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Mourning Populism. The Case of Poland

Abstract: The point of departures of the paper is the theory of populist reason of Ernesto Laclau and some ideas from *Mourning and Melancholia* of Sigmund Freud. Author questions two established theses: (1) populism is a hollow and non-specified term as long as it is without reference to given postulates or political claims; (2) populism can be considered only on a rhetorical, not ideological level. Instead, author postulates that: (1) the difficulty of determining the populist discourse is not a transient ailment, only occasionally related to that phenomenon, but a quality built in social reality, permanent and irremovable; (2) the populist rhetoric is not solely an epiphenomenon that can be neglected in any serious analysis. On the contrary, there is a direct link between the two layers: the rhetorical and the conceptual. The reconfiguration of thinking about populism that author would like to advance should allow him to expect answers to a number of questions: (i) What are the relations between politics and populist politics? (ii) How and to what extent does populist logic alter the mechanisms governing politics? (iii) Is the de-politicisation of liberal democracy (the prevalence of administration over politics) a direct cause of the return of populism? In order to substantiate the thesis that populism is today's way of doing politics, author reconstruct the recent post-communist history of Poland above all the situation after Smoleńsk tragedy, when a Tupolev-154M aircraft of the Polish Air Force crashed near the city of Smoleńsk in Russia, killing all 96 people on board. This moment marks opening of a new stage of development of populism that author will refer in the paper as "mourning populism."

Keywords: "bad" and "good" populisms, hegemony, identification, ideology, love-object, melancholy, mourning, narcissism, social demand, *vox populi*

> The correlation of melancholia and mourning seems justified by the general picture of the two conditions. Moreover, the exciting causes due to environmental influences are, so far as we can discern them at all, the same for both conditions. Mourning is regularly the reaction to the loss of a loved person, or to the loss of some abstraction which has taken the place of one, such as one's country, liberty, an ideal, and so on. In some people the same influences produce melancholia instead of mourning and we consequently suspect them of a pathological disposition.
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> Sigmund Freud (1917: p. 30–41)

> Populism is, quite simply, a way of constructing the political.
>
> Ernesto Laclau (2005: p. XI)

Populism in Question

The concept of populism would now seem to be present in every democratic political culture, although the term is used by historians, social scientists, journalists and

politicians to describe social, political and institutional phenomena that are often very different from each other. These differences may be explained by the fact that populism tends to emerge at different times and in various places. It also seems that today populist slogans are not only used by radical parties, as it is said often in the literature. Although populist rhetoric has been worked out by vast political platforms, not only on the right but also on the left of the political scene (Betz 1994: 33; Kazin 1995: 78; Taggart 1996: 14; Mudde 2000: 67; Zakaria 2003: 56). Populism today is not restricted to populist parties as such, but is increasingly associated with European leaders and movements.

Cas Mudde defines populism as "an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, "the pure people" versus "the corrupt elite," and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people (Mudde 2007: 41). Considering populism as an ideology or not, Mudde's definition seems to be only a collection of the populism features. First is negativism. Populism reacts against elites and institutions and is seen as anti-capitalism, anti-Semitism, anti-urbanism, anti-modernism, anti-etc. From the negation populists benefit by expressiveness. Negativism and expressiveness are presented by a discourse. Here, the discourse plays an important role and is based on the rhetoric that express not for who they are but against who they are. The following strong element of populist thinking is treachery. Populists usually claim that the people have been betrayed by an establishment. Usually all political elites are accused of abusing their position of power instead of acting in conformity with the interests of the people as a whole (Mény and Surel 2002: 13). To go further, populists argue that there is a conspiracy of elites against the people (Szacki 2004: 33). This is based also on simple rules derived from the common wisdom of the people and is deeply rooted in local tradition and culture.

The question is then: what do María Eva Duarte de Perón, Hugo Rafael Chávez, Silvio Berlusconi, Jean-Marie Le Pen, Jörg Haider and Jarosław Kaczyński have in common? They all are said to be, or have been, populists. The differences in political orientation between these disparate leaders shows the problematic nature of the concept and the difficulties in establishing its meaning. A first problem arises because populism has become a matter of attribution rather than a term with which most political actors would willingly identify: politicians would define themselves as "liberals," "socialists" or "nationalists," but hardly ever as "populists." The reasons for this reluctance are quite obvious. The term populism has a negative normative connotation both politically and economically. Politically, it has been associated with personalism, authoritarianism and the manipulation of a not very well informed or even irrational *populus*. Economically, it has been identified with irresponsible fiscal profligacy that exchanges short-term gain for long-term pain.

Ernesto Laclau's *On Populist Reason* positions him firmly on the side of those who vindicate the democratic nature of populism. More so, he turns the wheel full circle to argue that far than being incompatible, populism and democracy are almost inseparable twins. The ground for this claim is that there is no democracy without a *demos* ("the people") and that the constitution of democratic identities is based on

the very same logic that underlies the populist mode of identification. Populism is, for Laclau, a political logic rather than a political movement or an ideology, and to understand how this logic operates it is necessary first to grasp his theory of politics. Drawing on Saussurean linguistics, Freud and Lacan's psychoanalysis and Gramsci's theory of hegemony, Laclau has developed a highly distinctive theory of politics, which is both elegant and sophisticated. His is a relational theory of society whereby the elements of socio-political life exist only in terms of relations of differences and equivalences with each other. Relations of differences predominate in well-structured social constructs, such as language (in which, for instance, the term "father" draws its meaning from its differential position to that of "mother," "son" or "grandfather" within the discourse of the family), administrative structures and the welfare state.

Laclau's theory of populism helps us to understand populism as a mode of identification that arises out the chasm separating political institutions from the people and calls our attention to the limitations of a purely institutional understanding of democracy. His formal reading of populism as a political logic rather than as an ideology explains the elusive nature of populism, as the populist logic could be put at the service of the most diverse ideological contents, from the radical left to the extreme right. He is also right in claiming that populism has a radical democratic edge, and that populism and democracy share a common ground in the constitution of popular democratic identities. But although Laclau does not claim that populism is necessarily democratic, his arguments that the very possibility of democracy depends on the constitution of a democratic people and that democracy does not necessarily equate to liberal democracy fail fully to explore the undemocratic underside of populism, given by the imagining of a homogeneous people. If democracy is about the enactment of the will of the people, its survival depends on the acknowledgement that we can only have provisional versions of the popular will, and therefore the argument for the toleration of differences is not just a liberal argument but a democratic argument as well.

