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Politics and Trust in the South Caucasus, and in East and West Europe

Abstract: Trust in political actors is currently low in all parts of Europe and the former Soviet Union. This paper proceeds by presenting recent evidence from the EU27 and the South Caucasus, and explores differences in levels of trust towards different political actors, between socio-demographic groups, and between countries. The differences are around generally low levels of trust. It is argued that this lack of trust needs to be set in the contexts of economic globalisation having widened inequalities while disempowering national politicians, and the absence of effective political checks on politicians' actions. Throughout the analysis, contrasts are drawn between the relatively mature democracies of the west and the new democracies of Eastern Europe. The paper concludes by suggesting why, in certain regions, trust has been most easily maintained or restored in relatively undemocratic political systems and actors.

Keywords: democracy, globalisation, politics, social class, South Caucasus, trust.

Introduction

Corruption (real or imagined), private interests taking precedence in public life, and lack of trust in politicians (discussed in some detail below) are all symptoms of an underlying problem. This is that democratic practices no longer work in the textbook manner. Although governments are responsible to parliaments and/or presidents who are elected by the people, the latter, the general public, do not feel that their own interests and wishes normally take precedence or that they can exercise effective control over elected representatives. The following passages insist that these feelings truly reflect present-day realities.

The great age of European democracies was during the era of strong labour movements—trade unions which supported and often created parties of the left, while those who felt threatened (the right) mobilised in response. All parties were able to record successes at different times. After 1945 the parties of the left in West European countries created social market economies and the strongest welfare states (outside the communist bloc) that the world has ever known. That was then. We are now living in new times. In some ways the new market economies/democracies are still catching up, but in other respects their politics exhibit features that are developing more slowly in the older, more mature democracies of Western Europe and North America.

Exposing gaps between the theory and practice of democracy has never been difficult. In the 1950s the American sociologist C. Wright Mills claimed that the USA was run by a power elite of leading politicians, top industrialists and the military. Marxists have always insisted that in capitalist societies real power inevitably resides with the wealthy who are aided by compliant politicians and civil servants, the military, the police, the judiciary, and the media (for example, see Miliband 1969). How any political system works will always depend on the inter-relationships between government, the economy and society, and the following passages explore these current relationships. A symptom of a current democratic deficit is voters' low trust in their elected politicians. Why is trust so low? The following passages seek an explanation in contemporary configurations of the global market economy, national political processes, and worker-citizens and voters.

We proceed below with evidence from the EU27 then the South Caucasus, noting similarities and differences between and within the countries. We then note some overall differences between the relatively mature democracies of Western Europe and North America on the one hand, and the newer democracies of former communist countries on the other. It is argued that some differences between the operation of democracy in West and East Europe are explicable in terms of the latter systems' immaturity, but that in other instances the more recent arrivals in the democratic family have leapt ahead.

Losing Trust

A 2006 survey of representative samples from all countries in the EU27 found that most citizens in most countries 'tended not to trust' their elected representatives. Local governments and local politicians were the most trusted. Over 60% of the EU population tended not to trust their own national parliaments and governments, over 70% tended not to trust their countries' political parties, but only 42% felt similarly about their local councils (see Table I). Levels of trust varied between countries. At the time of this survey (2006) Denmark was Europe's most trusting country: only 19% of its citizens trusted none of the institutions in Table I. Poland was Europe's least trusting country: 81% trusted none of the institutions.

Table I

EU 27: percentages of populations who 'tended not to trust'

Council of city/village	42
National parliament	61
National government	62
Political parties	73

Respondents were presented with a forced choice between 'tend to trust', 'tend not to trust' and 'don't know'.

Source: European Commission (2007).

In the new democracies of East-Central Europe and the former Soviet Union, the typical attitude of young people towards politics and politicians is cynicism (Roberts 2009; Roberts et al. 2000). Young people may be highly interested, and may hold strong views on political issues, but disengage from formal politics. The overwhelmingly majority view is that politicians are serving their self-interests rather than the interests of electors (see, for example, Dafflon 2009). This view is not uncommon among young people in Western Europe, but it is even more widespread in the newer democracies.

