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Internationalization of Social Movements in the Czech Republic: The Case of the Anti-Temelín Campaign*

Abstract: The article analyzes different types of coalition formations that were established and hoped to be established during the transnationally coordinated campaign against the second Czech nuclear power plant in Temelín. The case study concentrates on the role the EU played in the campaign. Due to the ongoing accession process, the opponents of the power plant viewed this process as a unique opportunity for halting the plant's construction. They actively lobbied the European Commission to make the Czech Republic's accession to the EU conditional on discontinuing the construction. The perceived significance of the EU explains the political strategies the opponents developed at the end of the 1990s, in order to persuade the European Commission to become involved in the campaign.

Keywords: transnational contention, social movements, international institutions, European Union, coalition, conflict, nuclear energy, Temelín.

Introduction

Transnational social movement organizations have recently become a major research problem in the study of social movements. The process of trans-nationalization, especially in the framework of the so-called *political process model*, has been subject to special scholarly attention (see Tarrow 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002; Imig and Tarrow 2001; Imig 2004; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Tarrow 2005). The authors working within the tradition of the political process model have developed a sophisticated set of theoretical concepts that has made it possible to explain the timing of the mobilization and the demobilization of social movements, the strategies movements employ and, to a certain extent, the political influence movements are capable of exerting (Kriesi et al. 1995; Tarrow 1998; Burstein 1999; McAdam et al. 2001; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). A central tenet of this theoretical toolkit is the concept of the “political opportunity structure,” which defines the configuration of political institutions and political actors in a given polity as a central determinant of a movement’s political efficiency and potential for success. The approach was initially developed with reference to the activities of movements at the state level.

* This article has been prepared as part of the research project Political Theory of Social Movements (GA CR 407/05/P051). The article was completed while the author was a Fulbright Fellow at Columbia University, New York.

Reflecting the recent development of international institutions, the study of contentious politics proceeded to apply this originally state-level theoretical framework to the study of transnational social movements and other non-state actors active on the transnational level (Marks and McAdam 1999; Tarrow 2002, 2005). These subsequent applications, which are the starting point of the forthcoming analysis in this article, understand the expanding structure of international institutions as an *international opportunity structure*, which can account for the divergent levels of political mobilization observed among different organizations. Just as state institutions provided, and still provide, political opportunities for political actors at the nation-state level, supranational institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Union, allow space for both state and non-state actors to interact, cooperate, and clash in conflict. Hence, in the words of Sidney Tarrow, current politics is formed by “a dense, triangular structure of relations among states, nonstate actors, and international institutions, and the opportunities this produces for actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this system” (Tarrow 2005: 25).

In fact, international institutions not only shape movements’ mobilization at the supranational level, but they also considerably influence how, and how effectively, non-state actors act at the *state level* (Risse-Kappen 1995, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Risse 2003, Meyer 2003). In other words, in the internationalized settings of contemporary politics it is no longer viable to view ‘domestic’ politics as separate from influences coming from the ‘outside’ of national borders. When, for example, a social movement organization is attempting to push through its agenda in a particular national political system, the likelihood of its success increases manifold if this agenda is in line with internationally recognized norms or overlaps with the agenda of important international organizations. The currently developing literature on Europeanization—a particular manifestation of internationalization—has pointed out this type of influence in the context of the European Union, the most densely internationalized political space in the world (Cowles et al. 2001; Císař 2007).

This article intends to show the consequences of internationalization/Europeanization for political mobilization of both state and non-state actors in the case of the campaign against the second Czech nuclear power plant in Temelín. In order to be able to trace different patterns of coalition and conflict formed in the multi-level setting of the European Union in this particular case, the article draws on an analytical framework put forward by Sidney Tarrow (2004). At the same time, as the Temelín campaign presents a “crucial case” of European transnational mobilization, it provides a suitable opportunity to subject the Tarrow’s framework to an empirical test, and to assess its applicability for other instances of transnational contention in the European Union.¹

¹ For discussions of theory testing in qualitative research see, for example, Eckstein (1975); Mahoney (2007).

