KRZYSZTOF MUDYŃ
Jagiellonian University

On the Two Ways of Metaphorizing the World
Pars Pro Toto or *Intra Pro Extra*

Abstract: What experiences can be referred to when attempting to familiarize metaphorically oneself with the nature (essence) of the world? What is the source of thus emerging metaphors? The author suggests that there are two possible strategies of metaphorical representing the world as a whole: 1) *pars pro toto*, 2) *intra pro extra*. In other words, the source of metaphors can be either a more familiar part of outer reality or a dominant manner of experiencing oneself. Furthermore, the author introduce a distinction between two types of metaphorical language: 1) an intentional use of lexical constructions treated by user as metaphors, 2) a metaphorical expression of something without a conscious realization that a conventional metaphor is being used instead of a specific description.

Concluding, the author considers the consequences of an "intra pro extra" hypothesis, as well as the possibility of its empirical verification; either in the case of individual differences or between-culture comparisons. He suggests that in some circumstances we experience ourselves more as "I am my body" while in others, we concentrate on the mental aspect of our existence, "I am my mind." This dominant manner of experiencing oneself may pass onto a preferred way of metaphorizing entire reality.

Keywords: world metaphors; recognized and unrecognized metaphors; dominant way of experiencing oneself.

Introduction

It is said that every epoch has its favorite, somewhat imposing metaphor that is used in acquainting and explaining other, less familiar cognitive phenomena, events or objects. It also happens to be used in cognitively familiarizing the world (the universe, nature, reality) as a whole. Some metaphors, like philosophical concepts, come back in cyclic rhythm in slightly altered linguistic apparel that is adjusted to the style of the epoch. Generally, the changes mainly concern ways in which they are articulated, more as Chomsky's 'surface structure' rather than 'deep structure'. Later on in the text we will recall a few repetitive ways of metaphorizing and conceptualizing the world. This will allow the spectrum of background references to be widened each time we encounter the word 'world' (the universe) or when we try to state something about reality as a whole.

And this is where we encounter some difficulty. We usually reach for a metaphor to make a less know or at least less acquainted object more cognitively familiar by confronting it with a more known object from a different, contextually limited area of reality. It can be said that we are attempting to cognitively render a less known part of

reality by partially equating it with a better known, better understood part of reality. The author's interest, however, lies in a slightly different type of situation. Such an instance occurs when a proposed metaphor makes reality or, if one prefers, a crucial aspect of the world, more familiar as a whole. Colloquially, the whole of reality is usually called the world or the universe. Sometimes we refer to other integral terms such as 'nature'. According to a metaphor circulated since the Renaissance, it is the goal of the educated to "decipher the book of nature" (Pederson 1992).

Some Advantages and Less Obvious Consequences of Using Metaphors

The metaphor is an inseparable element of every natural language and a condition of effective communication and should be therefore considered in a multidimensional way. It can be examined in an only cognitive aspect and comprehended in an analytical way by concentrating on its formal aspects. The metaphor can also be treated more globally as a sort of vehicle that is useful in transporting sizeable amounts of knowledge and reaching beyond already acquired information. With the help of an adequately chosen metaphor, we can quickly compensate a deficit of specific knowledge or personal experiences of the interlocutor by referring to something that he, himself, had an opportunity to experience or something that he happens to know (or at least thinks he/she knows).

A new, formulated *ad hoc*, metaphor can attract attention and prevail the receiver to move onto a different, deeper level of processing information that is entangled in a dialog or narrative context. It can shift our attention to something that has been, up till now, in the 'deep' background, making it into a 'figure', i.e. a central element of our field of perception or of the transmitted message. What is more, by changing the relation between the figure and the background we change the meaning and evaluation of the given event, situation, person or object.