Moreover, the relation between Laclau's theory of politics and his theory of populism leads him to regard populism as the natural form of radical politics, and even of politics *tout court*. If populism consists in postulating a radical alternative within the communitarian space, a choice at the crossroads in which the future of a given society hinges, does not populism become synonymous with politics? The answer can only be affirmative. The problem is that Laclau's answer leaves a lot out of politics, as not all politics is necessarily radical and not all radical politics is necessarily populist. The *status quo* is as much a political construction as its radical alternatives. It is based on the political construction of differences, which Antonio Gramsci, using a term taken from the Italian political tradition, called the politics of *trasformismo*. On the other hand, many forms of radical politics are localised struggles that are no less radical because they fail to, or even do not aspire to, crystallise into a systemic alternative. But Laclau is right in reminding us that politics is ultimately about the construction of alternatives to the *status quo*, and this is even truer in an era of centrist consensus and political alienation.

Taken as a point of departures Laclau's theory of populist reason and some ideas from *Mourning and Melancholia* of Freud in the present paper I would like questions

two established theses. According to first one, populism is a hollow and non-specified term as long as it is without reference to given postulates or political claims; according to second one populism can be considered only on a rhetorical, not ideological level. Instead, I postulate that: (1) the difficulty of determining the populist discourse is not a transient ailment, only occasionally related to that phenomenon, but a quality built in social reality, permanent and irremovable; (2) the populist rhetoric is not solely an epiphenomenon that can be neglected in any serious analysis. On the contrary, there is a direct link between the two layers: the rhetorical and the conceptual.

The reconfiguration of thinking about populism I would like to advance, should allow me to expect answers to a number of questions: (i) What are the relations between politics and populist politics? (ii) How and to what extent does populist logic alter the mechanisms governing politics? (iii) Is the de-politicisation of liberal democracy (the prevalence of administration over politics) a direct cause of the return of populism? In order to substantiate the thesis that populism is today's way of doing politics, I would like reconstruct the recent post-communist history of Poland above all the situation after Smoleńsk tragedy, when a Tupolev-154M aircraft of the Polish Air Force crashed near the city of Smoleńsk in Russia, killing all 96 people on board. This moment marks for me opening of a new stage of development of populism that I refer in the paper as "mourning populism."

Not Populism but the Logic of Populism

The weakness in defining of populism as an ideology of some movements results from the fact that what is here treated as a tacit assumption is the thesis that populism simply express the inner nature of some political subjects (Canovan 1981: 56). Here, in the paper I defense the reverse possibility of populism understanding. We could assume that the political practices do not express the nature of social agents but, instead, constitute the latter. Such a solution proposed Ernesto Laclau, who suggests that practices would be more primary units of analysis than the group, what means—that, the group would only be the result of an articulation of social practices.

If this approach is correct, we could say that a movement is not populist because in its politics or ideology it presents actual contents identifiable as populist, but because it shows a particular logic of articulation of those contents—whatever those contents are. Individuals—in the theoretical context—are not coherent totalities but merely referential identities which have to be split up into a series of localized subject positions. And the articulation between these positions is a social and not an individual affair. The concept of populism that Laclau proposes is, in result, a strictly formal one, for all its defining features are exclusively related to a specific mode of articulation independently of the actual contents that are articulated. That is the reason why "populism" is an ontological and not an ontic category (Laclau 2005: 34). Most of the attempts at defining populism have tried to locate what is specific to it in a particular ontic content and, as a result, they have ended in a self-defeating exercise whose two predictable alternative results have been: either to choose an empirical content

which is immediately overflowed by an avalanche of exceptions, or to appeal to an "intuition" which cannot be translated into any conceptual content (Laclau 1996: 45; Torfing 2004: 89).[1]

Approaching the question of populism formally makes it possible to address another, otherwise intractable issue. To ask oneself if a movement is or is not populist is, actually, to start with the wrong question. The question that we should, instead, ask ourselves, is the following: to what extent is a movement populist? In this way we have presented political practices as operating at diverse points of a continuum whose two extremes would be: (1) an institutionalist discourse dominated by a pure logic of difference and (2) a populist one, in which the logic of equivalence operates unchallenged. These two extremes are actually unreachable: pure difference would mean a society so dominated by administration and by the individualisation of social demands that no struggle around internal frontiers, and in consequent no politics, would be possible; and pure equivalence would involve such a dissolution of social links that the very notion of "social demand" would lose any meaning, what offers us the image of society as the "crowd" or "mass" as depicted by the XIXth Century theorists of "mass psychology" like Hippolyte Taine (Taine 1878) or Gustave Le Bon (Le Bon 1896).

To be quite truthful, Laclau maintains that a social situation in which demands tend to reaggregate themselves on the negative basis that they all remain unsatisfied is the first precondition of that mode of political articulation that we call populism. While the institutional arrangement was grounded on the logic of difference, in populist situation we have an inverse situation, which can be described as a logic of equivalence. In the case all the demands, in spite of their differential character, tend to reaggregate themselves forming what Laclau calls an equivalential chain (Laclau 2005: 178; Torfing 2004: 123). This means that each individual demand is constitutively split: on the one hand it is its own particularised self; on the other it points, through equivalential links, to the totality of the other demands.

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[1] The smallest unit of his analysis of populism is the category of social demand. The strategic reason of choosing this term is clear: the subject of demand is constituted through raising this demand. However, the term "demand" involves a whole theatrical scene in which a subject is addressing his demand to an Other presupposed to be able to meet it. Laclau calls such an elementary demand "democratic;" as he explains it, he resorts to this slightly idiosyncratic use to signal that a demand that still functions within the socio-political system, i.e., a demand that is met as a particular demand, so that it is not frustrated and, because of this frustration, forced to inscribe itself into an antagonistic series of equivalences. Although he emphasizes how, in an institutionalized political space, there are multiple conflicts, but these conflicts are dealt with one by one, without setting in motion any transversal antagonisms. Laclau is well aware that chains of equivalences can also form themselves within an institutionalized democratic space. But what Laclau neglected to emphasize is not only the uniqueness of democracy with regard to his basic conceptual opposition between the logic of differences and the logic of equivalences, but also the full inner entwinement of these two logics. Democracy not only can include antagonism, it is the only political form that solicits and presupposes it, that institutionalizes it, what means, that what other political systems perceive as a threat, democracy elevates into a positive condition of its functioning. The conclusion to be drawn is that populism is not the only mode of existence of the excess of antagonism over the institutional-democratic frame of regulated agonistic struggle: not only the Communist revolutionary organizations, but also the wide phenomena of non-institutionalized social and political protest, from the student movements in the 1968 period to later anti-war protests and the more recent anti-globalization movement, cannot be properly called populist.