It is not only politicians who are not trusted. The 2009 Data Initiative Survey among representative samples from the three South Caucasus countries (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) asked respondents to indicate their levels of trust in a list of institutions on a five-point scale ranging from 'fully distrust' to 'fully trust'. This survey found that few fully trusted banks, the education or health systems, the media, NGOs, the police or courts. The most trusted institutions were religious institutions and the armies. The presidents enjoyed little more trust than other politicians in Armenia and Georgia, but here Azerbaijan was exceptional: 64% 'fully trusted' their president (see Table II). A cautionary note is required here. In Azerbaijan respondents may hesitate before criticising their country's president even in surveys where their anonymity has been assured.

Table II
Trust (in percentages)

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Georgia
<i>Fully trust:</i>			
Religious institutions	58	46	65
Army	61	53	43
President	17	64	22
PM and ministers	10	25	10
Parliament	7	21	9
Ombudsman	15	13	18
Local government	15	18	11
Police	10	16	21
Court system	7	13	8
Education system	15	18	19
Health system	15	14	15
Banks	17	16	17
NGOs	7	13	10
Media	7	14	10
<i>N=</i>	<i>1487</i>	<i>1268</i>	<i>1407</i>

Source: Data Initiative Survey 2009.

Azerbaijan's post-independence presidents have never permitted meaningful opposition. On most indices, Azerbaijan would be judged the least democratic of the three South Caucasus countries. Suppression of legitimate political opposition in Azerbaijan is said to create risks of disaffection being channelled through religion (the spread of radical Islam) (Cornell 2006; Fuller and Bakir 2007). However, the higher trust rating of the Azerbaijan president compared with his counterparts in

Armenia and Georgia invites the question as to just how popular democracy can be if relatively democratic politicians are not trusted. In Azerbaijan the respondents in the 2009 survey were more likely to feel that domestic politics in their country was going in the right direction, and that they were treated fairly by their government, than respondents in Armenia and Georgia (see Table III).

Table III
Views on fairness (in percentages)

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Georgia
Domestic politics is going, or definitely going in the right direction	36	44	39
Agree or strongly agree that people like me are treated fairly by the government	24	56	43
<i>N</i> =	1543	1474	1398

Source: Data Initiative Survey 2009.

The 2009 Data Initiative Survey presented its respondents with a forced choice. Did they believe that ‘the government should take care of the people like a parent’ or that ‘the people should control the government’? In Georgia opinion was evenly split, but in Armenia and Azerbaijan there were clear majorities for the ‘parent’ option (see Table IV). In all three countries, ‘People should control the government’ was most likely to be favoured by the university-educated middle classes. Table V divides the pooled samples according to whether respondents were higher education graduates (Ed), whether they were employed or self-employed at the time of the survey (Emp), and whether they were relatively affluent (Affl) or poor according to whether their reported monthly incomes were up to or above \$250. Inspecting the differences between the responses in Table V shows that it was education rather than income levels and whether or not people had jobs that was making the greatest difference to their political orientations. It was the highly educated, who were the most likely to be in non-manual jobs, typically in the public sectors, and based in the capital cities, who were the most discontent about the lack of genuine democracy in their countries.

Table IV
Views on the role of government (in percentages)

Preferred role of government	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Georgia
Take care of people like a parent	75	60	46
People should control government	23	35	47
<i>N</i> =	1822	1517	1668

Source: Data Initiative Survey 2009.

There is a widespread demand for strong leaders in the ex-USSR. Putin has been popular among Russia’s youth who speak disparagingly about all other politicians

Table V
Views on the role of government (in percentages)

Role of gov	Ed, empl, poor	Ed, empl, affl	Emp, poor	Emp, affl	Ed, poor	Ed, affl	Poor	Affl	All
Take care of people like a parent	52	44	63	59	48	44	66	70	61
People should control gov	41	50	33	36	47	48	31	24	35
<i>N</i> =	<i>380</i>	<i>284</i>	<i>1164</i>	<i>285</i>	<i>514</i>	<i>26</i>	<i>2799</i>	<i>68</i>	<i>5520</i>

Source: Data Initiative Survey 2009.