The role of the metaphor isn't limited to cognitive-communicative or aesthetic functions even in their broadest sense. 'In the hands of' (sic) an experienced user, it can have many more specific, less obvious functions. Adequately smuggled metaphors can be important elements of therapeutic influence, largely independent of the therapists' declared theoretical orientations (Barker 1997). The usage of specifically generated metaphors or story elements is a kind of noninvasive message. As it neither induces resistance nor provokes intellectualization, it reaches out to the patient enriching his inner resources with additional elements of procedural knowledge and helping him/her cope with difficulties. Some authors even argue against narrowing the concept of a metaphor to lexical constructions or verbal communication. And so, Broom (2002) suggests the term 'somatic metaphor' for situations when psychosomatic symptoms of the patient appear to be particularly congruent with a subjective interpretation of the problem by the patient and his/her behavior.

Metaphors undoubtedly refer to the imagination and imagination in turn refers to and takes advantage of sensory information. As a result, it's hard to overestimate the role of the metaphor in language and communication, as it enable us to connect

the sensory data base and the generative function of language in the most direct way. One can risk the argument that in culture, the lexical constructions that are most successfully replicated anchor strongly in imagination; they have easy access to a more or less universal sensory data base. As a result, the function of the metaphor appears to be not limited to cognitive or epistemological consequences, but is also responsible for the shape of socially shared ontological decisions, mainly spontaneous. Metaphors suggest in a psychologically persuasive (although not necessarily logically correct) way that something does or does not exist, how it exists or where the boundaries of different ways of existence are drawn.

Language co-creates the image of the world that is perceived by us. According to K. Mudyń (1997), language isn't secondary to experience because it doesn't just describe physical and social reality—it takes part in creating an interpretation of it from the start. Language is the way of cognitively controlling and structuring experiences. Each linguistic description is the beginning of interpretation. Usually, we call a description a habitual way of interpretation which is not accompanied by the consciousness of making such an interpretation. Consequently, language depicts what is real for specific people. The mere existence of a given word may lead to the belief that there also exists something in the real world that it refers to.

It can be expected that socially shared metaphors particularly influence the most abstract and least known aspects of reality. Such an abstract concept, among others, is time. There are doubts as to whether remaining in the realm of a given natural language, allows us to talk about time in a other than metaphoric way. *Tempus fugit*. But can time really (literally speaking) slip away or lapse? And can one literally have or loose time?

As we know, words often are misleading. Metaphors even more often than not. Being used by demagogic speakers they are dangerous tools which can strongly influence our attitudes and believes system. So, there is one of the reasons to analyze metaphors and differentiate them from more neutral ways of description.

Recognized and Unrecognized Metaphors

First, let us distinguish two quite different ways of usage of the metaphorical statements. We can use a given metaphor: 1) being aware that the figure of speech (used by us or a sender) has a metaphoric character and that we are dealing with only a certain estimation or analogy, or 2) believing that we are simply referring to an adequate description, despite that we are, in fact, making a use of a metaphoric expression borrowed from the description of a different area of reality.

Due to cognitive and behavioral consequences, these are two quite different situations. It can also be said that two types of metaphors are used: *recognized* (as metaphors) and *unrecognized*.

In agreement with Georg Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1989), metaphors are omnipresent in our lives. This is true not only for colloquial language, but also for science. In a later, theoretically inspiring work (Lakoff, Johnson 1999), the authors come to

conclusion that "Abstract concepts are largely metaphorical." Most importantly, we often use metaphors without realizing it. From the perspective of socially created reality, the role of unrecognized metaphors and their power over the user's mind is much greater than in the case of metaphors that are intentionally used (due to communicativeness or demagogy), despite full knowledge that they are only metaphors. In the case of the latter, we use the right expression selectively (not habitually), intentionally (and not involuntarily), rather reflectively than spontaneously. We can discard it at any time and substitute it with a different, more adequate expression that takes into account the purpose of the communication as well as the cognitive abilities of the receiver of the message.