The subject of the demand is different in these two cases. In the first, the subject of the demand was as punctual as the demand itself. The subject of a demand conceived as differential particularity, Laclau calls democratic subject. In the other case the subject will be wider, for its subjectivity will result from the equivalential aggregation of a plurality of democratic demands. A subject constituted on the basis of this logic Laclau calls popular subject (Laclau 2005: 148). This shows clearly the conditions for either the emergence or disappearance of a popular subjectivity: the more social demands tend to be differentially absorbed within a successful institutional system, the weaker the equivalential links will be and the more unlikely the constitution of a popular subjectivity. Conversely, a situation in which a plurality of unsatisfied demands and an increasing inability of the institutional system to absorb them differentially coexist, creates the conditions leading to a populist rupture.

For Laclau the very logic of hegemonic articulation applies also to the conceptual opposition between populism and politics: populism is the Lacanian "objet a" of politics, the particular figure which stands for the universal dimension of the political, which is why it is "the royal road" to understanding the political. Populism is not a specific political movement, but the political at its purest: the "inflection" of the social space that can affect any political content. Its elements are purely formal: populism occurs when a series of particular "democratic" demands (for better social security, health services, lower taxes, against war, etc.) is enchained in a series of equivalences, and this enchainment produces "people" as the universal political subject. What characterizes populism is not the ontic content of these demands, but the mere formal fact that, through their enchainment, "people" emerges as a political subject, and all different particular struggles and antagonisms appears as parts of a global antagonistic struggle between "us" (people) and "them." Again, the content of "us" and "them" is not prescribed in advance but, precisely, the stake of the struggle for hegemony.[2]

The fact that some particular struggle is elevated into the "universal equivalent" of all struggles is not a pre-determined fact, but itself the result of the contingent political struggle for hegemony—in some constellation, this struggle can be the workers' struggle, in another constellation, the patriotic anti-colonialist struggle, in yet another constellation the anti-racist struggle for cultural tolerance. The struggle for hegemony thus not only presupposes an irreducible gap between the universal form and the multiplicity of particular contents, but also the contingent process by means of which one among these contents is "transubstantiated" into the immediate embodiment of the universal dimension. For example in Poland of the 1980, the particular demands of

[2] Populism, therefore, follows a logic of equivalence and antagonism, whereby a part (or part object) comes to stand in for the whole. Indeed, this synecdochic substitution is doubled: first, a particular *signifier* from within the populist movement represents the people as a whole, retrospectively unifying their disparate demands; second and more generally, the people as an oppressed part of a divided society claim the right to stand in for society as a whole, deposing the parasitic minority who, they claim, illegitimately cling to power. Sovereignty should be returned to the people who constitute, populism argues, the full body of social totality. As Laclau points out, this same operation of taking up, by a particularity, of a universal signification is what he has elsewhere, and in his work with Chantal Mouffe, called *hegemony*. It is also, as Laclau indicates, very close to Jacques Rancière's recent argument that politics is defined by the emergence of an "uncountable part" (Rancière 2007) that "distorts the very principle of counting" and which "while being a part, also claims to be a whole" (Laclau, Mouffe 1985, p. 245).

Solidarność were elevated into the embodiment of the peoples global rejection of the Communist regime, so that all different versions of the anti-Communist opposition (from the conservative-nationalist opposition through the liberal-democratic opposition and cultural dissidence to Leftist workers' opposition) recognized themselves in the empty signifier *Solidarność* (Žižek 2006: 56).

Laclau conceptualization of chains of equivalences that forge links between demands which are not necessarily connected draws upon Saussurian linguistics, with its distinction between syntagms and paradigms, predicated on a non-referential and nonessentialist conception of language and relations among elements more generally. The creation of equivalences occurs through processes of articulation, which bring together elements that have no necessary belonging. It is only through the creation of equivalences that a set of relational differences can be drawn together into a totality, defined as a unity against something it is not. The separate, differential demands that emanate from a variety of different sectors of society are unified through their common opposition to an oppressive regime. In other words, while each of the particular demands is distinctive, they share the fact that they are opposed to a common enemy, which is the oppressive regime. They are rendered equivalent in this respect.



The unity of the chain of equivalences is then established by one of the elements of the chain taking on the function of representing the chain as a whole, thus operating as an *empty signifier*. In this way, the democratic subject emerges in and through the process of making demands, which in turn may come to perform as *empty signifiers*. It is important to note that the *empty signifier* plays a dual role in the constitution of a people. On the one hand, it has an active role of representation as it constitutes the people in the process of representing them; it does not simply reflect a pre-given totality. On the other, it represents the people. Since it has to act as a point of identification, it cannot be entirely autonomous from them. Given this, the constitution of 'the people' is the site of a tension. If the totalizing moment—that of equivalence—prevails, representation is destroyed. If, on the other hand, there is a complete autonomization of demands—where difference prevails—the moment of totalization necessary for the constitution of some form of unity would be blocked. To put it more simply, if the constitutive function of representation prevails without attention to the fact that a particular actor is being represented, the link between the representative and the represented is broken. If, on the other hand, the representative simply reflects the represented, there is no possibility of drawing together a number of distinct demands into a unity which exceeds the specificity of each of the demands. Hence, the *political*

function of representation is of necessity one of maintaining the tension between the two extreme points of the continuum.

Populism in Poland

Before we start to elaborate on populism in Poland one issue have to be mentioned, issue which influence political and social conditions in the country. The remark concerns the circumstance of settlement with communism. Namely, the series of negotiations, called "the round table," started in 1989 between the communists and the opposition *Solidarność*. The round-table agreement called for "your President, our Prime Minister," to quote the famous sentence of Adam Michnik. As an effect of the peaceful agreement, Poland's initial approach to the communist past was set in 1989 by Tadeusz Mazowiecki who declared that Poland should draw "a thick line" to mark off the communist past from the democratic future. Although Mazowiecki's intention was to make communists responsible for their era and the new government responsible for the future, in Polish parlance, the "thick line" came to signify a blanket forgiveness of past communist misdeeds. The opponents of this decision have been saying that practically what it meant was creating tolerance for Communists, even worse, silent cooperation with the Communists at the cost of the right wing. And so the post-Solidarność camp divided into those who shared Mazowiecki's and Michnik's idea to build a democratic system without looking to the past and those who did not want to accept Postcommunists'participation. In consequence of the peaceful agreement with the Communists, two problems that divided the post-Solidarność can be located. The first one relates to the concept of decommunization while the second, resulting from it, is lustration. Those concepts have influenced the political atmosphere and have become an important reason for the condition of Polish democracy and particular place of populism (Krasnodębski 2005; Śpiewak 2005).

