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Anti-Immigrant Feeling in Spain

Abstract: In just a few decades, with the arrival of immigrants from many different places, Spain has become a multi-ethnic society. Facing these increased streams has been a huge challenge to Spanish society. This article examines the evolution of feelings toward immigration in Spain (2000–2007) with data from a country-wide survey. The results show increasing hostility toward immigrants. The variables that contribute most to explaining this phenomenon are competition and threat, both individual (salaries, jobs or welfare resources) and group (national identity).

Keywords: xenophobia, competition, threat, insecurity, national identity.

Introduction

Ethnicity and multiculturalism are the two subjects that have contributed the most literature to the social sciences in recent years (Gilmartin 2008; Kymlicka y Shapiro 1997; Parekh 2000; Portes y DeWind 2004; Rex y Singh 2006). Wieviorka (1994) explains this as a break with the evolutionist illusion that modernity would eventually eliminate particularism. The "ethnic myth" (Steinberg 1989) has not only been eclipsed, but there has been a great boom in discourse and movements associated with cultural identity. In the framework of such discourse and practices, tense intergroup relations among members of the "majority," understood as the national population, and the "minority," equivalent to part of the foreign immigrants,[1] often derive in xenophobic behavior.

Spain has become one of those new migrant host societies[2] where the population is a melting pot generating anti-immigrant sentiments (Cea D'Ancona 2005; Díez

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[1] Delimiting the definition of foreign population is not a simple process since it is not homogeneous with regard to nationality, legal status, gender, etc. This diversity has led to considering some foreigners *outsiders* and undesirable (coming from poor countries) and others insiders (coming from the wealthy world). This is sustained by the immigration policies themselves and the social identity component.

[2] The recent history of Spain is closely related to migration. At first, labor was expelled to such different and far-off places as the Americas (especially Argentina and Brazil), North Africa (Morocco and Algeria) and, more recently, Central Europe (France, Germany, Belgium and Switzerland). But in only a few decades, the direction of flow has reversed, and Spain is now seeing immigration above all from Latin America, Eastern Europe and North Africa, in addition to foreign tourists who come temporarily or permanently from more developed areas in Europe (Germany, Great Britain and France) in their search

Nicolás 2005; Pérez Yruela and Desrues 2005). On one hand, politics and public opinion contribute through discourse based on "playing with the numbers," that is, through exaggerating them or presenting them out of context and, on the other hand, through presenting the hazard to stable employment, and loss of cultural identity and public safety. This is apparent based on the fact that in the last decade, all national barometers prepared by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Center for Sociological Research) (CIS), have presented immigration as a problem varying from the first to the fourth degree in Spain, along with unemployment, terrorism and housing, reaching highpoints during immigrant legalization processes (2001 and 2005). At times this qualified as a "social emergency" equivalent to other "alarms," such as drugs, delinquency, etc., and these social perceptions and cognitions have obviously been translated into discriminatory attitudes and behavior, hostility and even violence. [3]

Considering what was mentioned above, the aims of this article are first to verify the evolution of anti-immigrant feeling in Spain over the decade from 1997–2007, in which periods of economic recession and low immigration rates combine with those of economic expansion and high immigration rates. And second, to find out what the main variables defining feelings are.

Explanations for Attitudes toward Immigrants

There are several theories which attempt to define anti-foreign and discriminatory feeling (see Wimmer 1997), but following recent research, we are going to concentrate on the feeling of threat and competition for resources.

The main element in the competition model argues that attitudes toward the out-group are formed when there is a struggle between groups for power, resources and group identity, leading to feelings of threat and insecurity. Such emotions are expressed in frustration and/or aggression, arguing that granting rights to foreigners is detrimental to natives. Thus the perception of threat determines an instrumental model of conflict, which designs discriminatory strategies to increase the opportunities for the national population. The foreigner is perceived as a threat most during crises, and the idea that social rights for foreigners have to be restricted is reinforced.

