, there is one indication that at this time Vico could not be known to him. There is another position that he could have known Vico, but rejected his position due to the scholarship of Benedetto Croce.

Croce, a Renaissance scholar, phenomenologist, a close friend of German philosophers like Dilthey, Rickert and Windelband, to whom Znaniecki related too, became known in 1911 for his work on *The Philosophy of G. B. Vico* (Croce 2002). At that time, Vico was known for his obscurity, and known among others for challenging Descartes and natural science. While Croce did not do much to dispute Vico’s “obscurity,” he argued that Vico was everything but superficial. But soon, the verdict was also that Vico was a Hegelian, if only for his affiliation with Croce. Also Marx mentioned the scholarship of Vico a few times. After all, Vico had, at length, supported Bacon’s induction-theory and accepted Bacon’s logic for himself.

Given the prominence of Croce in the first-half of the 20th century in Italian philosophy, Znaniecki, during his travel to Italy, may have met Croce and learned first-hand of Vico. Internationally since 1913 Croce’s book on Vico was well known and also available in English. Thus, given Znaniecki’s scholarship, Vico was known by him and possibly from the common contention of Vico being a Marxian he abstained from engaging him. Whether Croce actually did much damage to Vico’s work and to what degree he was only classified that way due to Croce’s Hegel and idealism affiliation, is an open question. It is a fact that, despite his affiliation in thought, Znaniecki’s methodology did not link up with Vico. As will become known later, there are affiliations in thought and even terms between the two of them.

There is every indication that Vico’s scholarship through Croce was of interest to Marxian lines of scholarship. Horkheimer (1930/1970: 30) recognized Vico and understood his cultural theory based “on empirical research,” i.e. material conditions. And in the 1960s and early 1980s, two international meetings, suggested by Marx’s occasional references to Vico and to the Frankfurt School of critical theory, discussed “Vico and Marx” (Tagliacozzo 1983). Of course, it is exactly the point of departure, when other specialists of Vico via Croce and Marxian scholars took exception to such interpretation (Hösle 1990, Otto 1979). This departure occurred only in the later part of the 20th century and thus was unknown to Znaniecki. That line of scholarship became known as the Vico-Axiom and, in essence, estab-

lished now as a logical dogma a position already known in substance by Znaniecki in 1919.

3. His *Cultural Reality* (1919) acknowledges his theory of idealism and phenomenology (Windelband, Rickert, Münsterberg; slightly subdued to Meinong, Husserl and the new American realists) and, secondly, the French creationists (Renouvier, Guyan, Bergson). But he seemingly also takes some exception and argues that his later debts belong to pragmatism “of which I am inclined to consider myself almost a disciple” (xiv).

Cultural Reality is not only of significance concerning the cultural methodology; in his attempt to take some distance to his idealist tradition he tries to establish himself as a pragmatist over a sense of cultural realism. One might observe that American pragmatism is not far off its European tradition through Peirce and Kant; and the later representatives like Chisholm (1960). His discussion over culture also allows him to link up to his experiences via sociology at Chicago. He identifies as *culturalism* and deals with culture as an empirical object and a practical organization of reality. Before he addresses “the theoretic orders of reality,” he identifies for sociology “the sociological order” in contradistinction to the psychological and physical orders (284). On strictly theoretical and systemic terms, he elaborates the uniqueness of the sociological order, and argues that it needs the theoretic order of reality for sociology to overcome these difficulties to supplement psychology in rationalizing personal experience and behavior (298). He introduces the concept of *type* for the sociological order. It implies that it is along Kant and Simmel the identification of form to identify the sociology of culture. In the end, culture is the major principle of science as opposed to the natural science, and it is sociology as a specialty of culture. Such argument then leaves nothing for sociology as a material-natural concept of science.

The Method of Sociology

This book, published in 1934, is an emerging method for sociology as culture. It is not a standard method-book, rather it is a phenomenological methodology, sometimes to be referred, to (often in education) as a method in qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). The book, published during his two-year stay at Columbia University, conveys a sense of preliminary account. It makes a vast amount of references to American and European sources from social science, anthropology, history, psychology, philosophy and economy since the late 19th century. It is also important to note what is not mentioned in general sociology and its methodology. There is no notion of Max Weber’s methodology nor any mention of Menger’s 1883 “Methodenstreit.” Such discussion via Dilthey’s distinction of *Natur- and Geisteswissenschaften* (1922) is obviously taken for granted. Many references are just listed without any insight, let alone conclusion. There is obviously an intent to give justice to the existent body of sociological knowledge. However, while key references provide important information for his arguments, even authority figures like Wundt (1882; 1917) are in the

end criticized for limited insight at the same time providing an enormous influence on modern psychology, knowledge, ethics from psychology, history, ethnology and philosophy. At times there is also a tendency toward polemic remarks. And yet, one would have to be remiss by not taking Znaniecki seriously in his scientific understanding and making sociology as a special discipline, profoundly important and pursued through a cultural methodology.