Internationalization and Political Interactions

The currently developing governance structure of the European Union (EU) provides various opportunities for political action. As the paradigm of multi-level governance (Marks 1993, Marks et al. 1996, Hooghe and Marks 2001) pointed out already in the 1990s, the policy process within the EU is characterized by the interconnectedness of subnational, national, and European institutions that enable political actors at different levels to interact and establish various types of coalitions (Rucht 2001, Helfferich and Kolb 2001, Martin and Ross 2001, Greenwood 2003). According to S. Tarrow (2004: 53),

the map of Europe today offers the potential for coalition building, political exchange, and the construction of mechanisms of alignment and conflict among social actors across states, sectors, and levels of decision making. These can take horizontal as well as vertical form. Regional governments, political parties, and even social movements are reaching across and above their territories to exercise leverage against other actors, national states, and supranational authorities.

Tarrow distinguishes among four basic types of coalition and conflict formed among states, European institutions, and non-state actors—national local alignment, elite consolidation, supranational consolidation, and transnational alliance (see Table 1). All four can be observed in different situations in the multilevel structure of the European polity. They present a useful analytical approach that will be used later in the article for the analysis of the campaign against the second Czech nuclear power plant.

Table 1
Coalitions among European institutions, states, and nonstate actors

| | non-state actors | European institutions |
|-------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------|
| states | national local alignment | elite consolidation |
| non-state actors | transnational alliance | supranational consolidation |

Based on Tarrow 2004.

The four types of coalition and conflict are defined as follows:

1. National local alignment—the coalition of national government and non-state actors against European elites;
2. Elite consolidation—the coalition of national government with European elites against non-state actors;
3. Supranational consolidation—the coalition of European elites with non-state actors against national government;
4. Transnational alliance—the coalition of non-state actors in at least two different states against European elites.

Transnational Resistance against the Temelín Nuclear Power Plant

The Temelín Nuclear Power Plant (hereafter TNPP) project was launched in 1981 on the basis of an agreement between the then Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union on

the construction of a four-unit nuclear power plant in Czechoslovakia.² The project was prepared in 1984, and in 1986 preparation work began in Temelín in South Bohemia. After the fall of the communist regime in 1989 a decision was taken to stop construction work on the third and fourth units of the plant (CNA 29 May 1992). What followed was a particularly intensive political conflict over the completion and activation of the first two units which witnessed the involvement of a wide range of actors from the Czech Republic and abroad (see also Axelrod 2005; Fawn 2006).

Due to the cross-border character of the problem (TNPP is located just 36 kilometers from the Austrian border), a number of transnationally operating organizations became involved in the conflict. Among the most active Temelín opponents were transnational environmental organizations operating in Austria (Greenpeace, Global 2000—since 1999 the Austrian member of Friends of the Earth International) as well as in the Czech Republic (Greenpeace, Rainbow Movement—since 1993 the Czech member of Friends of the Earth International). Domestic organizations (for example, South Bohemian Mothers) also closely cooperated with foreign, primarily Austrian, actors (Fagan and Jehlička 2003). In addition to NGOs, some Austrian Lands (Bundesländer) (mainly Lower and Upper Austria), as well as the Austrian central government and its representatives, took part in the conflict on the side of the Temelín opponents. Austrian political parties and individual politicians were also among the important anti-Temelín voices.

Immediately after the fall of the communist regime, foreign actors intervened in the political game that unfolded around TNPP. The conflict over TNPP's completion thus had a clear international dimension from the very beginning. Political interactions taking place in the Czech Republic were influenced by the activities of actors from other countries. Czech actors coordinated their activities transnationally and used their contacts abroad. A transnational alliance was struck against TNPP since the very beginning of the campaign.

The Role of the EU in the Anti-Temelín Campaign

After the Czech government reaffirmed its original stance and issued a decision in 1999 to the effect that the construction of the power plant should be completed, Temelín opponents concentrated on playing the 'European card' (for a more comprehensive overview of the whole anti-Temelín campaign in the period between 1989 and 2001, see Císař 2004: 121–158). Elements of this strategy could already be discerned in statements by some Temelín opponents from the mid-1990s onwards. In 1996 the Upper Austrian branch of the Austrian People's Party tried to press the government to suspend cooperation with countries in Central and Eastern Europe until they signed bilateral agreements settling the issues of nuclear power plants lo-

² This study is based on the qualitative analysis of news items concerning TNPP, released by the Czech News Agency (CNA) throughout the 1990s. The database, which was created on the basis of an electronic search of the CNA's archive, originally contained 6196 news items, which were further processed. This resulted in 266 items, that were used for the actual analysis (see Císař 2004).