However, in the first instance, the metaphor simply becomes a representation of a given element or aspect of reality. What is more, when it becomes an unquestionable representation, it starts to be identified with the 'real description' of reality, i.e. reality in itself. We can, in some instances, in fact discern 'the map from the territory', but contrary to appearances this isn't all that simple.[1] The task becomes easy only when we get hold of two maps (representations) of a given territory and, what is more, if we know that we're dealing with one and the same territory, despite contrary claims from the maps in our possession. We should also ask ourselves: What happens when we've never been in a given territory and our only source of information is just one map? If, as opposed to Mr. Hopkins, we've never been inside an atom (Gamow 1951), we have nothing left to do, but believe in its planetary structure. This is, of course, under the condition that this is the only model of an atom that we've had the opportunity to be acquainted with.

Generally, it's hard to resist the notion that "unrecognized metaphors" are difficult to overestimate, building blocks of our "visions of the world," i.e. our personal ontological orientations.

Let's also notice that "unrecognized metaphors" can be discussed from an outside (meta)observer's point of view or *ex post*, i.e. already after being recognized by its ex-user. Metaphorization is not only the constructional property of the natural language, but also the relation of the user to the applied figure of speech.[2] In psychology, for example, we can meet such term as "psychological mechanisms" or "defense mechanism." For some psychologists (representing humanistic or transpersonal psychology trends) this term is only an unfortunate metaphor, while for others (e.g. for neo-behaviorists) it serves as a precise description.

Dan Sperber (1994), referring to Fodor's modular conception of the mind, claims the existence of a separate, specific subsystem called the 'meta-representation module'. In contrast to other modules that "process concepts and representations of things" this one "processes concepts of concepts and representations of represen-

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[1] I refer to Alfred Korzybski's famous statement—"The map is not the territory," which became one of the operating assumptions of Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP).

[2] Let's recall here Joseph R. Royce's three epistemological styles: rational, empirical, and metaphorical. It appears especially significant that, as the author underlines, they decide not only on the style of filtering, coding, and processing of information, but also on different criteria that each is valued on (Royce & Mos, 1980). Positive correlations were found between metaphorical styles and aesthetic, social and religious values.

tations" (Sperber 1994, p. 60, see also Sperber 1997). Concurring with the author, it's thanks to this meta-cognition that we take a reflective attitude toward representations without believing them, i.e. without ascribing to them the status of facts. In other words, we can analyze and comment these meta-representations without treating them as descriptions of facts, as a description of something real—in the conventional sense of the word. Regardless of the fact whether we call Sperber's mechanism a specific module or rather an additional non-modular device, it's meta-knowledge, i.e. cognitive representations of (at least) the second order, that undoubtedly allow for a selective, intentional use of lexical constructions as metaphors.

Therefore, a practical and empirical question arises—how can we discern and assure ourselves, that the construction (considered by us to be a metaphor) that was used by a given person, was applied in that particular function? In other words, how to empirically discern when a given expression is a recognized metaphor for the user and when it functions as a description?

In an operational sense, we can acknowledge that the person uses the given expression in a metaphoric sense if he/she can easily point out a different context for using a crucial part of that same predicate, in which it appears in a quite different and—what's important—more concrete or more original meaning.

In such an operational way of defining metaphoric expressions, the line between metaphoric and literal expressions becomes clearer. We start then to distinguish the omnipresence of metaphors in our and other people's statements. In a certain sense, the mere concept of a metaphor becomes relative. The procedure mentioned above can be also used as a special kind of linguistic exercises, which make us—as I could repeatedly observe—more sensitive to the metaphorical side of language and its cognitive consequences. In a sense, such a procedure forces the user of a given expression to temporarily distance himself/herself towards it, to apply the second perceptual position (Dilts, DeLozier 2000) in the NLP (Neuro-Lingiustic Programming) sense.