To exemplify the Laclau thesis that there is not a populism as such but only the different ways of doing politics by the use of populism and that there is not a sense to ask—whether a party or the movements is populist or not but there is only a sense to ask—to what extent is a movement populist?, I try to analyze the different logics of populist reasons in Poland. In January 2005, Law and Justice (L&J) [Prawo i Sprawiedliwość] wins the parliamentary election and its victory gives the party a mandate to deal with two focal issues of the campaign: social justice, to be achieved by the introduction of the vetting law, and launching an attack against the system of corruption (Kaczyński 2006). It seems that the latter of these issues provided an "empty signifier," capacious enough to be able to accommodate various social claims, beginning with those of the nurses and ending with those of the intelligentsia—mesmerised by the idea that the troublesome social reality is a corrupt fruit of the Roundtable Talks in 1989. There it was, the Roundtable Agreement, to be finally blamed for taking away their rights, leaving them helpless and poor, and for deforming the political scene. In that sense, the victory of L&J and its later policies were short

of populist. The need to refer to the nation and to represent the nation, the need to carry out their policy not just by democratic choice and the sufficient number of votes cast, but by acclamation, anointment, and delegation, has deformed the otherwise noble project and tied it up with populism.

On the other hand however, the victory of Civic Platform (CP) [Platforma Obywatelska] in the parliamentary elections in September 2007 had much to do with the promise of a new Ireland, our dream to come true. The fact that it was such a successful message and that it became a true banner of the victory allows us to see CP's success in terms of populism: the ignition of the dream of Ireland has also channelled a set of multiple social claims: for the entrepreneurs, more freedoms, more support for free initiative; for everyone, education and health. All that can be a worrying signal, that in fact contemporary politics is merely a mix of various populisms, addressing varied groups, with the help of varied structural combinations. While L&J seduces the nation of the rejected ones, CP seduces the nation of people who were chosen to accomplish deeds. One thing that both parties have in common is that they both accuse each other of pandering to the electorate and formulating hollow promises.

One of the objectives of the paper is to establish whether a distinction between "good" and "bad" populisms is implicitly assumed in analyses of populism. If so, "good" populism would be the one celebrating democracy as its core value, asking for more power on behalf of the people—and appearing to go along the lines of the customary way of doing politics. "Bad" populism, on the other hand, would question the delegation of power to a few chosen people, the foundation of today's representative democracy, as well as most of the democratic institutions and long established democratic procedures. "Bad" populism, while shaking the foundations of democracy—its core ideas and procedures, is even more critical towards guarantors of the constitutional order, other than those democratically chosen by the nation—e.g. the Chairmen of Central Banks or the Judges of the Constitutional Tribunal.

Based on Laclau's definition, Polish populism regards the society as being ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups. "The pure people" can be represented by different social classes such as workers, farmers, Catholics, but also by the smaller entrepreneur. All of them are disappointed with the transformation (meaning democratisation, Europeanisation, globalisation, etc.) and blame the establishment for its failures. They are all united around disagreement with "the network," which for the Polish populists means everything that has any connections with communism. Interesting, that includes not only post-communists but also those who settled the agreements with them and, according to populists, blended the past with the future. Populists stress that such conduct has led to the divisions of society, pathologies and corruption on different levels (political, economical, social).

However, the good, or should I say—"blessed" populism of CP, is ready to sacrifice some of the beneficiaries of the transformation in new middle classes—like doctors who have their own profitable practice, successful academics employed various institutions, bankers, presidents and directors of big companies, etc.—who all too hastily believed in their success being the inevitable outcome of positive changes as well as

their own hard work and skills, and thus justified liberalism as a free market ideology bringing little security to the unfit, unskilled, and unlucky. Those beneficiaries saw liberalism the religion of a strong and victorious, self-confident man, who takes from God and Nature whatever he justly deserves. The teaching of this religion is reason promising better future to all, and bringing contempt to what makes the coming of this better world so distant, namely helpless and irrational clerical masses. This way Polish populism has thus been trapped in a vice between the discourse of desire for success and the success necessitated by the CP, which is essentially a discourse about the promise of heaven and salvation here on earth, and the discourse of frustration triggered by corruption of elites, who renounced ties with the people and allowed them to perish in liberal hell. It would be only little exaggeration to say that Polish populism is trapped in a vice between the "rebellion of the elite" alienated from society, and "revolt of the masses," alienated from the corrupt elite.

The claim that the Civic Platform is a populist party may raise controversy, and even argument to divide populism into "good" and "bad" populism not divorce these doubts. Doubts do not withdraw by the appeal to a broad concept of populism, according to which populism is a way of doing politics today. The problem with the Civic Platform is that it is problematic, above all, the status of the party. Civic Platform is the platform on which fit all kinds of ideas and concepts, as excellent demonstrate personal moves before the election, which permit Platform absorbs politicians from other parties, including as ideologically diverse as the L&J and SLD. These divers ideas have tied up the rhetoric of modernization and rationalization. As a result, CP grows to become the hegemonic party, defending the system, and not anti-system populist party. In which moment of political process Civic Platform becomes a populist party, at least at the level of rhetoric? When Civic Platform becomes a party again? Of course, CP becomes a party, condemned on populist rhetoric, at the moment of election. In this moment CP models his enemy in the form of the L&J party and urges voters to vote for CP, because non-voice for CP will mean the return of dangers ghosts IV Republic and its worst demons. In this way CP creates the idea of hegemonic state of government of L&J. In which way does work populist rhetoric if not in exactly the way? System in the rhetoric of the CP is simply connected with the idea of the state, which we remember from the period of the L&J government. We are threatened by comeback these governments and warned against an almost Manichean evil that these governments are involved. Populism occurs when one fraction of the dominant class seeks to establish hegemony but is unable to do so and so makes a direct appeal to the masses.

If we come back to Laclau's distinction one could even say that CP's populism and L&J's populism seek to attain what Laclau recognizes as unconceivable: (1) the CP's aim is to establish an institutionalist discourse dominated by a pure logic of difference and (2) the L&J's aim is raising of the word in which rules the pure unchallenged logic of equivalence. Let me only recall: pure difference would mean a society so dominated by administration and in consequent the very dead of politics; and pure equivalence would involve such a dissolution of social links that the very notion of people lose any meaning.