cated near the Austrian borders (CNA 12 May 1996). The Austrian Greens and the environmental organizations Greenpeace and Global 2000 frequently brought up the idea that Austria could use the EU in its struggle against Temelín. These organizations explicitly and repeatedly demanded that the government should not follow the official European policy of emphasizing maximal safety requirements for nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe, but should instead require the *closure of these power plants as a condition for East European countries' accession to the EU* (CNA 26 June 1998). As mentioned above, this effort was supported by the Upper Austrian branch of the Austrian People's Party (CNA 19 March 1997). The Austrian government, however, was reticent and never attempted to explicitly set this type of condition, even though it repeatedly expressed its hostile attitude to TNPP (CNA 5 May 1997; see also Fawn 2006: 103). The Greens (CNA 1 July 1997; 15 October 1998; 25 February 1999) and environmental organizations (CNA 21 September 1998) criticized the government for its insufficiently strong stance.

The use of EU accession conditionality as a means for stopping TNPP became a significant issue in public discourse in 1999. In spring 1999 Austria announced that it would no longer try to stop the construction of new nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe, and would focus on changing the EU position (and policy) regarding nuclear power. At this time the European Parliament (hereafter EP) also became involved in the problem. Statements that Temelín could make the Czech Republic's accession to the EU more difficult became more frequent after the Czech government endorsed TNPP's completion in 1999.

The traditional opponents of Temelín were joined by the German Minister of the Environment, who also called attention to this possible complication (CNA 14 May 1999), although his opinion did not represent any consensus on the issue in Germany (CNA 19 May 1999). The parliaments of four Austrian Lands (Bundesländer), Lower and Upper Austria, Salzburg, and Vienna, lobbied the government to ensure that one of the conditions for the Czech Republic's accession to the EU would be that TNPP was not put into operation (CNA 18 May 1999). Chancellor Klima declared his willingness to negotiate with the power plant's opponents, but rejected the possibility of vetoing the Czech Republic's accession to the EU on these grounds (CNA 8 June 1999).

Global 2000 and Greenpeace Austria asked the government to persuade the EU to adopt Austria's high standards for nuclear safety as European standards (CNA 9 June 1999). The rationale behind this proposal was to compel accession countries to meet Austria's demands. This strategy intended to increase the costs of building nuclear power plants to such an extent that it would become economically more sensible to abandon their construction. In June 1999, after a meeting with Chancellor Klima, several ministers (economy, finance, consumer protection and nuclear issues, and the environment), the state governors of Upper and Lower Austria, and Vienna, and activists from the environmental organizations Greenpeace and Global 2000, the Austrian Minister of the Environment announced that TNPP did not meet 'European Union standards' and was thus an important barrier to accession. The Chancellor expressed uncertainty as to whether the Czech Republic took EU requirements con-

cerning the safety of nuclear power plants seriously. Global 2000 and Greenpeace interpreted the results of the meeting as a “guarantee that the Czech Republic with Temelín ... would not enter the EU” (CNA 10 June 1999). The willingness of top Austrian politicians to meet with environmental organizations and to deal with some of their demands was, however, primarily motivated by the EP election campaign taking place at that time, and as an attempt to pacify these organizations and partly co-opt them (CNA 11 June 1999).

During his visit to Prague the President of the Austrian Parliamentary Committee for the environment, Karl Schweitzer (FPÖ), spoke about the possibility that the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU would be blocked if it failed to ratify the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment and re-evaluate TNPP in accordance with the convention’s provisions (CNA 23 June 1999). After yet another meeting of the Chancellor and other members of the government with Greenpeace and Global 2000, it was announced that Austria would demand a three party (Czech-Austrian-German) safety evaluation of TNPP. Determining whether TNPP met German norms was considered by Vienna to be an integral part of the process of the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU (CNA 25 June 1999). This demand became part of the Austrian ‘action plan’ against nuclear power plants (CNA 6 July 1999). The leadership of Upper Austria began to directly lobby the European Commission to ensure that one of the requirements for the Czech Republic’s accession to the EU would be that TNPP was not put into operation (CNA 23 July 1999; 27 July 1999). The Governor of Upper Austria, Josef Pühringer, announced that the Austrian government would support demands that the Czech Republic should be denied EU membership if it continued with the building of TNPP (CNA 31 August 1999). Hence, Austrian politicians and activists strived to forge a coalition between Austria and the EU (elite consolidation), which would take aim against the representatives of the Czech Republic.