For example, is the expression 'high income' a metaphor? In light of the proposed operational definition the answer is yes. We can suppose—following the operational definition—that before the concept of 'high income' came to be, the adjective 'high' referred to the dimensions of physical space. We can suppose that the term 'high tree' came earlier and that height in relation to a tree means, nonetheless, something different. Let us consider another example. We can say that a given encyclopedia is a good source of knowledge and information. Following this proposed procedure we should ask ourselves if there is another context where 'source' would be understood in a more concrete (specific) way and would be likely in earlier use. We can realize that 'source of water' fulfills very well these requirements. If so, we conclude that 'source of information' is a secondary and, in the above sense, a metaphorical expression.

The suggested procedure can be treated as a useful tool in gaining distance to expressions in the native language, in which we have been submerged since ever. With the help of an exercise in finding other, i.e. literal meanings of all sorts of linguistic expressions included in a given text, we can successfully free ourselves of linguistic dominance in the course of our cognitive processes. We can separate, to

a considerable degree, the content of our representations and cognitive processes from the habitually used form of our lexical constructions.

Metaphorizing Reality. Some Doubts and Difficulties

It appears justifiable to use metaphors taken from those areas that seem more cognitively penetrated or at least more "tamed," to familiarize oneself with the nature of reality (as a whole). In order to cognitively become familiar with something we don't really know very well, we have to make avail of some source of inspiration; we have to refer to something that is, or at least appears to be, more known or more familiar.

For the sake of further argumentation, the concept part-whole will be useful. Let's notice, on the side, that we've grown accustomed to saying and thinking about reality in the single case.[3] If there is one reality, then it must have a systemic character; its parts should be interconnected, integrated. And so, we would have to deal with two categories, i.e. reality –as-a-whole and different parts of it, understood as "something real."

Such a distinction seems useful for a number of reasons. If we tried to talk about metaphorizing reality without this distinction, then one could ask with due reason: Is there something which we'd know better than reality? And what could this be? For only such an assumption could fully justify using, in the form of a metaphor, something that is more familiar, to understand something that is less familiar. However, in connection with the former distinction, it could be simply said that sometimes a part of some whole is more familiar than the entire whole. Incidentally, attempts to explain something that is rather unfamiliar by referring to something that is even less familiar, but sounds good and evokes more "precise" associations or connotations, are not rare. Sometimes it can even be inspiring. It can flourish into a fleeting (and usually groundless) sense of understanding, or—what is more important—produces an additional portion of meta-knowledge, clarifying one's own ignorance, e.g. lengthening the list of questions which we know that we can't answer satisfactorily.

Let's also notice that merely talking about reality understood as a whole, is a troublesome task and not entirely achievable, since it puts the narrator in a paradoxical situation. A well understood whole of reality should also contain a subject which describes it (observes it, reports about it, etc.). This is not really possible, at least without changing perspective, i.e. within the confines of one cognitive act. Usually we deal with this inconsistency by trying to talk about reality (as a whole), meaning so called outer reality, i.e. all of reality with the exception of oneself.[4] In other words, when we concentrate on observing, we forget about the observer. When we concentrate on

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[3] This doesn't mean, that talking about reality in the plural sense as 'realities' is considered unjustified. This is quite to the contrary. Nonetheless, for now, we remain in a more conventional conceptualization suggesting that there is one reality. Everyday language corresponds rather with the monistic standpoint. We therefore use this perspective for further discussion.

[4] In some cases it leads to contradictions. As in the classic Epimenides Paradox. Epimenides, being a Cretan, claims that "All Cretans are liars." Isn't he telling the truth?

the painting we forget about the painter; when we concentrate on the narration, the narrator, etc.

In that case, do we know anything better than our outer reality? At a time when introspective psychology was flourishing, many authors would probably tend to defend the argument that we know our own consciousness better than outer reality. If that were so, than exploiting what we know about consciousness for metaphorizing the outside world could be treated as a good metaphor of reality as a whole. Nowadays, it is much harder for such optimism. Thanks to Freud, we readily think of our consciousness as "the tip of the iceberg." Nowadays, more than 100 years later, we become aware that human consciousness is far from being the most explored scope or aspect of reality.