Given his limited exception, one is inclined to argue that what happened to Vico is similar to Znaniecki. Not only does Znaniecki, in sociology as a specific science of culture in contradistinction to Descartes and the natural sciences, follow Vico, it was the latter's fate that he was not taken seriously for centuries. Not only that, Znaniecki became subjugated, like Vico being a Hegelian or Marxian, to be a symbolic interactionist (Lopata 1970). One should add that Znaniecki accepted such notion, responding to the hospitality he received in the Midwest and when he seriously identified himself with American pragmatism. Given the fact that pragmatism had strong affiliations with European philosophy, such affiliation is acceptable. Actually, we had previously identified Znaniecki as a representative of idealism, pragmatism and phenomenology (Lüschen and Tibbetts 1986) to which, for idealism, one might (for the inability to understand Polish) add its Polish/Lvov brand.

His book starts with a first chapter on determination of scientific data. He introduces the principle of closed system as a fundamental assumption, which he modified over 20 years from French system theory (1934: 12). He finds a system and its elements to be pursued by an explanation of change. Here and elsewhere he faults Comte for the fact that dynamism and static as separate terms overlook the fact of constant changes in systems. Similarly he holds that historical description and explanation can not reach scientific insights without abstract definitions and general laws. And for the then present sociology, he criticizes its state as being in danger of speculation on one hand and disjointed hard facts on the other, "yet (sociology) steering the proper course" (29).

A second chapter on cultural data begins with the clear separation of nature and culture, as if that distinction were already clearly found in previous contributions since his 1919 *Cultural Reality*; he already brought with him from Europe, the concepts of values and hermeneutics by among others Windelband, Rickert, Münsterberg or the phenomenology of Husserl, Meinong or the French creation theory of Bergson (1932). He introduces his *humanistic coefficient* as a basic element of cultural system; cultural data are all the time "somebody's" never "nobody's data" and thus a source of socio-cultural analysis. He identifies values as cultural objects. Again he distinguishes psychological phenomena and cultural objects including cultural systems and their duration. In conclusion this chapter is not an easy one as he tries to incorporate philosophical, psychological, ethnological references in an incorporation to what so far was *Kulturgeschichte*, demonstrates his humanistic coefficient and gradually becomes a notion of cultural system.

Chapter Three, "The Data of Sociology," addresses the concepts developed in sociology from community to forms of groups and ending with a general definition of social systems. This chapter is short and yet relates to a huge number of socio-

logical contributions, implying quite a few of sociological specialties as had emerged since the early 20th century. As contributions of culture to the sociological enterprise this is acceptable, as a theoretical system it appears clear. However, it does not meet the implicit expectations of Znaniecki's design given the present state of the discipline.

Chapter Four, "The Sources Sociological Material," addresses such critique, when Znaniecki discusses the "inadequate utilization of sociological material" (154–156). Reflecting on philosophy, he separates original vs. vicarious experiences, observations of sociologists and experiences, observations of other people (157–198), terms that are hardly better than common sense. Equally short and problematic are his insights that he gains from "generalizations used as materials" (198–212). And that "the new generation be not only spared the waste of time... in worthless material, but he shown... valuable sources..., thus direct observation in the future (212)."

Chapter Five, "Criticism of some Methodological Tendencies," can be understood as an approach to pursue systems analysis, not the experiences of the practice of sociology at his time. And he argues that "sociology is to study social systems, not other kinds of cultural systems" (213). It means segregation of raw material, different systems with a variety of social relations. Systems may not be complete in data and thus imply the need for *conjecture*, entirely different from *hypothesis* (215). Sociology is an inductive science, typically using such method as scientific enumerative induction, such as found in ethnic or historical studies and also in sociology (217–225). Most common is the statistical method, which despite its history and type of procedure, follows the same method. Moreover, it is producing a *formal certainty* and a *formal precision*. For Znaniecki, it was not surprising in sociology that following statistics was as he found it "the line of least resistance" (228). He also criticizes that a true inductive scientist would not be satisfied with what he already knows. And in such motivation, neither statistics nor enumerative induction is contrary to what a cultural scientist would ultimately pursue.