According to some students of the conflict over TNPP, Austria’s repeated efforts to make the Czech accession to the EU conditional upon stopping the construction of the power plant brought real uncertainty for Czechs in this respect (see Fawn 2006). Nevertheless, information from the European Commission indicated that Temelín would not affect the Czech Republic’s EU accession (CNA 25 September 1999). From the very beginning the nuclear power station was regarded by the EU as an upgradeable unit and the regular Commission Reports did not require its decommissioning, but its modernization. Unlike Temelín’s opponents, the European Commission strived for the enforcement of the safety standards prevailing in the EU rather than for the closure of the power plant.

In 1999, however, Austria blocked the preparation of position documents for the negotiations with accession countries on the chapter on energy policy in order to compel them to make a commitment to maintaining the ‘highest possible’ safety standards (CNA 28 September 1999). According to the prevailing interpretation, this move was provoked by the upcoming elections in Austria (CNA 30 September 1999). As a result, however, the EU was unable to formulate a common position and accession negotiations on the energy chapter were not opened at that time. The stalemate was subsequently solved by a compromise: the controversial formulation ‘highest

possible' was replaced by a demand to maintain safety standards 'reflecting the situation in the EU'. Austria ultimately unblocked the opening of this chapter, for which it received sharp criticism from the Austrian non-state opponents of TNPP (CNA 5 November 1999).

Coalitions and Hoped-for Coalitions around the Temelín Issue

In view of the proposed theoretical framework, TNPP's opponents saw EU institutions as a potential powerful ally. They believed that if they succeeded in securing the support of the EU, they would radically increase their chances of attaining what they demanded. At the time, two types of actual coalitions were struck with the ultimate goal of developing broader alliances that would also include European elites. First, there was a coalition including the Austrian state and Austrian non-state actors against the Czech Republic. Equally, the coalition's demands targeted European elites (i.e. it was an instance of national local alignment). One of the goals of this alignment was to construct a coalition of the Austrian national government and European elites against the Czech Republic (elite consolidation). Second, there was a coalition of Austrian and Czech non-state actors (transnational alliance) against the Czech Republic. Once again, the alliance's claims targeted European elites, as it aimed at establishing a coalition between environmental groups (non-state actors) and European elites against the Czech Republic (supranational consolidation). All in all, two actual coalitions formed with the intent to integrate the EU as part of both of them.

Accordingly, a range of strategies were developed to convince the European Commission to use the EU enlargement as a mechanism for halting the construction of TNPP and other nuclear power plants in Eastern Europe. These activities continued in 2000. The Governor of Upper Austria Josef Pühringer lobbied the Commissioner for Enlargement (CNA 8 February 2000). The Brussels office of Friends of the Earth (FoEE, Friends of the Earth Europe) was also actively working towards this goal. It produced several policy papers in which it demanded that the EU used its eastward enlargement as a means of stopping not only the TNPP project, but also all other nuclear programs in the candidate countries (FoEE 2000; 2001).

While the composition of the government in Austria had changed in the meantime, the new Minister of the Environment stated that the new government would continue the existing anti-nuclear policy (CNA 6 March 2000).³ The German Minister of the Environment advocated a complex assessment of the power plant (CNA 11 April 2000;

³ It was the coalition government of the Austrian People's Party and the Austrian Freedom Party of J. Haider (FPÖ), which made the rest of the EU originally employ diplomatic 'sanctions' against the country. Although this contributed to the isolation of Austria in the EU over the Temelín issue, the real reason why the EU did not support its antinuclear stance is to be found in the fact that the EU "does not have a policy regarding nuclear power safety because of the divergent policies of nuclear and nonnuclear states." (Axelrod 2005: 262) Therefore, it is debatable whether it makes sense to argue that the EU supported Czech interests against the interest of Austria in the conflict over TNPP, as Fawn (2006) does. Rather, the EU did not have a chance to put a stop to the project, and all the effort to get its authority on board of the anti-Temelín coalition was deemed to fail.

14 July 2000; 22 August 2000). The Czech Minister of the Environment requested that thirteen additional changes to the power plant project be assessed, which appeared to create additional opportunities for the power plant's opponents (CNA 14 April 2000). At the same time, a massive anti-Temelín campaign under the name 'Referendum 2000' began in the Czech Republic. It was a petition for holding a referendum on putting TNPP into operation organized by a coalition of 74 NGOs (this number grew during the course of the campaign) (CNA 19 April 2000). In Austria, the Greens criticized the new government for not doing anything to prevent the power plant from being put into operation (CNA 14 June 2000).