Maybe a metaphor of reality could be something fictional, something unreal? Maybe it's what the more nominalistic authors (e.g. Hans Vaihinger, comp. Bertallanfy 1975) tended to regard solely as a useful type of fiction? It's also a well known fact that science readily uses so called idealizations. Physics, for example, uses concepts like 'ideal void' or 'ideal black body', which doesn't mean that physicists expect to find objects that are designates of these concepts in nature. And even though this direction of reasoning (to explain what is real by what is, in fact, considered unreal), appears quite interesting, it won't be continued here. Two other directions of exploration will, however, be signaled.

Metaphorizing Reality as *pars pro toto* Replacing

It can be supposed that there are at least two possible ways of spontaneously (involuntarily) metaphorizing reality. The first kind of metaphorizing is carried out *pars pro toto*—the most cognitively tamed and penetrated by practical activity *part* of reality becomes involuntarily a metaphor of the *entire* reality. In other words, the most familiar *part* starts to function as a model (analogy, metaphor) in relation to a less familiar and more complex *whole*. And in this way, by attributing this or that part—raised to the rank of a universal law—to the whole reality, it (the world) was and is treated in various ways. Here are some repetitive ways of metaphorizing it.

The machine (in a typical 18th and 19th century understanding).

The term 'mechanisms of personality development' or 'defense mechanisms' are chips of this metaphor, transcribed into 'gears and cogs of the social machine', 'motors of progress', 'breaks of change' or 'gears' and a 'fly-wheel of the economy'. Eugene Dupler's statement, that moral standards function as the "smear" in social machinery, fits into the same convention. Maybe even the popular belief in academic circles that each concept can and should be precisely defined, is also embedded in a metaphor of a 'precise machine'. As we know, in the 17th century, Gottfried W. Leibniz used a mechanical metaphor of simultaneously wound up clocks to explain the order of events in the world without referring to casual relations. At the same time, Julien O. de La Mettrie tried to make human nature more familiar also by referring to an analogy of a machine.

The organism or a living system. Comparing a society or a country to an organism is a frequently repeated metaphor. In the 19th century it was exploited e.g. by Herbert Spencer, and in some sense also (which is rarely remembered) in the later, meta-physical works of Gustav T. Fechner, who argued that everything has a soul (comp. Fechner 1861). Today, it returns in the form of our earth's ecological problems. For representatives of 'deep ecology', treating the our Planet as a living organism, it is, of course, not a metaphor, but an accurate description. The same goes for representatives of the general systems theory (Bertalanffy 1975) or stronger versions of the systemic approach. What is important, is that each time we think of the world as an organism, we give testament to the conviction that reality is something well organized and integrated, and like in an organism where there are no redundant organs, every-thing is important, not coincidental and not meaningless for the functioning of the whole (comp. Bugiarello 2000; Talbot 1991).

The process of change—physical, biological, social, spiritual (Hegel), material, and mental change. Dialectical and historical materialism of Karl Marks seems to be matched to this perspective. Heraklit's "Nothing is the same except change" statement represents this standpoint very well. Its corresponds, to some extent, with evolutionary way of thinking.

Mystery or 'terra incognita'. Mystery as a metaphor often appears in a religious context. We often talk about the 'mystery of faith'. Holy attributes are, of their nature, impossible to completely comprehend and are therefore a mystery. Treating reality as something naturally mysterious also corresponds well with all other versions of agnosticism. Reality, considered from this point of view is, most of all, something un-known and (in essence) inscrutable. In the European cultural tradition it is reminded to us by Immanuel Kant's *Ding an sich*. Emil Dubois Reimond (1898), on the other hand, stated this in the shortest way possible—*Ignoramus et ignorabimus*. Similarly, Jean Lacroix in his *History and Mystery* (1966) considers the 'riddle of the world' and 'mystery of person'. He also quotes Blaise Pascal who, in one of his letters wrote: "Everything conceals some mystery. Everything is a curtain that conceals God" (after Lacrois *op. cit.*, p. 125).