Furthermore, this concern for threat is not constant, but varies depending on different scales and variables. The first one acts on individuals, in which competition and threat reflect on their own interests. Thus the population with the most vulnerable position in the social system (low education, low salaries, unemployed, etc.) shows

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for sun and sand. More specifically, according to the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Institute of Statistics) (INE), there were 542,314 foreigners in Spain in the mid-nineties, and currently there are 5,708,940, which is the strongest increase in foreign population in the entire European Union.

[3] That was the case of the racist demonstration in El Ejido (Almería) against Maghrebi immigrants, which was considered the most important in Spain and one of the most notorious in Europe in recent years (see Checa et al., 2010). Far from being isolated, acts of racism have gradually been increasing in Spain, although more on an individual level, that is, except for the few occasions where entire groups are attacked (such as the Chinese in the city of Elche), since hostility is now shown toward particular individuals in daily surroundings.

a more negative and discriminatory attitude toward the out-group (see Quillian 1995; Raijman and Semyonov 2006; Semyonov et al. 2004).

The second, which is collective, argues that discrimination and out-group prejudice are based on a threat to group identity, that is, the presence of the population of other groups endangers the cultural and identitary homogeneity (Schiefer et al., 2010; Schwartz, 2008), and for some, even the democratic political system. Thus in the context of immigration, there is more sympathy for those groups that speak the same language, practice the same religion, and have similar socioeconomic status, than for those with which there is hardly any shared ethnic content, since ignorance is a key factor in creating or consolidating negative prejudices and stereotypes of the out-group.

Moreover, in some cases, "historical residue" also defines the attitude of foreigners. That is, the type of relations that have become established over the years between home and destination may condition present and future relations between their subjects. Therefore, there is not a lack of authors who argue that in Spain those from Latin America and former Spanish colonies are "chosen" over other groups (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Izquierdo et al. 2003).

Both levels, individual and group, are also affected by variables such as the size of the population, economic situation, immigration policies and intergroup relations.

The size of the population has been the variable most studied as an element of threat and insecurity in intergroup competition. The more people there are in the out-group, the greater the feeling of threat and competition, which is translated into ethnic dissatisfaction and discrimination (see Kunovich 2004; Quillian 1995, 1996; Scheneider 2008; Schuman et al., 1997; Semyonov et al., 2000). In fact, when defining threat and insecurity, the population size is almost always more perceived than real, and therefore, it is even possible for there to be xenophobia without the presence of foreigners.

Economic conditions noticeably influence perception of the threat, so when economic scenarios are good, the negative feeling against other groups decreases since there are more opportunities and less competition in the labor market (see Kunovich 2004; Quillian 1995; Schneider 2008; Semyonov et al. 2008). In other words, when economic expectations are a concern, competition and the impression of danger come to the surface, translated into prejudice and discrimination, which are fed by ethnic antagonism and decline of opportunities. Of course, economic conditions alone do not influence hostility. They must be accompanied by group size; thus, a place or a country in economic recession does not show opinions against foreigners if their number is unimportant or insignificant.

Increased xenophobia is also related to nationalist political positions and/or ideologies and feelings (citizenship) (Ceobanu and Escandell 2008). The prolonged and significant arrival of immigrants causes a dilemma for political agents defining migratory policy. On one hand, equal rights for all could be promoted, while on the other, socioeconomic opportunities could be limited for immigrants, especially for those whose presence supposedly does not increase the social well-being of the destination (illegal or regrouped family members not of working age). Among Spanish politicians, it is often stated that the immigrants' use of public social services (for

example, the health service) are damaging to its enjoyment and/or use by the national population. This is accompanied by discourse in which such terms as "overloaded society," avalanche, invasion, abound as well as others are used in order to promote immigration as a problem more than a global phenomenon.