Shortly before the expected unloading of fuel at the power plant, the Austrian Greens and Social Democrats asked the Chancellor to negotiate directly with Czech Prime Minister Zeman and to try to stop the preparatory work (CNA 23 June 2000). Austria requested to be included in the final evaluation of TNPP, but the request was met with a very sharp rejection by Prime Minister Zeman, whose opinion was shared by other Czech political leaders (CNA 2 July 2000). The government's stance regarding the possibility of announcing a referendum on TNPP was equally hostile (CNA 4 July 2000).

The commencement of the fuel delivery mobilized resistance to the power plant. The activities of the Austrian opponents (Greenpeace, Global 2000, Upper Austria, the Greens) and their Czech counterparts (Rainbow Movement—RM, Greenpeace, South Bohemian Mothers) continued uninterrupted. The 'Referendum 2000' petition was signed by 114,667 Czech citizens. On this basis, RM went ahead with demands for a referendum (CNA 5 July 2000). The demand was supported by President Havel (CNA 9 July 2000). Three relatively important members of the Czech Chamber of Deputies presented a draft law on the Temelín referendum, insisting that the referendum should take place in April 2001 (CNA 11 July 2000). In general, however, the prevailing attitude to the referendum was one of skepticism and dismissal and it came as no surprise that the draft law was rejected by the government (CNA 26 July 2000).

Austrian Chancellor Schlüssel actively lobbied for postponing plans to put the power plant into operation (CNA 5 July 2000). The Bavarian (CNA 6 July 2000) and German (CNA 8 July 2000) Ministers of the Environment took a stand against the accelerated completion of the plant. During the summer of 2000 the Austrian government repeatedly expressed dissatisfaction with the delivery of fuel to the plant (CNA 7 July 2000). The Austrian Greens pressed Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen to clarify the European Commission's position on TNPP and to explain what consequences the project had for the Czech Republic's accession negotiations (CNA 9 July 2000). Austria also raised the problem of Temelín during a meeting of the Council of the EU. The Council assigned the European Commission with the task to make a report on TNPP (CNA 10 July 2000). At the same time, the Czech Republic received confirmation from the Austrian plenipotentiary for the issues of enlargement Erhard Busek that Austria would not block the enlargement (CNA 11 July 2000). The following day Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen asked Austria not to politicize the problem of Temelín. He emphasized that this problem

"did not fall within the jurisdiction of the EU;" hence, the EU could not interfere with candidate countries' nuclear energy policies (CNA 12 July 2000).

Chancellor Schlüssel received the same response at a meeting with members of the European Commission when he complained about the delivery of fuel to TNPP. At that meeting he argued that EU pressure was essential, because the Czech Republic had joined the boycott of bilateral relations with Austria in line with EU sanctions imposed at that time in response to FPÖ's participation in the Austrian government and was not communicating with Vienna (CNA 12 July 2000). Other Austrian representatives also regularly voiced the TNPP problem at various forums in the EU (CNA 15 July 2000). Austria's activities continued through August 2000; the EU kept repeating that it did not support Austria's demands (CNA 9 August 2000; 10 August 2000; 17 August 2000; 21 August 2000; 25 August 2000; 28 August 2000). At the end of the month Austria again made threats to block accession negotiations on the energy chapter (CNA 29 August 2000) and asked neighboring Germany to support its stance (CNA 30 August 2000).

Austrian resistance reached its peak at this point. Upper Austria announced the first blockades of Czech border crossings (CNA 31 August 2000). In response, the European Commission again emphasized that the TNPP was a bilateral problem between the Czech Republic and Austria, and that it would therefore not interfere in the dispute (CNA 1 September 2000). An attempt by Austrian Members of the European Parliament (EMPs) to raise the issue at a plenary meeting of the EP failed.