Metaphorizing Reality as an Intra *pro extra* Replacing

The second way of metaphorzing reality would require the acceptance of a condition which may be resisted by the 'lazy common sense'. It should be assumed that the most tamed scope of our experience is our most subjective reality and is located in the subject itself. This is a step towards a constructivist approach. Let's observe that, for a lot of people, God exists somewhere high and far away, usually above the world or at least somewhere outside of it. God has always existed, or at least has since time immemorial. One way or another, it's usually assumed that his (or their, i.e. Gods) existence is something primary in relation to one's own individual existence or to human's existence as a species. However, a contradictory thesis subscribed to Euhemerus (IV–III B.C.) states that people are the ones that create Gods (some-

what in their image and likeness) and are not themselves products of God's creation (Winiarczyk 2002, Littlewood 1998). I don't intend to discuss religious and worldview subjects here. Freedom of conscience and religion is constitutionally guaranteed and the rule *cuius regio eius religio* thankfully no longer applies, rather.

Nonetheless, Euhemer's position appears to be interesting in the context of searching for an answer to the question: What could be a metaphor for an integral reality? Is it possible to defend the argument that the outside world is in some sense created by ourselves, in our own image and likeness? Pawluczuk's (1991) reasoning leads in the similar direction when he writes about centering the human subject, to whom "the world is assigned to. This everyday existence humanizes the world in a specific way" (1991: 20). The author selects the following ways of 'humanizing' the world: the world as our property, as our work, as an area for a game, and as logos.

It's not hard to find signs of anthropomorphism (reflecting the *Zeitgeist* or spirit of the time), not only towards animals and visitors from other planets, but also towards Godly attributes that change according to the epoch and culture.[5] Let us notice, the God of the Old Testament is commanding, just yet ruthless while the God of the New Testament is merciful and loving. The Greek gods residing atop Olympus were—without a doubt—very human, although not very generous—a lot of their time was consumed by love affairs, intrigues and power struggles, offended ambitions and revenge. Let's notice also that in "Close Encounters of the Third Kind," the visitors from space, despite of Steven Spilberg's imagination and stage designer's efforts, remain humanlike.

One way or another, besides being able to experience the outside world, each one of us experiences ourselves in some way. Let's consider—and not many people would like to question this—that each one of us is in some sense a 'psychophysical being'. Let's add to this the assumption that individual differences are present and that an individual is inter-situation changeable in different circumstances. In a declarative sense, regardless of one's own psychophysical state and circumstances, we can stubbornly stand our ground by a once accepted conviction despite what we experience here and now.[6] This doesn't change the fact that we experience ourselves differently, and sometimes even very diversely, in different situations. In a state of physical exertion and lowered mental activity, we are more likely to answer the question "Who are you?" with the answer "I am my body." In a contrasting situation, i.e. when our body is silent and the so called mind easily creates new visions, the more probable answer, in Platonic fashion, would be "I am the mind (soul) that rules over the body," and to some extent also over its own world. However, in the course of action, which demands using one's psychophysical abilities to an equal degree, the answer "I am

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[5] Back in the time, Ivan P. Pavlov accused Wolfgang Köhler of anthropomorphizing apes in his work when describing chimpanzees' problem solving. Frankly speaking, when we try to describe animals' mental activity possibilities are limited. We can choose the lesser evil—we either personify their mental activity or ignore it. In fact, we have only two rich natural language domains, one is for describing people and the second is for describing things.

[6] This difficulty has, mainly, an empirical character—how to 'slip past' the subject's beliefs to discover some specifics as to what he/she is experiencing at the given moment (even if it remains contradictory to his/her fixed conviction).

the mind-body unity" best corresponds with the actual experience of the self and of one's own existence.