It is well known that neo-fascist political ideologies reject immigration, generating a climate of violence and antagonism toward those who are not nationals, based on individual (they take away our jobs and lower salaries) and group (national identity is lost) competition (see Pain 2007; Semyonov et al. 2007; Skenderovic 2007; Van Spanje and Van der Drug 2009). At the same time, their agendas insist on hardening immigration policy, controlling entry of immigrants or arguing for their expulsion, discourse which, although softened, is being imposed in other political parties and governments with more moderate tendencies (see Brodkin 2005; Carrera 2006; Simon and Sikich 2007).

Florence and Martiniello (2005) argue that the conception of national identity has been important in defining integration and foreign citizenship rights based on either *jus soli* or the civic nation, or on *jus sanguinis*, founded on the romantic vision of the cultural and ancestral nation. Therefore, it is important to know society's definition of the country, analytically understood as "civic" (universalist/post-nationalist) or "ethnic" (particularist/credentialist). An exacerbated feeling of particularism leads to larger doses of xenophobia because of the threatened loss of cultural homogeneity. Immigration is perceived as a social problem and a problem of potential loss of identity, especially when diversity is more patent.

Finally, many authors point out that exclusionist attitudes toward foreigners are also defined by the type of relations or contact the natives have with them (*contact hypothesis*) (see Allport 1954; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Pettigrew 1998). More specifically, xenophobia is weaker the more intense and lasting the contact is, especially if there are facilitators with equal status, cooperation among groups and common goals, where symbolic interethnic boundaries become hazy (Bail 2008; Mclaren 2003). Such relations sometimes end up increasing mixed marriages (Johnson and Jacobson 2005) and reducing stereotypes, and thus diminishing anti-immigrant feeling.

The migratory phenomenon is definitely an interpretable reality based mostly on a perception responding to private interests through real or perceived experiences, which determines attitudes and behavior. Therefore, attitude toward immigration should not only be interpreted as the framework of relations between natives and foreigners, but should also be a tool for politicians to keep in mind when designing their social integration policies for stable, peaceful coexistence.

Data and Variables

From 1997 to 2007[4] the opinion survey firm, Análisis Sociológicos, Económicos y Políticos (Sociological, Economic and Political Analyses) (ASEP), carried out statis-

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[4] After 2007, no more national surveys were carried out with the same indicators for evaluating attitudes toward immigration.

tically significant surveys[5] on the Spanish population (18 and older) attitudes toward foreigners. This database contains information from 13,292 surveyed individuals. The sample is stratified proportionally by the number of immigrants settled in various autonomous regions. The information was collected at random. The matrix was completed with official statistics from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Statistics Institute) (INE) on the foreign population and unemployment rate.

For our longitudinal analysis, we chose three different time periods. The first, 1997/1998, responds to a period of economic crisis when the immigrant population was small; the aggregate sample for this period is 2,413. In the second period, 2003/2004, the country was enjoying strong economic expansion and the number of immigrants increased considerably. This sample was made up of 2,420. Finally, in 2006/2007, the immigration rate was high, a process of immigrant legalization was coming to a close and the highpoint of economic expansion had been reached, as stagnation and the later recession were already beginning to be felt. The sample this time was 2,405 individuals.

To measure Spanish attitudes toward immigrants, we constructed an *index of anti-immigrant feeling*. To do this, the affective and cognitive components of attitude were taken into consideration through the following questions (Checa et al. 2010; Díez Nicolás 2005; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Semyonov et al. 2006): "Immigration will cause Spain to lose its identity" (Agree = 1); "Influence of immigration on unemployment" (Increase = 1); "Influence of immigration on salaries of Spaniards" (Lower = 1); and "Influence of immigration on delinquency" (Increase = 1). The index varies from 0 to 4, where 0 implies no anti-immigrant feeling.

The essential points emphasized by Evans and Need (2002) concerning the independent variables and predictors of anti-immigrant feeling were taken into account: threat, insecurity and social distance, along with other points that refer to migratory policy and social rights indicators (Cea d'Ancona 2009).