Populism after Trauma

Thesis of this paper is rather straightforward, and before we move forward necessary are few general remarks on the dynamics of populism in Poland. In the 1990s, at the frontier of populism in Poland were dissatisfied peasants—remnants preserved in state economy, still treasuring memory of robust years and now assigned to Poland "B," they took capitalism for St. John's revelation and equipped with survival instinct made stage debut in big cities, displaying peasant populists. Since then, the negative effects piled up, governments fell and other social groups started appreciate demands for state controlled economy. When the socialist left made a concession and accepted the inevitable, the disenfranchised formed a unified front of discontent and assigned their problems to the Nation; vows renewed, corporations, global and transnational, European Union and the State were put on watch and surveyed for negligence (Bauman 2003; Wysocka 2009).

However, the majority and media were still blindly optimistic, that is until the date of the accession of Poland into EU was made public and despite betterment in the lives of many, prophets came, and warned the Nation of a mistake in letting rich buy out the land of Poland, finalizing God promised plan after almost giving up hope. Radical populism, soon boiled down to grass-root party called "Self-Defence," did justice rather than talk, admired for timing—state of emergency before accession. Popularity of the fearless peasant leader peaked day of elections, the borders were opened and—popularity fell, together with that of other nationalist parties. Importantly, the shift towards right stayed on. Even the 2008 crisis was not that much of a problem. Populism and its late parliamentary formation lost currency (Dzwończyk 2000; Markowski 2004; Marczewska-Rytko 2006).

And then, one fatal day in 2010, a terrible tragedy at Smoleńsk airport brought immense loss to the country, taking lives of the whole board of administrators, members of the state, and late President Lech Kaczyński, at that time cohabiting with liberal government often engaging in competence disputes. The Polish Air Force Tu-154 crash occurred on 10 April 2010, when a Tupolev 154 Maircraft of the Polish Air Force crashed near the city of Smoleńsk in Russia, killing all 96 people on board. These included the Polish president Lech Kaczyński and his wife, former president Ryszard Kaczorowski, the chief of the Polish General Staff and other senior Polish military officers, the president of the National Bank of Poland, Poland's deputy foreign minister, Polish government officials, 15 members of the Polish parliament, senior members of the Polish clergy, and relatives of victims of the Katyń massacre.[3]

[3] The final accident report, created by MAK, was published on 12 January 2011, and placed the majority of the blame for the accident on the pilots. Some aspects of the report were criticized by members of the Polish government, specifically that the investigation found no fault with the Russian air traffic controllers. Poland published their comments to the MAK final report on the same day. Commenting on the MAK final report Polish Interior Minister Jerzy Miller said that the report was not created in full compliance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation because some requested documents and evidence were not provided by Russia. Additionally Polish comments to the final report were not agreed to nor fully applied. Polish comments to the report are not part of it, however they are published on the MAK website among other appendixes. The MAK defended their report and stated they would accept any

In Poland, the public reacted with shock and grief to the disaster. Almost immediately after the news broke, tens of thousands of Poles assembled at the Presidential Palace to lay tributes, including flowers, wreaths, and candles. A week of national mourning was declared in Poland. Poles around the world mourned Kaczyński and set up shrines in the week that followed: many wept openly, flags flew at half mast in Poland. Sports fixtures, including women's U-17 UEFA Championship elite qualifying phase game Poland versus Republic of Ireland in Ukraine, were postponed. Concerts were cancelled. On 11th April, Kaczyński's body was flown to Warsaw on a military plane; tens of thousands of Poles gathered at both the airport tarmac and the streets of the city to pay their respects to the late president as his casket was driven by hearse to the Presidential Palace. Afterwards, the casket was laid in state at the Palace. The casket remained there throughout the week, until Kaczyński and his wife were laid to rest at the Wawel Cathedral a full week after the crash, on 18 April. On 15 April, Polish scouts put a wooden cross in front of the Presidential Palace at Krakowskie Przedmieście in Warsaw to commemorate the 96 victims of the Polish plane crash. The establishing of the cross provoked much controversy in Poland. Polish politicians began a dispute; the topic of the dispute was where the cross should be placed. Some people, mainly Catholic Church members, said the cross should stay in front of the Presidential Palace, because it is "manner worthy of remembrance." Other people said the cross should be moved to the St. Anne's Church, because the Presidential Palace is secular place and it should be "without sings of religion." A lot of people of the another religion than the Catholic religion were outraged and disappointed. The Catholic Church in Poland did not make any comment about the situation. During the summer of 2010, there were several protest. The acting president of Poland, Bronisław Komorowski said the cross should be transferred. After many disputes and the turbulent summer of 2010, on September 16, 2010, the cross was transferred to the St. Anne's Church. Also, during the summer of 2010, the people in Poland commemorated the 96 victims of the plane crash by putting the arrays. One of them was placed on the wall of the Presidential Palace.

Shortly after, an elderly, unknown man poured filth on the wall. A public noon commemoration ceremony in Warsaw's Piłsudski Square was attended by more than 100,000 people on 17 April. Sirens sounded and bells tolled around the country. A three-gun salute was fired. People waved the flag of Poland complete with black ribbons and the names of the those who died in the crash were read out from a white stage decorated with a giant cross and photographs of the dead. The crowds bowed

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international investigation or audit of their findings. Despite of no access to some evidences (wreck of plane, original recorders from plane are in Russia, 13 recorders including radar recorder and camera mounted in Air Traffic Control tower were not provided to Poland—according to MAK report all were broken and did not save any data) The Polish Committee for Investigation of National Aviation Accidents published its report on 29 July 2011. According to the Polish report the main cause of accident was trial approach and the descent below the allowed altitude at an excessive rate of descent in bad weather conditions, in conjunction with to late execution of the go-around procedure. Circumstances that let to this are incorrect training of Polish Pilots but also wrong work of Russian Air Traffic Controllers who gave bad information to crew of Tu-154m. Criminal investigations by the Russian and Polish prosecutor's offices, which examines the criminal responsibility of individuals, rather than just reasons of accident, have yet to be concluded.

their heads. On 18 April, the couple's caskets were driven at a slow pace through the streets of Warsaw, passing the city hall and a museum dedicated to the 1944 Warsaw Uprising which Kaczyński favoured. The funeral ceremony began at 2 pm local time with a Mass held at Kraków's St. Mary's Basilica, with thousands attending, archbishop of Kraków Stanisław Dziwisz presided over the ceremony, and addressed President of Russia Dmitry Medvedev personally.