From here on he suggests *analytic induction* as a method to be pursued in sociology as culture (235–245). He produces such procedure as exemplified in biology and botany, where the exception is based on an essential instrument of progress. And so the principle of exception is proposed for sociology as culture. Analytic induction recognizes for sociology a breakthrough for theory and insight. His wording is quite dogmatic; but he uses a note of caution, indicating the limits of analytic induction on one hand and the uniqueness of sociology on the other (244). Moreover, "there is hardly any necessity to mention ...statistical methods" as he mentions Lundberg has well done already (246), seemingly another quib toward him.

Chapter Six, "Analytic Induction in Sociology," is rather easy to understand. "The analysis of data is all done before any general formulation" (249), i.e. there is no deductive reasoning, nor is there anything to be learned about the class of such data. On top of it "analytic induction ends, where enumerative induction begins, ...leaves no real and soluble problem for the latter" (250). And so he goes, probably producing any number of conflicts by statisticians but also by those, who like Weber, employ understanding and explanation at the same time or only consecutively.

Analytic induction is the “type” method or method of typical cases, could also be called “eidos” and “eidetic case” (251). This understanding of procedure or terminology is a fair description to a social professor of what is also referred to as phenomenological reasoning. It means also with Kant and Simmel the advancement of form over content. Of course, after his caution to the limits of analytic induction, Znaniecki does not reject statistics, rather he challenges such procedure and looks for the exception and as he says for a “gradation of importance” (258). At another time, in terms of structural change (and against Comte), such procedure stresses structural dependency based on dynamic laws which is the theory of systems (262). In the end, Znaniecki pushes for this formula, which implies a high level of abstraction for his system theory: “the composition of the system is determined by its structure; its existence is conditioned by its composition” (266).

Under such assumption elements of a system are part of the system, after they have been selected as part of it. But an element does not actively influence the system. An element is not a sufficient condition (265). Znaniecki goes on to argue that social systems “possess an intrinsic order similar to that of deductive logic: ... the whole composition and structure of the system follows with a kind of logical necessity” (267).

In line with Simmel and with a sense of deductive science in C. Znamierowski/Poznan, he calls this “the principle of structural dependence” (270). Under those circumstances and interpretation, the analytic induction is suddenly a social system itself, i.e. the very kernel of sociology as culture. And it appears that Znaniecki’s system-theory is essentially a matter of logic and potentially based on a function of the system itself. Such analysis could not be developed through the system-theory of Parsons, who starts with social structure and as Luhmann refers to “action is system” in Parsons. As he mentions that was a basic error in Parsons system-theory (Luhmann 2002: 20–22). As Luhmann assumes functionality as the basis of his theory (1984), there are strong suggestions that Znaniecki may well have developed a similar system-theory some 50 years earlier.

Znaniecki advances the method of sociology to what he calls ontogenetic analysis. Among others, it implies that social systems are not perfectly closed and coherent, i.e. systems in modern life are never realized in the way they were planned. Such is the case in a club, and it may be found in a Roman-Catholic parish. Thus, ontogenetic analysis producing similarity should be used more often in sociology, while it actually is not.

In three more discussions *Phylogenetic Classifications*, *Causal Changes of Social Systems* and *The Problem of Quantifications*, Znaniecki pursues fundamental structural domains of social systems based on a number of distinct logics. It appears that only a few of such premises have been pursued in what Znaniecki subsumed under analytic induction.

As for quantification (307–319) for system-theory itself, he argues that the humanistic coefficient offers the easiest approach to that problem. Such quantifications may provide for social actions dualities like friendly vs. hostile, more or less effectivity, heavier or lighter duties, which provide the first step toward quantification. And he adds that statistics are most useful (311). Yet, because of such characteristics, soci-

ological quantification has so far, as of the 1930s, been slow to develop. To be sure, there would now be quite a bit to be added from statisticians.

Finally, there is a note of “social forces,” which mean dynamic relationships between systems (316) of which constructions and obstructive forces can be distinguished.

The Method of Sociology, with the high number of references and the breadth of sociology in Europe and America, and in a whole set of disciplines analyzed by sociology itself provides a sense of social system and of its special theory of culture that is quite powerful as a system itself. Whether analytic induction as outlined by Znaniecki is the answer, it requires more engagement by the field, including some of the logical premises that he discussed in his *Method*.