(Dafflon 2009). In 2003, just prior to Georgia's Rose Revolution, over 80% of Georgians said that democracy had not proved effective and that the country needed a firm hand (Sumbadze and Trakhan-Mouravi 2003). In this context it can be difficult even for ideologically democratic politicians to govern democratically (see Broers 2005). Support for a strong authoritarian president in Azerbaijan could be a reaction to the conflict that swept the country between 1988 and 1993. In Armenia and Georgia support for this option must be set in the context of the countries' (usually) frozen conflicts. The authoritarian leaders of the other Central Asia states can point to Kyrgyzstan's experiences in 2005 (the Tulip Revolution) and again in April 2010 (the ousting of President Bakiyev) and June 2010 (ethnic riots in the south of the country). Earlier in 2010, prior to the above events in Kyrgyzstan, 91% of a representative sample in Kazakhstan expressed a favourable opinion of their President Nazarbayev while only 47% thought that democracy was definitely the right form of government for their country (Lillis 2010a). A poll in August 2010 found that people tended to regard the Kazakhstan president as the country's guarantor of stability, which was by then (following the 2010 events in neighbouring Kyrgyzstan) valued more highly than ever (Lillis 2010b). Maybe people everywhere will tend to opt for security over freedom if the choice has to be made, but how can we explain the currently fragile state of democracy in the EU's older member states (if the low levels of trust are a reliable guide)?

Losing Faith in Democracy: Globalisation and the Worker-Citizen

There are many dimensions to globalisation. Some have been operating for centuries. Most nations' security from external threats has always depended on their international relations—their ability to dominate weaker nations, or to gain the protection of a leviathan. NATO has expanded because at present there is no alternative that offers comparable security. Countries outwith this organisation are vulnerable unless they have their own nuclear shields.

Nowadays information (images, sounds and text) flow easily all around the world. Some governments may feel threatened, but their citizens are unlikely to object.

Locally sourced news and entertainment remain available for those who prefer them (majorities in most countries). There is also easier movement than ever before of people, goods and capital. Most countries now allow their citizens to leave without exit visas. The internal passports with which people needed to register and thereby obtain permission to relocate inside their own countries have been abolished in most ex-communist states. These new freedoms have been welcomed. People can and do use their new opportunities to travel, typically from poorer to richer regions, and from poorer to richer countries to work and earn, sometimes to study, and less frequently for leisure. Tourist flows are mainly in the opposite direction: from richer countries to poorer countries.

All these mobilities drain power from national governments, but none more so than the free movement of goods and capital. All countries are exposed to risk—most of all if they wish to trade and if they need to borrow. ‘Free trade’ in goods and capital, like all other free markets, needs rules, and the rules of the global market economy are currently drafted by the World Trade Organisation, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the G7/8/20, and the European Union. All countries that need to trade, to buy and sell internationally, are expected to fully open their domestic markets to international competition. ‘Markets decide’ whether, and if so how much, countries can afford to borrow. Loans are made with conditions attached which usually include governments balancing their own budgets, thereby protecting the value of inward investments. There are ex-communist countries where, under the old system, governments were expected and generally succeeded in creating jobs for all would-be workers, and were responsible for the living standards of their people. The global market place reduces the powers of national governments to guarantee anything. Whoever people vote for, whoever is elected to office, it can be global markets that really decide. This was demonstrated during 2010 in the PIGS quartet (Portugal, Greece, Italy and Spain), also subsequently in Iceland and Ireland.

Insulation from the effects of global flows is possible only for the largest and strongest countries—the USA and China, possibly Russia, and potentially the EU except that its states and their citizens are reluctant to pool the necessary sovereignty. Europe’s citizens identify themselves as Poles, Italians, Greeks, British and so on ahead of feeling European. Sixteen countries share a currency (the Euro) but most governments have been reluctant to submit their national budgets for prior approval to the European Central Bank or the European Commission. In the stronger European economies, primarily Germany, there is opposition to ‘bailing out’ weaker economies though their fates are conjoined by the currency that they share. Everywhere, popular protests are more likely to be directed at national politicians and governments than at European, trans-national institutions, though summits of the world’s leading economies can be relied on to provoke anti-globalisation demonstrations.