Since the crash, conspiracy theories have spread in Poland about the cause of the disaster. Artur Górski, a Polish Member of Parliament belonging to Kaczyński's L&J party, claimed that the Russians in the Smoleńsk North Airport's control tower were ordered to keep the plane from landing so that the president could not attend the Katyń ceremony, resulting in the crash. Górski apologized for his remarks, saying that he had been in a "state of shock." In November 2010, Law and Justice members Anna Fatyga and Anoni Maciarewicz travelled to Washington with an open letter by Jarosław Kaczyński and a petition of 300,000 signatures from the Association of the Katyń Families 2010, calling for the U.S. government to launch an independent international investigation into the crash. Fotyga, Macierewicz, and Jarosław Kaczyński have become critical of the Russian-led investigation, and have indicated suspicion that the Russians have engaged in a cover-up over the disaster.

Disbelief and suspicion beyond reason became trademark of underrepresented and critical towards the government. This period marks absorption of politics by two parties, liberal an social. *Vox populi* was anxious and neither charges nor responses were satisfying, accusations of both sides and third parties added fuel to the national tank. By almost unanimous and little hasty decision late President with late First Lady were buried in Wawel cathedral in Krakow, thus far a place reserved for Poland's kings and heroes. This moment marks opening of a new stage that I will refer here as "mourning populism." No katharsis was discussed, and opposition party leaders echoed all, even nonsensical insinuations. The tragedy, as a reference point, unfold into complex map of interdependent indicators establishing accuracy one's political opinion, if only. The official line is rejection of conspiracy theory which, based on facts in question, establishes links and then web of questions summing up to treason, punishable negligence or grave disrespect to Polish history.

Remembering Smoleńsk is key distinction in political life. "Living it" it is a token of patriotism and legacy to the nation, while "living with" is a disregard to the country and treason. To do it justice, it is least exotic form of populism yet encountered those mentioned so far. There is certain level of control over its use in politics, but since it is either—or, all political stands ultimately reduce to this axis. We are the day after the new elections in October in Poland year and no doubt this was the major topic in the campaign.[4] Impenetrable to the core, the division may prove lasting in political life,

[4] Poland's elections on 09. October 2011 produced two significant changes: first—a governing party was re-elected for the first time since the collapse of communism in 1989 and, second, a new anti-clerical party, Palikot's Movement, won third place. Donald Tusk's Civic Platform was probably rewarded for its predictability. It did not run an especially impressive campaign, but more voters seem to place their trust in its ability to handle the second wave of the global crisis than any of its rivals. Its focus on Europe is also appreciated by many. Janusz Palikot is an extrovert businessman who wants a clear separation of Church

but even given the spin it has today, the prerequisite is footing in culture, and to find it we will trace it back to classical romantic period, when the framework of today's populism was forged.

From the political perspective, romanticizing Poland's past is a must (Janion 1975). What is not so obvious and not so viable, is how the application of romantic imagery shapes political agenda and translates to decision making. The heritage of late president Lech Kaczynski is another flight to war stricken Georgia, founded on and rock solid belief that the enemy—Russia in that case, is and will be hostile. From a very practical point of view to take and hold such a political stand one needs to establish it at the intersection of great loss and great sacrifice. As for the loss, the position extreme is that of biblical Job. In his classic gesture he is helplessly submerged in his suffering and so devastated by the loss, that no explanation and no gratification would suffice. From this stand, question "why" is almost irrelevant, as "because" given beforehand. Same applies to the Russians: "the" Russians, "the" suffice. Job's loss is so irreparable that no apology nor punitive measure can ever sooth his bitter disbelief. We have seen it life and such is the lesson by Job. Despite the loss he never really gets down to question "why," instead he perseveres faith in God, despite prevailing sensation that injustice has been done. In other circumstances, we would call it dignifying loss, that is loss moral, ultimate, unexplainable. This is exactly how Poland takes losses. I should think this is Christian trait, making memory of departure the guarantee of salvation, as epitomized by Job.

For ever greatest Polish romantic poet, Adam Mickiewicz, presents us in his masterpiece *Forefathers' Eve* a new type of hero: Gustav/Konrad. However, it is already in the preface that we come across an observation valid today as before. He famously says there, that suffering inherent to Poles is best compliment to the concept of nationality. The drama alone is a voyage into the land of many irrefutable reasons for his earlier claim. Martyrdom is one of the indispensable among those. The slogan "Poland Christ of Nations" is, of course, a cornerstone of the national myth, to only gain more weight in time. In a letter to his fellow-exile, the historian, Joachim Lelewel, on 23 March 1832, Mickiewicz wrote: "I place great hopes in our nation and in a course of events unforeseen by any diplomacy. […] I would think only that our aspirations

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and state. He created a party based around himself and campaigned on legalising abortion, gay marriage and marijuana. Those are still extremely controversial issues in Poland, where the Roman Catholic Church remains influential. Mr Palikot's support among younger voters is perhaps a sign that Polish society is heading in a more liberal and secular direction. What, however, combines Palikot's Movement with the party of Kaczynski, it is their open attack against the system. Palikot admits that, when answering the question whether something combines him with Jarosław Kaczynski, he said: "There is one common point: we are against the system. Being against the system unites us. Only that Kaczynski used it for the challenge of democracy, and I was to strengthen it" (Palikot, 2011, p. 141). This superbly illustrated Palikot's populist thinking, because if the strengthening of democracy is to take place by the struggle with the system then, using Laclau's concepts, Palikot's Movement request (dements) are not democratic, but populist one. The distinctiveness of populism is that it gathers together disparate ideological positions or political demands, and stresses their equivalence in terms of a shared antagonism to a given instance of political power or authority. In other words, once again, populism should be defined by its form rather than its content: it tends to divide the social field into two distinct camps, championing the "people" over what Laclau variously terms "the dominant ideology," "the dominant bloc," "the institutional system," "an institutionalized Other," or even "power" itself.

should be given a religious and moral character, distinct from the financial liberalism of the French and firmly grounded in Catholicism" (Mickiewicz 1899, p. 89). The third part of *Forefathers' Eve*, which Mickiewicz wrote in Dresden later that spring, develops these ideas in dramatic form, taking the enigmatic fragments of the earlier parts in quite a different direction. The starting point is Mickiewicz's own biography: its central character, Gustav, who takes the name "Konrad," is, like Mickiewicz, a victim of Tsarist oppression in Vilnius in the early 1820s. It is over Konrad's soul, and, by extension, the soul of Poland, that the greater forces of Good and Evil are waging a titanic struggle. As he awaits trial in his cell, Konrad questions the existence of divine justice, given the monumental crime against Poland. His blasphemous conclusion is that God is, in fact, the Devil, identified with the Tsar. However, he is saved from damnation by Father Peter, who leads him to understand the need for expiation and suffering, introducing ideas which Mickiewicz was to expand upon in the *Books of the Polish Pilgrimage and Nation* (1832), specifically that Poland was the "Christ of Nations," whose collapse was a necessary sacrifice in the moral regeneration of Europe. The Vilnius scenes are complemented by a series of realistic, satirical scenes set in Warsaw, showing sections of Polish society collaborating with the Russian oppressor.