There is no question that the notion of sociology of/as culture in contradistinction to nature and after the previous contributions by Vico, hermeneutics, phenomenology and systems analysis, has become a powerful methodology for sociology. The uses of analytic induction have become a less powerful methodology. After some early advances, among the use of deviance by Lindesmith (1947), has been less successful. A recent discussion by Manning is essentially negative in its evaluation (1991: 401–430). Znaniecki himself later on made no mention of the concept anymore. This is at least somewhat surprising; at least some of his logical premises are based on analytic deduction.

One of the most recent critiques of *analytic induction* is by Jacques Tacq, a Belgian statistician and methodologist, as part of this 2007 series on Znaniecki. In an otherwise very laudable engagement, Tacq, as a quantitative methodologist rejects Znaniecki’s motto “exceptions stimulate modification of the rule” and is rather negative in calling analytic induction “a recommendable brain activity.” As a statistician, based on Descartes and on a natural science model of sociology, there is no way for him to conclude to any other result. Of course, as I tried to assume from a cultural perception of methodology, most notably found in Vico, and through a system approach, both are viable in Znaniecki conclusion. They need to be challenged, but from a model of culture in methodology and substance vs. a natural science approach. Otherwise one is in danger to start from a wrong assumption for science itself and for one sociological specialty of culture.

The majority of sociologists and those following quantifiable data and procedure will support Tacq’s judgement. But one should be reminded of Ernest Nagel’s contention that the social sciences hold a somewhat erroneous conception of the natural sciences (1952). That may be true concerning the logic of the natural sciences; but we may also assume a simplicity of natural science and what can be done the natural science way—or not. Moreover, Znaniecki in terms of training and identity was since his engagement with Durkheim (1953) and his school in Paris a Durkheimian scholar; for his method and logic he knew Durkheim’s *Rules of Sociological Method* (1895), which was and is more than statistics.

One may also conclude that not all of Znaniecki’s methodology is conclusive and final. Some of his logical premises have never been tested. Actually, he addressed not only rather difficult matters of epistemology; in his attempt to consider the vast

area of matters of culture and sociology, he was not able to conclude a sense of sociological system as culture. Of course, since Vico, since Kant, since phenomenology, since system theory Znaniecki is in good company and there might be a chance for a redefinition in sociology in years to come. For the time being, even the system-theory, let alone phenomenologists, represent the lower power for the field. As for phenomenology and hermeneutics, the tradition of critical theory and the Croce-line of Vico provides major work to be done in order to complete what Znaniecki has provided so far.

Cultural Sciences—Florian Znaniecki's Magnum Opus?

In his 1952 book Znaniecki changed the singular science of culture into a plural *Cultural Sciences*. It implies a note that his concerns of culture as a specialty of sociology might no longer be his concern. Some of the methodological terms like *analytic induction* are no longer mentioned. He observes that induction in scientific uses is no longer that consistent (160). Are his logical concerns in sociology and its method no longer part of his methodology? There are also observations that this work signals that he left sociology to be a philosopher again (Bierstedt 1969: 10).

In his chapter on “The Function of Sociology for Cultural Science” (1952: 373), he clearly reiterates otherwise, that sociology as a specialty has the key function in the cultural sciences. And he adds in reference to Sorokin that he rejects the latter’s understanding of sociology as a general and all-inclusive theory of culture (1947). Sociology remains a special theory of culture similar to physics for the natural science, which also is not all-inclusive. But for the present situation, it is also clear that sociology as a specialty of culture has not been able to provide yet what Znaniecki had projected for the field. So, his present situation is a hope, a projection rather than a concluding connection:

Sociologists are gradually becoming aware that the importance of sociology for other cultural sciences increases in the very measure in which it limits its task to a comparative study of those social systems upon which the existence of every realm of culture depends (396).

And he mentions the sociological contributions by Barnes and Becker (1938) and Gurvitch and Moore (1945) as cultural specialties of the field. But it is also clear that the present book depends on contributions of other cultural sciences, thus the plural above. Znaniecki is also hopeful that beyond sociology’s own cultural analyses, sociology will be able to contribute to cultural studies of other realms.