Globalisation is the context in which economic inequalities within countries have widened. This trend has been global, but the widening has been most dramatic in the relatively egalitarian (at the time) former communist countries. The benefits of growth (when and where this has occurred) have gone mainly to the top two-thirds, the top half, the top third, and usually most disproportionately of all to the top 10% and the top

1%. Governments are not directly responsible (though they are liable to be blamed). Explaining income inequalities is difficult even for economists. They have theories, but too many facts fail to fit. Governments feel unable to cap and tax: those threatened could take their business or draw their incomes in lower-tax regimes. Globalisation has created tax competition. Profits and taxable income move to where taxes are lowest. Rather than exceptions, the mineral-rich new independent states (mainly Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Turkmenistan) have experienced the steepest escalation in top incomes. Meanwhile, unemployment and under-employment are as widespread in these countries as anywhere else (see Roberts, 2009). The new market economies have joined the global market in an era where growth has ceased to automatically reduce unemployment or alleviate poverty. Governments' ability to intervene on behalf of the disadvantaged is compromised by the risk of incurring market-imposed penalties if they try to raise taxes on wealthier citizens and/or raise levels of spending on welfare and public sector employment.

Inter-country inequalities have not narrowed, but citizens in lower-income countries have become more aware of and sensitive to the scale of these inequalities. Hence the new migration flows. Ulrich Beck and Elizabeth Beck-Gernsheim (2009) claim that today's young people, wherever they are based, have an expectation of global equality. If Bulgarians are as well-qualified and work as hard as Germans, why should the former be paid less? The western way of life appeals to young people in all parts of the world. Cultural globalisation has made people aware of (or made them feel that they know about) this way of life. If it is out-of-reach at home, then huge numbers will travel to find it, thereby helping to spread economic precariousness into the richer countries.

This was not supposed to be an outcome of 'the transition'. When the existing EU member countries committed to eastward enlargement in 1991/92, they planned a long lead time during which, following shock-therapy market reforms, productivity in the candidate countries would rise towards western levels, and the countries would be able to afford the 'European social model'. Yet following accession in 2004, salaries in the new member states in Central Europe remained around or less than 40% of German rates in nominal terms, and 70% in terms of local purchasing power (Galgoczi et al. 2009). Hence the attraction of pendulum migration—earning in the west and returning to spend in the east.

People who are still under-employed, and others who are still poor, have become disillusioned. It has become difficult to maintain faith that all will be well when the countries' transitions are complete. The poor in East-Central Europe know that some of their fellow citizens have grown incredibly wealthy, and cannot understand how and why, except that it surely cannot have all been honest, the outcome of sheer ability and effort. A difference in the older market economies is that wide inequalities are familiar, unsurprising, and do not shock. Another difference is the anonymity of the rich in the west. In the new market economies the rich are known individuals—their names, faces and lifestyles. In contrast, most names of the richest people in Britain are not recognised by most citizens. Their faces would not be recognised on the street. Elite lifestyles are admired, shared by celebrities, and do not attract

opprobrium. Politicians are regarded differently. As in the new market economies, manifest affluence among political elites is read as evidence of corruption.

Losing Faith in Democracy: Politicians and the Voter-Citizen

In the mature western democracies, politicians are embedded in political parties, buffered by professional public administrators, and subject to the rule of law in ways that at least appear to separate public duties from private interests. Yet as explained below, these buffers and rules simultaneously legitimise ways of pursuing private interests on the ground that ‘no rules are broken’, which is liable to trigger an upward spiral in public cynicism.

Western politicians need parties. Voter loyalties are attached to parties rather than individual politicians. Aspirant politicians need to be adopted as candidates, and their long-term career prospects as politicians depend on retaining the support of their parties. Party members and/or officials scrutinise the conduct of elected representatives. Europe’s parties of the left were typically created by trade unions. Other parties began as caucuses of politicians, but today the main parties have histories that are longer than the careers of all living politicians. Parties have histories and policies that politicians are elected to implement.

Things are still different in the newer democracies of Eastern Europe. Current leaders were often responsible for creating their parties, which continue to exhibit high birth and death rates. In Poland the Law and Justice Party [Prawo i Sprawiedliwość], and Civic Platform [Platforma Obywatelska], each of which held office during the first decade of the 21st century, were both formed only in 2001. New parties may build up mass memberships rapidly (and lose them just as rapidly). Either way, these memberships are attracted by the leaders: the leaders are not produced by the members. It is still mainly the communist parties and their direct successors where the parties came first.

The most stable parties in former communist countries (apart from the communists) are the new parties of power, where these exist: for example, United Russia, the Party of the Regions (Ukraine), and Nur Otan (Kazakhstan). All these parties have large memberships. They are the real successors to the Soviet Communist Party. People may join for ideological reasons—to express support for the leader or pride in their country, but they may also join for career reasons. Membership is likely to be expected, and advisable, for anyone in or seeking public sector employment. These are examples of members being mobilised by leaders rather than the rank-and-file elevating and mandating the leaders.