At the beginning of September 2000 a blockade of border crossings was carried out with the active support of Upper Austria (CNA 2 September 2000), which was subsequently repeated several times. Austria made ever more categorical demands on the Czech government. TNPP had definitively become an international problem that had begun to receive enormous media attention. In the autumn of 2000, a resolution on Temelín was put on the program of a plenary session of the EP (CNA 4 September 2000). The Czech Republic raised objections because, in breach of an agreement reached earlier, the EP did not consult the resolution with the Czech side. The Czech environmental organizations RM, Friends of the Earth, South Bohemian Mothers, CALLA, and Civic Initiative for the Environment pleaded with the EP to adopt the resolution and thus support their action against TNPP (CNA 6 September 2000). The resolution was adopted: the Czech Republic was asked to carry out an environmental impact assessment of the power plant and to provide the domestic and foreign publics with information on the project (CNA 7 September 2000). In the autumn of 2000, the activities of all opponents of the power plant further intensified and radicalized. In addition to the repeated blockades of the border, Greenpeace activists also blocked the Czech embassy in Vienna (CNA 2 October 2000). These events, however, did not induce Czech political leaders to change their mind and on October 9, 2000 the first unit of TNPP was put into operation.

It is especially important for this case study to evaluate the role the EU played in the conflict. In brief, the EU was perceived as a *potential political ally* in this conflict. It was therefore the most important component of the strategies of anti-Temelín activists among both state and non-state actors. The repeated attempts of activists to

influence the EU and secure its support bear witness to the significance they ascribed to it. For example, Upper Austria's Governor Pühringer, who came to Brussels in September 2000 in order to lobby the European Commission, expressed this position openly: "without the support of the European Union our fight against Temelín will be lost" (CNA 20 September 2000). However, the European Commission repeatedly emphasized that there was no way for it to become involved in the matter, even if there were will to do it. Thus, in spite of their continual efforts, neither Austria nor social movement organizations were successful in achieving their ultimate goal. The hoped-for coalitions, which would include the EU, never materialized in practice.

This conclusion significantly undermines Fawn's (2006: 104) arguments regarding the context of the conflict over the nuclear power plant. According to his account, "Czech accession could not be taken for granted. The Czech Republic risked much by advocating Temelín." However, the evidence presented in this article rather demonstrates the general powerlessness of the power plant's opponents. The reason for that is to be found in the fact that there was no room for the EU to exert influence over the question of whether TNPP would ultimately be put into operation. Accordingly, the Temelín issue did not have real potential to jeopardize the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU. In this particular case, the international political opportunity structure remained closed for the protestors (see Císař 2004). They hoped for the EU's participation in the anti-Temelín coalition, but in reality, there was no opportunity to actually realize this goal.⁴

Negotiations at the End of the 1990s

Due to the continuing blockades of the Czech-Austrian border in September and October 2000 and because of the impossibility of solving the problem on the basis of bilateral negotiations, the Czech government asked the European Commission for consultation on the matter (CNA 12 October 2000). At an informal EU summit in Biarritz Chancellor Schlüssel requested that the EU set unified European standards for nuclear safety in order to solve the Temelín crisis (CNA 14 October 2000). Subsequently, the blockades of Czech border crossings were interrupted, in order to enable bilateral talks between the Austrian Chancellor and the Czech Prime Minister. After the meeting the blockades resumed with the same intensity.

The border blockades had the unwanted effect of silencing resistance against TNPP within the Czech Republic. They framed the entire conflict in nationalistic terms as a conflict between "us" (Czechs) and "them" (Austrians). According to the co-founder of RM and long-time coordinator of its energy campaign, Jan Beránek,

⁴ Only Austria could present a real threat, if it decided to veto the accession of the Czech Republic. However, this was a highly unlikely scenario. As R. Axelrod (2004) concludes, regarding a veto of Czech accession, Austria "lacked support in the EU Council," and she continues: "Having just recently been isolated by EU bodies and member states following the inclusion of Haider's right-wing FPÖ in the government, Austrian officials were loath to risk being the 'outsider' again and being subject to reprisals in the European Council. EU Commissioner President Prodi rejected demands for safety guarantees at the EU level. There was no legal basis for stopping Temelín."

unemotional discussion was impossible in this discursive environment. Thus, RM distanced itself from the blockades and suspended cooperation with the organizations taking part in them. Although in the 1990s RM had worked together with the Upper Austrian Platform for Nuclear Safety, which took part in the blockades in 2000, it terminated cooperation when the blockades began. At this point, the anti-Temelín transnational alliance started to break apart.

In the second half of October 2000, the European Commission offered to act as a mediator in the dispute. At the same time, it stressed that it would not take sides in it (CNA 17 October 2000). The goal of the mediation was to ensure that Austria would obtain full information on TNPP and to thus prevent further blockades of Czech border crossings. However, the lower chamber of the Austrian parliament adopted a resolution that obliged the Austrian government to act on all levels to prevent TNPP from being put into operation (CNA 19 October 2000). The Austrian opponents of TNPP wryly asked European Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen to stop prioritizing the interests of a non-member state and start defending member states' interests instead (CNA 20 October 2000). Austria continued making statements to the effect that the Czech Republic would be blocked from joining the EU because of Temelín (CNA 30 October 2000). More concretely, Austria was threatening to prevent the conclusion of accession negotiations on the energy chapter.