Even a brief excursion into the historical context from Polish culture originates risks becoming entangled in the great dilemmas and debates of Poland's aesthetic and political history, debates both emotionally heated and conceptually confused. Like many other national literatures in the nineteenth century, Polish culture broke with classicism and embraced romanticism by riding the wave of national aspirations. However, while the nationalist component became only one among many other ingredients of Western European romanticism, in Poland it came to define and dominate literary experimentation and innovation. The triumph of national romanticism is responsible for shaping the concept of the Polish poet as national destiny's supreme interpreter (Adam Mickiewicz), its inspired visionary (Juliusz Słowacki), or its shrewd dialectician (Zygmunt Krasiński). Each individual voice became vatic *ex officio*, at the same time pushing the lyrical voice into a sort of tolerated exile (Cyprian Kamil Norwid).

In the result—English obsession with the weather is Polish obsession with suffering. This is a proper way to make friends and begin a conversation. Overall, Polish populism makes best appearances when matched with a trauma—the partitions of Poland in XVIII Century, uneven war in XX Century, genocide by Stalin on Polish intelligentsia in Katyń 1940, then of course Warsaw Uprising, and along the line—the last flight of Presidential Topolev 152, landing Smoleńsk near Katyń on 10th of April 2010—whether the mist that day was artificial or not is still in investigation. Katyń/Smoleńsk, 1940–2010 is a no coincidence.

It is so ostensibly visible that the dates soon appeared on the T-shirts and graffiti, and the names of the late President and His Wife provided names for parks and institutions. There is even a painting presenting the site at Smoleńsk and the killed climbing up the skies on the rays of sun, their kind faces telling "You know All." All this shows how desperate is the demand for symbols to serve as pegs of Polish collective memory. Katyń–Smoleńsk, 1940–2010 is seven decades of martyrdom, and a proof, that forces of evil defy time, as does perseverance and memory. To add more

substance to this claim, after the crash there was a march of a group of protesters chanting "woe betide those who forbid Jesus to be King of Poland." And apart from this initiative, which by the way is legally grounded, Poland now holds new record. As of November 2010 Rio de Janeiro's Christ the Redeemer is second tallest in the world. The tallest, at 33 meters high—a meter for each year of the Savior's life, is now home at Świebodzin. We may only feel sorry for the editors New York Post, who called it "a grandiose dream of a local priest," but anyhow, let us now consult Freud.

Mourning in Freud's theory, has an affinity for melancholy in that both are affected by the loss of ability to find a new object of love. In way beneficial, stage two requires little distance to the deceased, by refraining from the shared memories, or avoiding going places that evoke memories from the past. We have not seen it happen in 2011. The work of mourning is full ahead and excelling. We might call this advanced mourning phase, which means that patient already made a discovery that the beloved object is elsewhere, and made such accusations like questioning good will of persons involved and a plethora of other factors that kept coming daily for the period of last year. Also, there is a sign of progress as we are partly relieved from thinking of the loss on daily basis, and instead deposit collective memory by erecting monuments. This is all in progress, but here we reach resistance, since next stage envisaged by Freud needs to see a new object of adoration. At this stage, clearly visible is perseverance. At this stage those mourning take perceive the lost as a phantasm or void, empty signifier, as if possessed by demon that starts pulling the strings of emotions—something which recollects the living spirit of Hamlet's father.

Freud in *Mourning and melancholy* wrote *explicite*:

> There is no difficulty in reconstructing this process. An object choice, an attachment of the libido to a particular person, had at one time existed; then, owing to a real slight or disappointment coming from this loved person, the relationship was shattered. The result was not the normal one of a withdrawal of the libido from this object and a displacement of it on to a new one, but something different, for whose coming about various conditions seem to be necessary. The object-cathexis proved to have little power of resistance and was brought to an end. But the free libido was not displaced on to another object; it was withdrawn into the ego. There, however, it was not employed in any unspecified way, but served to establish an identific action of the ego with the abandoned object. Thus the shadow of the object fell upon the ego, and the latter could henceforth be judged by a special agency, as though it were an object, the forsaken object. In this way an object-loss was transformed into an ego-loss and the conflict between the ego and the loved person into a cleavage between the critical activity of the ego and the ego as altered by identification (Freud 1917: 248).

This passage leaves little doubt as to the reason why today in Poland the opposition is messianic and the ruling party has no idea how to react and cope with it long term. But as a hypothesis we may assume that in the case of Poland the functions of politics is the transformation of an object-loss into an ego-loss.

The opposition party leader, twin brother of the late President Kaczyński, shows little resemblance to the romantic hero of Mickiewicz, and to approximate his image I could only compare it to a rather peculiar hybrid of Hamlet and King Lear: not only he is mourning over the immense loss, but also seeking an object, as Freud puts it, to place his free libido, which in time is gradually getting absorbed by his national ego and makes him embodiment of Christ of Nations. This, in turn, would explain why the major party leader and Prime Minister Donald Tusk is in comparison a mix of

Pontius Pilate and Lady Makhbet, presenting reports on the progress of investigation and defying accusations of lack of diligence before the eyes of confused public.