Civil societies, populated by voluntary associations, are still fragile throughout Eastern Europe. The blossoming that was predicted in 1989 never happened (see Lomax 1997). Many of the stronger NGOs are funded from abroad. Few young people have been joining political parties or any other civic associations (for data from Armenia see Shahnazarian 2008; Sociometr 2004/05). The street mobilisation that produced the colour revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine in 2003 and 2004

respectively might not have happened without Western advice and funding (see Collin 2007; Mitchell 2009).

These are features of political life in which the new democracies are arguably leading the world because western politicians have become less dependent on mass membership parties. Nowadays they campaign through the media. If necessary they can hire paid (telephone) canvassers. Corporate sponsorship has largely replaced individual membership fees and donations. Given the widening economic inequalities, it has become easier to obtain \$1 million from one wealthy person than \$10 from each of 100,000 supporters. The millionaire might not be offered influence, but he or she can definitely expect 'access'.

The new democracies inherited Soviet-era public sector bureaucracies and administrative practices, and both the extent and the direction of change have varied. In Soviet times there was no western-type division between the political and the administrative. The task of state bureaucracies was to implement the commands of party bosses. Top appointments in all spheres of activity—education, the arts, the military and so on—were political, reserved for nomenklatura. Where a version of the old system continues, public sector employment remains a route into political (government) positions, and state departments are expected to follow without questioning the instructions of their political heads.

Western-type, independent, professional civil services take a long time to mature. Transforming organisations' cultures is more difficult than re-writing rules. Staff recruitment to independent, politically impartial civil services is left to the civil services. Elected politicians are not allowed to interfere. Professional civil services are responsible for implementing government policies, and should do so impartially. The jobs and careers of professional civil servants do not depend on particular politicians remaining in office. While in office politicians cannot appoint relatives and friends to public sector posts. Civil servants, not elected politicians, organise tenders and award contracts to supply the government with goods and services: politicians cannot determine who benefits directly from state spending. It is true that in Western countries elected politicians can import their own political staffs into departments of state, but political appointees are typically kept out of line management, and one of their functions is to make it unnecessary for career civil servants to take-on political work—explaining government policies to the media, for example.

This is not what happens in the South Caucasus or in most other ex-Soviet republics. Appointments throughout the public sectors are political. Politicians personally direct the award of government contracts, export and import licences, building licences and anything else with a commercial value. Friends and relatives expect to benefit. An outcome is huge payrolls, huge client circles, for whom regime change would be a calamity. All who are part of these circles need and are expected to do everything possible to ensure the re-election of incumbents. A variant, documented in Azerbaijan by Safiyev (2008), is to informally sell positions in central and regional state administrations. These 'investments' can be a reliable source of profit via the sale of subordinate positions and the ability to award contracts. Whether positions go to family members and friends or the highest bidders, 'corruption' seeps into daily life

in all sections and strata of a society (see Glinkina and Rosenberg 2003). Involvement in a grey economy becomes a survival strategy for virtually everyone. Proclaimed revolutions are then diverted into regime change. There is a change of personnel at the top, but further down nothing changes.

In western democracies demarcations between the roles of elected politicians and state officials are underpinned by the rule of law which is an innovation, where implemented, in former communist countries. These states possessed laws and courts under the old system, but the notion of law constraining governments as well as the governed was alien. Governments made the laws. Under communism courts were expected to act on government agendas. It can be difficult to persuade lay people that anything has changed where the judiciary are still political appointments, but this is only part of the problem. When communism ended all the countries experienced a period of wild and free 'bandit capitalism'. There was no commercial law. There were no relevant laws governing personal and business taxes, let alone how to privatise state assets. This was the period during which everyone broke laws. No-one knew for certain what the law required. This applied to state officials as much as anyone else. So people 'negotiated'. Rules were ignored if they appeared to conflict with conduct that all concerned regarded as sensible business practice. There was rampant collusion and exchanges of favours between businesses and state officials. There were precedents (blat) from Soviet times which proved useful to all concerned (so it appeared) in the new market economies (see Stefes 2006). Thus business and politics became, and in some places have remained, 'dirty'.