This book has been a long part of his work. There was his concern for values, and he implies that he originally would rather have used values instead of attitude. It would have been much clearer concerning culture in sociological terms (237–60). The understanding of sociology as a specific theory of culture in his introduction is being clarified as a matter of knowledge for the whole range of cultural systems. His earlier *The Social Role of the Man of Knowledge* is one specific system of culture for science and education. In this connection, he mentions his own two-volume analysis of education

in Polish (1928–30). And we may add our own contribution on educational analysis of European culture based on a system-approach and quantifiable data (Coombs and Lüschen 1976).

The book implies and assumes also his *Social Actions* (1936) as one case of cultural systems. He uses a number of social system constructs from active tendencies, standards and norms, disorganization. Early on he analyzes three concepts of order, two domains of metaphysical theories, and theories of man as if he cites Vico. There are other parallels, when Vico on his system of culture talks about the “poetic order of the family” (1744: 268–314) and “poetic politics” (315–86), whereby before the term was coined we used the term “sociology,” or for Znaniecki’s usages “specific culture.” There are a total of 14 chapters with resources from other disciplines than only sociology. It is quite obvious that he cites many materials from psychology as if to make sure that there are clear differences from sociology; and there is a consistent challenge to identify what the cultural domain is all about. Philosophy, as in metaphysical universal order, is a homebase. The natural order among data in the natural sciences as a matter of culture can be difficult; human actions and active tendencies are difficult to separate. Attitudes, standards and norms appear to be easy sociological terrain; and so are cultural patterns, disorganization and reorganization of cultural systems, given the heavy scholarly information in criminology and law.

Znaniecki’s book is not easy to read. One could have expected more organization and references to his method, and of systems in particular. Moreover, there is an abundance of material he assumes as given. His models of sociology as a specific culture are Frazer’s *Golden Bough* on the cultural history of magic and religion, Barnes and Becker’s on social science culture, Bergson’s evolution concern for creative culture. But so are many resources from psychology, history, anthropology, philosophy, and religion in his attempt to demonstrate the potential of a sociological speciality of culture through material from other sciences of culture.

There are two cultural and sociological issues that Znaniecki, like morality, have left out or received, like practical application, only as an afterthought. Morality—after all sociology was called a moral science by Durkheim—is a surprised omission (Durkheim 1993). There is a mention of morality in Znaniecki’s *Method* connection to family and moral conscience (1934: 112–16) with a remark that morality is not the same as the law. It is a weak understanding and, considering the attention that he gave Durkheim and his school for matters of religion as culture, morality should have received a stronger involvement. After all, it is Vico that debates *poetic morality* (1990: 255–68) and Croce addresses morality and its relationship to law through Vico (2002: 73–102). Wundt made ethics and morality a prime topic of his work. In pragmatism, morality has been a key and, eventually, also a sociological issue for long (Thayer 1968; Selznick 1992). At times the topic referred to as “moral conscience,” and there may have been reason for Znaniecki for psychological consideration to leave morality out. Anyway, morality and ethics are not debated in *Cultural Sciences*, nor in *Cultural Reality*; of course, there is an early Polish article on ethics and moral by Znaniecki in 1909. For his final book, the issue of morality remains a puzzle, even if one could consider his concern for the value since his early times to replace the morality

question.. The magnitude of morality parallel to ethics since Aristotle and Kant and the more previous concerns in sociology and philosophy (Rawls 1971; Kohlberg 1981–1984; Etzioni 1985; Luhmann 1996) almost requires a thorough pursuit in future Znaniecki research.

The issue of application for the cultural sciences is an issue that Znaniecki dealt with only shortly. This is surprising as a number of times he addressed matters of application, his two-volume treatment of education in particular. In this book he talks about the difficulties in solving practical problems and continues with a short discussion about “The prospects of applied sociology” (415–419) with which the book concludes. The last paragraph ends with his optimism “that sooner or later the solution of all important human problems will be entrusted to cultural scientists” ...and ...“sociologists would function as intellectual leaders.” His understanding of cultural science and for the specificity of sociology suggest a whole range of such function which would need a whole set of activities of the discipline and that is a major part of the unfinished methodology that Znaniecki has left us.

Sociology as a specialty of culture since Znaniecki’s 1919 writings and through the Vico-Axiom is a methodological breakthrough for sociology. *The Method of Sociology* provides an enormous challenge that methodologists have not been able to address so far. His *Cultural Sciences* demonstrate the need for sociology’s specialty of culture; yet, the material amassed, also through other cultural sciences, so far does not demonstrate the anticipated breakthrough for the field. There are similar developments concerning cultural theory through philosophy and linguistic theory (Schwemmer 1976, 2005) that may provide further insights for sociology beyond Znaniecki’s contribution.