It can be assumed that different people prefer different types of activities and that different activities get people involved to different degrees, as a result of individual preferences or outside circumstances. In other words, it can be assumed that the three above mentioned types of experiences happen to people in different proportions. Even if in a strictly theoretical (or declarative) sense, not many people would feel a need to dispute over the mind-body unity of themselves or of humankind in general, a presumption remains nonetheless justified that some experience themselves more often as a 'physical unity', others as a 'mental unity', and only a third of us as a 'mind-body unity'. And considering that it's possible to concentrate and feel one's 'physicality' without feeling its unity, as also with experiencing one's 'mentality', the thesis itself can be simplified—some people experience their somatic physicality more frequently and in a stronger sense while others their mentality. Others still, may experience both aspects of their activity simultaneously and in equal amounts.

If these three types of people, selected due to their dominant manner of experiencing themselves, are persuaded or provoked to step onto a higher level of abstraction and are asked, "What can reality as a whole be?" or "What is reality first and foremost," then it could be supposed that for the first type of people, reality is firstly *matter*; for the second type—an *idea* (spirit, mind, cosmic consciousness). In regards to the third type, the spectrum of preferred philosophical positions appears to be wider, but the observed preferences are not coincidental. Maybe it would concern positions coming close to monism (for 'unity' seems stronger here) by various ways of overcoming dualism. Maybe pantheistic visions of the world could count on good resonance and acceptance here.

By analyzing the specifics of folklore and depicting the relations its members have with the world, Włodzimierz Pawluczuk (1978) comes to the following conclusion:

Generally speaking, folk ontology appears to be based on the conviction that all objects in the world have a substantial character and that a mental element resides in all things. Hence, religious and philosophical dualism—the division of the world into nature and supernatural forces, into the world of matter and idea—is not justified on the grounds of folk mentality. (Pawluczuk, 1978: 55).

In connection with this, the question of the specificity of experiencing oneself arises in the case of authors who, on a theoretical basis, postulate the idea of "multiple realities" (Chwistek 1921/61), "alternate realities" (LeShan 1976) or "multiple possible words" (Levis 1986). William James's (1880) idea of "microworlds" should also be mentioned here, as well as many pluralistic conceptualizations of reality in present sociology. Additionally, H. Maturana (1988), the author of the autopoietic systems conception, proposes that the term *universum* be substituted with *multiversa*. According to Krzysztof Mudyń (2007), if other people's subjective realities interest us and if we try to explore them empirically, than it's best to think of reality as a modality, as something gradual. And henceforth, instead of inquiring "What is reality really like," we can ask "What is more real for you—X, Y, or Z."

Some Consequences; Is it Verifiable?

In search of the source of metaphors of reality, I tried to justify the thesis that the function of a metaphor of an integral reality can be achieved by its most cognitively tamed part. However, the second source of metaphorizing the nature of reality can be the predominant manner of experiencing oneself by a given individual. It appears that this way of reasoning can lead to quite interesting consequences.

The hypothesis, articulated above, on the relation of preferred ontological standpoints and the dominant manner of experiencing oneself should be confronted with empirical studies. The task doesn't look easy, although it is achievable to some extent. First of all, an additional question should be asked, "What factors or circumstances can influence the manner in which you experience yourself? We can look for these factors on a macro scale, i.e. in between-group or between-cultural comparisons as well as by concentrating on individual or within-situational differences. We can start by comparing cultures or by changing situations (in maximum controlled experimental conditions) to influence how one experiences oneself. From the assumption that most of us don't want to negate that we are psychophysical (mind-body) beings, we can try to find out, e.g. to what extent a given person experiences him/herself as a bodily (physical) or mental being in particular experimental conditions. We can expect that, e.g. intense fatigue or pain accompanying a somatic illness enhances experiencing our physicality and changes the proportions in the auto-perception of both aspects of ourselves and, in consequence, influences the answer to the question, "To what degree do I now feel like the body and to what extent like the mind."