In the relatively mature western democracies elected representatives and state officials are subject to the law, and there are rules which separate public responsibilities from private interests. Yet simultaneously, this not only allows private interests to be pursued because there are ways in which this can be done within the rules, but actually legitimises the conduct. Businesses can and do seek to influence government ministers and state officials about how the state regulates economic life in general, and how this affects their own businesses in particular. Firms can seek to have rules 'fixed', that is, modified in their favour. This is not done by bribing politicians or civil servants. Intermediaries are likely to be involved. The right to lobby is enshrined in law. Professional lobbyists know how, when and who to approach when seeking to exert influence. The influence may be for the right to life or the right to abortion, or for a change in a tax regulation, planning regulation, or anything else. Private citizens, but more typically business people who seek influence, may make donations to political parties and individual politicians' campaign funds. For their part, politicians can and do use their positions for private gain. They can sometimes hold paid jobs, often acting as consultants, and have financial interests in private businesses while holding elected office. Of course, there are rules that govern such activities. These rules are likely to require disclosure of the relevant interests. This then legitimises whatever is done within the rules. After voluntarily retiring from political life, or after being rejected by voters, former government ministers can accept private sector jobs in which their main asset is inside knowledge (of government). Retired civil servants may do likewise. Rules limit, while simultaneously protecting those who remain within

‘the letter’. In the newer democracies where relevant rules are still being developed, there may be more scope for private interests to intrude, but however exemplary their personal conduct, it is difficult for any politicians or state officials to avoid the taint of corruption.

Conclusions: Restoration or Progressive Erosion of Trust?

New rules, more rules, additional and/or more effective rule-enforcement agencies, will not remove current democratic deficits. The weaknesses are more fundamental. Of course, there are differences among western countries, and there are even wider differences today among ex-communist countries even though, less than a generation ago, they began their transformations from similar start-points. Countries that became candidates for EU membership were required to adopt and implement rules governing elections, the conduct of business, and much else. They were given templates to guide their reforms. Changing cultures and everyday practices may be more prolonged, but embrace by the EU has made a considerable difference.

So has the manner in which countries’ transformations began. Some republics had independence thrust upon them. It was a problem that the existing political elites needed to address, which they usually did by reinventing themselves as nationalists, democrats and market reformers. This happened throughout Central Asia (except in Kyrgyzstan), Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan and Belarus, and also in Russia where the transformation was triggered from above, within the Soviet political elite. Maybe coincidentally (or maybe not), none of these states had pre-communist histories as industrial societies and political democracies—histories that other countries have been able to recover and resume.

In other countries the transformations were genuine revolutions, albeit usually peaceful revolutions, triggered from below. This was the case throughout East-Central Europe, South-East Europe, the Balkans, Georgia and Armenia. Huge swathes of the populations were not personally involved, especially outside the capitals and other major cities. For many the changes just happened while they continued with their lives as best they could. However, in all the above countries there were popular movements that mobilised the people. The exemplar was *Solidarity* in Poland which demonstrated that when pushed persistently the communist ‘dominoes’ would begin to fall.

Here we have examples of ‘path dependency’ (Stark 1996). History matters: there are key events which leave enduring consequences. *Solidarity’s* leaders risked their lives and imprisonment. Many were imprisoned in the 1980s. At the time they were not seeking personal financial gain. Some subsequently became successful business people (Wedel 2009), but many never became incredibly wealthy men and women. In Poland, and in other countries which experienced revolutions from below, there were high expectations about how the countries would change, and how their new political elites would behave. In 1989 Poland was far and away Europe’s most religious country. Some Poles expected Poland’s admission to the EU to start a re-moralisation of Europe! Poland was expected to become the continent’s prime example of rectitude

in politics, business and personal life. The higher the initial hopes, the greater the scope for and the more intense the possible disappointment. Eurasia's new czars and khans who treat their countries' assets as family property, and who run state departments as fiefdoms, are less likely to be destroying hopes, and may have found it relatively easy, as in Azerbaijan, to maintain or restore the trust of their people.

The EU countries are all very different today—basically democratic—but the weaknesses of these democracies will be removed only by new socio-political movements, inspired by new change ideologies, which can promise to return economic life to political control, and which produce a new generation of leaders who genuinely represent and are subject to control by their rank-and-file.

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