Threat is measured, on the one hand, by the real and perceived size of the foreign population (Quillan 1995; 1996; Scheneider 2008; Schlueter and Scheepers 2010; Semyonov et al. 2000). In the first case, we took the percentage of foreigners. For the second, we gave a score of (1) to those who answered that there are too many immigrants settled in Spain. On the other hand, identitary threat is seen as perception of conflict in questions of identity, highly praising either ethnic or civic identity. To do this, respondents were first asked about the effects that immigration has on Spanish culture (bad or very bad = 1), typical of an ethnic or credentialist identity. Second, self-identification with the territory (universalist = 1) fits to a civic identity, and third, their position on materialism (postmaterialism index) (materialism = 1) (Díez Nicolás 2005; Inglehart 1997). *Insecurity* derives from threat, which is expressed

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[5] Cea d'Ancona (2009), continuing along the line begun by other authors, approaches the difficulties of measuring xenophobia or anti-foreigner feelings in surveys. Such limitations exceed the technique itself, since he speaks mostly about *social desirability* bias, defined mainly by the stigma of admission of xenophobia in modern societies where any declaration or behavior contrary to the constitutional principles of equality and non-discrimination is censured, and even penalized. In spite of this problem, we use the data from the survey since it is the only one carried out so widely in Spain.

based on two components: The first component, material, quantified on one hand by the attitude, "immigrants should only be allowed to enter when there are no Spaniards to perform that activity" (Agree = 1), and on the other, by the unemployment rate. The second, political insecurity, referred to in two questions, related to migratory policy and granting citizenship (Díez Nicolás 2005). First, "The economic situation is complicated enough for Spaniards without allocating money to help immigrants" (Agree = 1), and second, "A better attitude toward illegal immigrants (Legalized = 1).

Social distance, understood as a lack of interaction, is operationalized by three dimensions of *intergroup contact*: intense, occasional and at work (Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Hamberger and Hewstone 1997). The first corresponds to the question "Do you have a close affective relationship with any immigrants?" (No = 1). The second asks the question, "Have you ever had a long conversation with immigrants?" (No = 1). The third asks, "Do you have relations with immigrants at work?" (No = 1).

Finally, individual variables are also enormously important in predicting anti-immigrant feeling (Coenders and Scheepers 2008; Díez Nicolás 2005; Escandell and Ceobanu 2009; Kessler and Freeman 2005): sex (Male = 1), age (In years), education (Universitary = 1), income (Lowest quartile = 1), political orientation (Right = 1), activity (Unemployed = 1), marital status (Married = 1), location of residence (Urban = 1), frequency of travel outside of Spain (Never = 1) and Autonomous Region (Valencia as the reference).

Results

The first outcome of the longitudinal study was the gradual increase in anti-immigrant feeling in Spain. While in 1997 the mean was 1.4, in 2003 it reached 1.8, and by 2007 it was already 2.1 (see Graph 1). In other words, the foreigner is identified more and more as a generator of unemployment, delinquency, falling salaries and a threat to cultural identity. This rise occurs in three different periods within the same decade. At first, from 1997 to 1999, the feeling remains almost constant at around 1.4. In the beginning of the new millennium, there is a sharp rise to 2.1. Finally, from 2004 to 2007, there is an upward trend reaching 2.4, although in the last year this feeling diminished. Therefore, in Spain, just as Blalock (1967) argues, attitudes toward the out-group do not undergo a linear increase.

Furthermore, the increase in anti-immigrant feeling is also reflected in the variables used in the analysis. Firstly, in Table 1, it is observed that the percentage of foreigners in Spain increases, such that in 1997 foreigners constitute 1.6% of the population, while in 2004 this rises to 7.2% and in 2007, it reaches 10%. However, the threat perceived increases more than the real population, since in the two-year period of 1997/1998, 26.8% of Spaniards thought there were too many foreigners, while in 2003/2004 this opinion was held by 46.6% and by 61.9% in 2006/2007.