Cultural Sciences is not Znaniecki’s magnum opus. It is a major accomplishment for an attempt to analyze the material from a variety of cultural sciences. As cultural sociology his last book has many questions open. As his *magnum opus* one should rather qualify his more conclusive *Social Actions* (1936) to hold that rank. After all, it is more conclusive as an action-theory, it also implies through the special culture of sociology an example of one of the scientific fields of culture.

Conclusion

Znaniecki’s special sociology of culture is a major work of scholarship. His deep understanding of what has become the Vico-Axiom for cultural science occurred in 1919, when he developed a major breakthrough for sociology’s theory and methodology. Why it did not result in a major reorientation of logic and methodology for sociology may be debated in a number of ways: There is the time and situation of life. Znaniecki came to the U.S. a number of times, and at least twice not voluntarily. Because of war over several years, 1919, 1934, 1939–45, there were major political disruptions to his continuous hard work and publication, interrupting the line of scientific thought and influence for the discipline itself. The whole tragedy of this scholar became quite strong when in 1945, right after his intent to go back to his native Poland, he identified

himself in *Sociology and Social Research* already at University of Poznan (1945). His family and friends held him back to stay in the U.S. and at the University of Illinois.

In terms of scholarship, he represented a school of thought that was highly international, a group of scholars who defined humanistic phenomenology, including a group of social scientists who were unable to pursue their work or were located elsewhere from the 1930s on. Figures like Adorno, Elias, König, Landecker, Lewin, Schmalenbach, von Wiese, some of them close friends, come to mind.

There is, however, also a note of time and period gone by in addition to mainly political periods. Idealism was gone, phenomenology never really made it in the U.S. Moreover, there was some excitement of systems-theory and functionalism in the U.S., that period bypassed Znaniecki. And the more recent developments in Germany through Luhmann befriended Parsons and then joined up with von Foerster and Maturana, but not Znaniecki who at that time was gone.

But there is more to be said concerning the development of sociology and Znaniecki. Symbolic interactionism, the step-child of pragmatism in sociology, was during Znaniecki's time a small affair in the Midwest. Then there was critical theory, another step-child but in this case of phenomenology and hermeneutics. As became quite clear concerning Znaniecki's methodology as culture and his affiliation with Vico, these were in theory rather incompatible. Of course there would have been exceptions with Habermas (1988) who from early on was not that closely affiliated to the Frankfurt School. Regardless of some differences with Gadamer and hermeneutics (Hahn 1997), Habermas' recent concern for morality (cf. Kohlberg 1981–1984) and religion expand his own lines of cultural sociology. For cultural sociology there are the early cases of Riesman (1953), Bellah (1985) Kohlberg (1981–1984) for the U.S., for Elias (1938), Lévi-Strauss (1949), Giddens (1976), Bourdieu (1980), Ellul (1983), Luhmann (1984), Touraine (1984) and Beck (1986) for Europe as examples for Znaniecki's lines of thought. But it is also apparent that the recently most powerful theory of Coleman (1990), like many others, explicitly follow no cultural science and Znaniecki's methodology.

What is left? Actually, quite a bit, if sociology were capable and willing to pursue a more solid theory of science, an epistemological concern for the field. The sophistication and understanding of sociology as a specialty of culture, a Vico-Axiom of sociology as cultural science will need a reorientation and renewed concern for sociological theory. Such support can be provided through an affiliation with social philosophy (von Wright 1971; 1974).³ It may through such methodology like *Deontic Logic* (von Wright 1972) and sociology as culture lead to a new concern for application problems in sociology (Lüschen 1992–1993; 2005)

The long-range outcome for sociology showed more recently anything but a lesser concern for critical theory and the continued empirical often natural-science models such as exchange-theory for the field. And methodological problems of application (Kotarbiński 1965; Bauman 1999) or morality (Putnam 1978; Gorecki 1996; Selznick

³ There were changes happening in the early 1980s, when the ASA organized a meeting in Philadelphia with philosophers and social scientists like Nagel, Skinner, von Wright with a lead-paper by Markowicz (Jones, 1981). See also Pickering 1992.

1992; Lüschen 1998) in sociology are rare. Consequently, the unfinished methodology of Znaniecki and his sociology as culture is more than history; it provides a real challenge for international sociology and its change.

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