If we widen our scope of searching and change our perspective to a more global one, we face the question what factors, e.g. lifestyle or type of close environment, can influence the way we experience ourselves. Can extended contact with machines and physical objects (also products) lead to the same consequences as interacting with other people or nature? Keeping the mechanism of internalization in mind, constantly being around machines or merchandise may cause us to treat ourselves like products or machines. In this context, the term "sense of connectivity with nature," which the authors understand as "a perception of sameness between the self, others, and the natural world" (Dutchner et al. 2007: 474), seems very promising. Considering the fact that the term was operationalized by the authors in the form of a questionnaire, it would be interesting to check whether individuals who deal with the artificial on a daily basis have just as strong a connectivity with nature as people who daily interact with animated nature. In an indirect way, this could shed new light on the relation between lifestyle and living conditions, and experiencing manner and metaphorizing (conceptualizing) the world as a whole.

Last years we have started to realize better and better, that all our cognition is somehow embodied. One may say also that our bodies are grounded or immersed in different, specific environments. It is understandable that our embodied experiences of typical, everyday situations can establish frames of reference of the entire reality. Antonio Damasio, the neuroscientist, presents it as follows:

The body, as represented in the brain, may constitute the indispensable frame of reference for neural processes that we experience as the mind; that our very organism rather than some absolute external reality is used as the ground reference for the constructions we make of the world around us and for the construction of the ever-present sense of subjectivity that is part and parcel of experiences; that our most refined thoughts and best actions, our greatest joys and deepest sorrows, use the body as a yardstick (Damasio 1994: xvi.).

Concluding Remarks

Summing up, sources of inspiration and possible conditionings of different ways of metaphorically shaping the world were sought in the text. It was stressed that the process undergoes cognitive control only to some degree, i.e. we do not always see the difference between a metaphorical way of speaking and a literal description. A hypothesis was advanced that, apart from a more obvious way of depicting reality based on the *pars pro toto* rule, the source of metaphors depicting reality as a whole may be the predominant manner of experiencing oneself—either as a physical or mental (spiritual) being. It can also be expected that the way a person experiences oneself may be connected, to some extent, to the individual's dominant form of everyday activity and the nature of his/her relations with their close environment. We suppose that this point of view leads to further, interesting questions and could inspire more sophisticated hypotheses that could be empirically explored.

Regardless of further theoretical consequences and implications, the presented paper can be treated as the contribution to a very basic question: In what way and to what degree do we create our subjective worlds. Whereas on a practical level it sensitizes us to those communication aspects, which take place in the "far background" and are hard to talk and think about, and which finally determine our communicating efforts. This is especially important when the interlocutor's 'default' view of the world is very different from our own—treated as something obvious and universal. We easily forget or underestimate these differences. It seems that, especially regarding contacts among cultures, the first question we should ask is: How different is my interlocutor's view of the world from my own? Good communication is not only a matter of abstract and instrumentally understood language. To have a 'common language' means in fact to share with somebody a 'common ontology'. If this doesn't occur or is impossible, the only 'salvation' appears to be (meta)knowledge about the differences that separate us. We can experience just how much cross-cultural views and ways of conceptualization and metaforizing reality can differ while reading "Ontology of Consciousness. Percipient Action" (Wautischer 2008).

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Biographical Note: Krzysztof Mudyń, Ph.D. Associate Professor at the Institute of Applied Psychology, Jagiellonian University, chair of the Department of Basic Exploration in Psychology. Author of, among

other, *O granicach poznania. Między wiedzą, niewiedzą i antywiedzą* [On Limits of Cognition. Between Knowledge, Lack of Knowledge and Anti-Knowledge]; *Zdarza się, że myślimy…* [It Happens We Think…]; *W poszukiwaniu prywatnych orientacji ontologicznych. Psychologiczne badania nad oceną realności desygnatów pojęć* [Searching for Private Ontological Orientations. Psychological Exploration on Reality of References of the Terms Assessment].

Address: E-mail: krzysztof.mudyn@uj.edu.pl