The feeling of threat also increased over cultural and economic patterns. In 1997/1998, 17.4% of Spaniards thought migration caused adverse affects on the culture, a percentage which increased to 24.3% in 2003/2004 and to 36.5% in 2006/2007.

Graph 1

Evolution of the anti-immigrant feeling index in Spain (1997–2007)

Source: ASEP database. Graph by author.

Concerning economic insecurity, in 1997/1998, 45.5% of Spaniards thought that immigrants should be allowed to enter only when there were no Spaniards to perform the jobs, a percentage which increased to 57.5% in 2006/2007. This trend is in contrast with the real evolution of the unemployment rate. In 1997/1998 the unemployment rate was 20.1% of the active population and in 2006/2007 the rate dropped to 9.9%.

Similarly, political insecurity also increased during these years. While in 1997/1998 41.6% of the Spanish population was against allotting funds to the social integration of immigrants, one decade later the situation accentuated, arriving at 57.9%. Also, while 29% of Spaniards in 1997/1998 were in favor of legalizing immigrants, the percentage gradually fell to 8.8% in 2006/2007.

Therefore, in light of what is mentioned above, the majority of Spaniards conceive of an ethnic rather than a civic nation. That is, immigrants that fit the "requirements" of being accepted, have been born in Spain, have Spanish ancestors, practice Spanish customs or even be Catholic, rather than the more civic characteristics, such as living in Spain, speaking Spanish or being a citizen.

Finally, intergroup contact, although still slight, is increasing. Thus, for example, in the two-year period 1997/1998, 94.4% of Spaniards had no friendship at all with immigrants, 78.2% had never had a conversation with one, and 95.9% said they did not work with immigrants. One decade later, the figures changed slightly: 20% of Spaniards said they did not have any immigrant friends, 72.3% had not had a conversation with one and 72.5% still did not work with any.

Among the individual variables, the first thing that stands out is the substantial decrease in the number of Spaniards who say they have a low income (13.6% in 1997/1998 and 3.9% in 2006/2007), which is normal in light of the economic progress the country underwent in that decade, when unemployment rates went from the highest in the country's recent history to one of the lowest. And second, the low and falling percentage of Spaniards who identify themselves as universalist as well as the increased ranking of materialist values.

Therefore, xenophobic events have occurred during the decade through both attacks on certain population groups, such as North Africans in El Ejido (Almería) or Chinese in Elche (Alicante), and on individuals. These attacks, which foster hid-

Table 1

Evolution of descriptive statistics of the variables in the analysis (%)

Variables		1997/1998	2003/2004	2006/2007
Threat	Real population (Percentage)	1.6	7.2	10.0
	Perceived population (Too many)	26.8	46.6	61.9
	Evaluation of the effects on our culture (bad)	17.4	24.3	36.5
Insecurity	Only allow immigrants to enter when there are no Spaniards (Agree)	45.5	52.1	57.5
	Unemployment rate	20.1	10.6	9.9
	Money for immigrants (No)	41.6	46.3	57.9
	Legalize Immigrants (Yes)	29.0	17.2	8.8
Intergroup relations	Close friendship (No)	94.4	94.3	79.9
	Occasional (No)	78.2	78.9	72.3
	Contact at work (No)	95.9	89.2	72.5
Socio-demographic	Sex (hombre)	48.3	48.5	48.5
	Mean age	45.0	46.2	46.1
	Education (university)	7.5	6.1	8.0
	Income (low)	13.6	5.6	3.9
	Activity (unemployed)	9.5	7.7	5.6
	Political orientation (right)	17.3	14.9	17.0
	Marital Status (married)	63.5	64.2	63.5
	Residence (urban)	74.6	76.4	78.3
	Self-identification (universalist)	5.1	4.5	4.7
	Post/materialism index (materialist)	62.7	61.1	67.7

Source: ASEP database.

den feelings of threat and insecurity that have consolidated over time, are not due exclusively to certain coincidental events.