From Mourning to Narcissism

Political correctness advocated by liberals for over 20 years came through with the assertion that there is no modernization without secularization. It is now evident, that sociological argumentation stressing that the inevitable cost of modernization is secularization was empty. Poles were definitely participating in the processes of modernization, and if so, there must be a different reason for this puzzling negligence. What is wrong however, is the whole equation: Polish modernism is as epidermal, and such is also radical nationalism altogether with our supposedly strong religious beliefs. What this means however, is that both fake modernists and radicals are particularly vulnerable to the return of populism. The modernists have just displayed how modern they really are by showing much interest in anti-clerical discourse (Movement of Support for Janusz Palikot). The secularized are meantime waiting for the return of the avenger, the Messiah whose earthly abode is the opposition party and person is its leader (radical wing L&J Jarosław Kaczyński). And the declared liberals from the governing party (one man government of Donald Tusk, CP) do nothing apart from inciting panic in face of roaring extremism and practice liberalism of fear. Yet others feel the urge to act and equipped with torches and high spirit once again enter the center of world events, refusing the new President moral right to be where they are, before his office, and let the flames tell of the conspiracy while they share a word of encouragement, weary of local TV. Some probably still wonder how to restore the cross placed there the day of tragedy and months later hid and profaned by the forces of police state at the service of the traitors. The cross stands unguarded in the nearby church—a proof of pure evil (Bielik-Robson 2010: 56; Stavrakakis 2005).

Smoleńsk 2010 tragedy only intensified division between liberal and enlightened establishment and unenlightened clerical mass. It was also a rich source of symbols that guarantee action and suspense, each opening the gap between the two forces. It makes a come back of populism plausible, as much as a come back of naive, profane, quasi-liberal Enlightenment. We tend to forget that liberal science is church of atheism in the same way religion is guardian of the revelation. The account of tensions in Poland twined with the unredeemed loss, evil spell of the land, unknown malfunction, culpable misdoings and irreproachable errors, piled up with evidence tracing back to years ago and churning out imputations and pleas to institutions worldwide—this was just a beginning of a process that with time started posing the question of the very nature of state and politics, from foreign affairs to lower bureaucracy. On the other hand it brought realization, that there is dimension beyond state and directly related to, where grief poured in and thickened in accusations. This put institutions under surveillance and revealed them impotent exactly when their might is sought for and their authoritative stand is expected. Similarly, the State proved not much of an avenger, shepherd or deliverer. This way, in the course of events, what first seemed

a tiny crack or a dent, quickly opened a chasm where in the deep only torches flickered. Irreparable loss coupled with deploying external institution instead of taking control, compensations which somebody called petty and asked fivefold, army proved danger to itself—the State was as bulky as it was hollow. The match should not be hasty, but I think we may feel rushed to try arrange the hollow within the State with void in-between religion, and in my opinion case Poland provides adds substance to the idea of arranging space in-between by marriage of state and religion, civil religion, that is independent from the state, but at the same time complementary to its functioning.

My analysis of what I call here "mourning populism" is thus half-way between the purely formal, structural position of Laclau and positions analyzed by Cas Mudd in reference to the contents of populism. I follow Laclau in his observation that populism has its own logic, which is transcultural and may in principle apply to any content—be it economic, religious, or racial, etc… However in attempt to understand the specific embodiment of populism and its syntax, we must analyze also the cultural context specific to a given country. This does not mean that populism is the expression of the very nature of a given population, but it does mean that in a discourse, a given population organizes and builds its identity around recurring fixations and themes. This is not nature, however, that provides a pretext for their expression, but discourse, which becomes a prerequisite to provide natural and irrevocable with certain identity.

A superficial reading of Freud's *Mourning and melancholy* goes that his 'sane mourning' is opposed to 'pathological melancholy'. While mourning, a suffering subject is about to accept the loss, allow for it, and reconcile with the 'so called' reality. A melancholic, while mourning, is supposed to narcistically identify with the object lost, unable to let it go, denying 'the reality'. However plausible, this Freudian insight may not be sufficient to explain mechanisms governing labour of memory, work of our life energy systems, our energy residues, and accordingly—our affects.

Maybe we should, contrary to that reading, assume the supremacy of melancholy over 'sane mourning'. There are always reasons to impair one's ability to accept the loss, and the final loyalty towards the object. Maybe us—Poles, have particular reasons to become a nation of melancholics, whose loyalty and persistence constitutes our civic responsibility. A suffering subject, if loyal towards the object—be it his erotic fascination, or intellectual choice, or personal identity—is bound to become a melancholic. For only he guarantees loyalty to the object and disagrees to break off with the past. Given that standpoint, the process of 'sane mourning' could now be seen as a kind of betrayal, where the object is let aloof, its heart breaking, its make-up flaking. We accept the loss, because—we are told—'life goes on'. It has to go on.

Speaking in Kant's terminology, a melancholic makes a mistake blending the loss with the lack of the object. Object of desire—here in its crucial and constitutive meaning—is something that is missing, something that we lack. In melancholy however, this lack is interpreted as the loss. Melancholy blurs the fact that the object was missing from the start. This is why a melancholic so easily turns into a plaintiff or a prosecutor. First, he is mourning the loss of the object of love, then he complains it has been stolen, his pleasures intentionally denied, his very own house taken away. This is what constitutes Hamlet.

Freud in *Mourning and melancholy* wrote *explicite*: "Melancholia, therefore, borrows some of its features from mourning, and the others from the process of regression from narcissistic object-choice to narcissism. It is on the one hand, like mourning, a reaction to the real loss of a loved object; but over and above this, it is marked by determinant which is absent in normal mourning or which, if it is present, transforms the latter into pathological mourning. The loss of a love-object is an excellent opportunity for the ambivalence in love-relationships to make itself effective and come into the open" (Freud 1917: 249). If I proper understood this fragments, it means that the case of politics of mourning is in fact the case of politics of narcissism because it offers to subject the opportunity for regression from narcissistic object-choice to narcissism.

Perhaps, for us Poles, this bitter time is a revival of national symbols, the moment of identification with one object, and so we reunited with a community, at this stage—community of tears. Perhaps the tragedy at Smoleńsk released already a non-modernist, and with yet more patience and ease, maybe even anti-modernist attitude: Smoleńsk was a reunion of body, and all us into "people." Today, in retrospect, we already realize how tricky can be the sense of national unity, and how deceptive is politics devoid of divisions, the vision of the State (society/nation) completely reconciled. We, the Poles, we already know that this sense of unity was temporary, and the work of mourning was opening chasms and mounting new divisions, namely the work proved to be that of free from love object libido, which is not bound up with the new object after the loss and instead has been absorbed back into ones own national ego. The sort of genius Freud was would never miss or pass a remark, destroying the divine perfection melancholic wishes to retain. And why is it always so deep, that most bitter taste will never again send us so high, no mention joy in dead serious. No matter how far up melancholia takes our divine detachment from the earthly bliss, there is a shade copy-cat, on second look more radical, turned inside out and blessed with one-to-one with envy.

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