At the beginning of November 2000, the situation at the border crossings blocked by Austrian opponents of TNPP became more dramatic. The blockades temporarily disrupted bilateral relations between the two countries as Czech representatives refused to engage in negotiations under the pressure of the blockades. Subsequently, the situation gradually returned to normal and the blockades ended (CNA 9 November 2000). Austria blocked the formulation of a common EU position on the energy chapter in the accession negotiations with the Czech Republic (CNA 10 November 2000). No common position could be formulated on the environment chapter either. Thus, one round of accession talks had to be left out (CNA 16 November 2000). At the end of the month, Austria dropped its reservations regarding the environment chapter (CNA 27 November 2000).

At the beginning of December 2000 intense bilateral negotiations on TNPP began, mediated by Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen. The basic framework for the agreement was decided upon in Melk at a meeting of the Austrian Chancellor, the Czech Prime Minister, and the Commissioner for Enlargement. At these negotiations the Czech Republic committed itself to carrying out an environmental impact assessment of Temelín under the supervision of the European Commission (CNA 13 December 2000). This marked the start of the so-called Melk process. The final agreement on Temelín was reached in Brussels on 29 November 2001. On the basis of this agreement, Austria stopped blocking the Czech Republic's accession negotiations on the energy chapter and the chapter was closed at the end of 2001 (CNA 12 December 2001).

Hence, the power plant's opponents were unable to achieve their final goal. Constant pressure from the Austrian opponents of the power plant succeeded in making the decision- and policy-making process on this issue more transparent and exposed

the plant to additional safety assessment. However, the opponents' declared political goal—to prevent the power plant from being put into operation—was not attained. Others have come to the same conclusion too. While Fawn (2006: 113–117) stresses that the Czech government accepted additional safety measures that it would have “never sought,” the overall outcome “can be construed as a Czech success... Austria can be said to have ‘lost’ over Temelín.”

Conclusions

The article focused on the analysis of different types of coalition and conflict that were established and hoped to be established during the transnationally coordinated campaign against the second Czech nuclear power plant in Temelín. The case study concentrated on the role the EU played in the campaign. Due to the ongoing accession process, the opponents of the power plant saw the EU as a unique opportunity for halting the plant's construction. They actively lobbied EU institutions to make the Czech Republic's accession to the EU conditional on discontinuing the construction. The perceived significance of the EU explains the political strategies the opponents developed at the end of the 1990s, in order to persuade European elites to become involved in the campaign. Thus, while the Austrian opponents strived for *elite consolidation*, transnationally operating actors in the Czech Republic and Austria pushed for *supranational consolidation*. There are other instances of such attempts at a ‘strategic use’ of the EU in political conflicts within the European multi-level polity. Remaining in the Czech Republic, one might list the policy areas of gender equality and anti-corruption, where domestic non-state actors utilized ‘EU-centered’ frames in order to express their grievances (see Saxonberg 2003, Císař 2004, Vráblíková 2007).

Tarrow's framework, presented in the beginning of the article, provided the analysis with suitable tools to sort the different dynamics behind the campaign. The framework helped conceptualize the coalitional patterns which were actually established at the time of the campaign: the national local alignment of the Austrian state and non-state actors, and the transnational alliance between Czech and predominantly Austrian non-state actors. At the same time, it explained the strategies undertaken by both state and non-state actors to create new coalitions that would include the EU (elite and supranational consolidations).

The case study clearly demonstrated that the coalitional patterns put forward by Tarrow do not necessarily go together with the assumed targets. In fact, as Tarrow (Tarrow 2004: 56–58) shows, it is not substantiated to link a particular coalitional pattern to a particular target, such as national local alignment which is generally presumed to be formed against European elites. As the case study demonstrated, a coalition of a national government and non-state actors does not need to take aim against European elites, but against another government. In addition, such a collation can be struck against multiple targets. Hence, the case study pointed out the great variability of political conflicts in contemporary Europe. It is left for the forthcoming

research to extend the framework in a way that would better model the complex nature of possible conflicts taking place among different coalitions of actors.

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