Multivariate Analysis of Anti-immigrant Feeling

The data enable us to estimate, based on individual and contextual variables, three regression models for predicting anti-immigrant feeling (see Table 2). In Model 1 we examine the role of the variables in generating threat and insecurity, as well as intergroup contact. In Model 2 we add the individual variables, and in the third model, we insert the different autonomous regions of Spain, taking Valencia as a reference, because as according to Díez Nicolás (2005), it has had one of the highest doses of xenophobia over the years.

The analysis shows that during all three periods, the variables that best explain the variance in anti-immigrant feeling are threat, insecurity and intergroup contact, with 39%, 34% and 38%. And finally, with the addition of the autonomous regions, the variance explained is 41%, 39% and 41%.

In the first model in 1997/1998, both the threat variables themselves and insecurity are good predictors of the feeling. More specifically, in this order, all of them being positive: threat perceived, funds allocated to integration policies, negative effect on

the host culture and allowing immigrants to enter only when there are no Spaniards to perform the activities. Less important and negative is legalizing immigrants. None of the contact variables are statistically significant.

In 2003/2004, all of the variables became more explanatory, especially those referring to economic competition, since the employment rate acquired statistical significance that it had not had during the previous period. The variable which again impacts the most, with a positive sign, is the perceived population, followed by allotting funds to immigrants, negative effects on the culture and accepting immigrants when there are no Spaniards to perform the activities, and with one negative, legalizing immigrants and unemployment rate. Again, occasional contact is the only significant intergroup interaction variable.

In 2006/2007, the variables became still more important in explaining feeling toward the out-group. During this period, rejection of allotting funds to immigrant integration policy has the most explanatory power, followed by perceived population and threat to culture as well as accepting immigrants when there are no Spaniards for the work. Again, legalization is negative, and unemployment rate is less important than in the previous period. In intergroup contact, close relationships with immigrants became statistically important for the first time, such that the closer the contact, the more xenophobia is reduced.

Based on the results above, the perceived threat created by the various agents and institutions, economic competition and politics are more important in creating feelings toward foreigners than the real population or unemployment rate, this is noticed even when immigration is relatively low, as in 1997/1998, or when unemployment rates go down.

In the second model, the individual variables are inserted. The data on threat, insecurity and intergroup contact remain almost constant. In 1997/1998, they predict feelings toward the out-group in this order: age, political orientation, education (negatively), marital status, sex and unemployment. In other words, the older individuals are, having a conservative ideology, being less education, married, male and unemployed, the stronger the feelings toward foreigners become.

In 2003/2004, the figures remain almost constant, but unlike in previous years, marital status is not statistically significant while low income is. Therefore, the lower the income is, the more negative the feeling toward the out-group.

In 2006/2007, habitat (urban), male and unemployed were the most important socio-demographic variables in predicting xenophobic feeling, even though unemployment was at its lowest in the period analyzed. At this time, education, and income lost their predictive ability.

In the third model, the autonomous regions are inserted, with Valencia as the reference. Those that have a negative sign, show less anti-immigrant feeling than in Valencia. Thus, in 1997/1998, as in 2003/2004, all of the regions were less xenophobic. However, the standardized coefficients are not statistically significant for Asturias, Baleares and Navarra in 1997/1998 or Baleares, La Rioja, Madrid and Murcia in 2003/2004, suggesting that their feeling does not differ much from the Region of Valencia. However, in 2006/2007, the situation changes radically, since all of the au-

tonomous regions except Aragon, Castile la Mancha, Castile Leon and Galicia, which are still negative, have a stronger anti-immigrant feeling. The Regions of Murcia, Basque Country and Catalonia now have the most anti-immigrant feeling compared to Galicia, which had the least.

Discussion

Following theoretical premises, the article specifically examines the proposition that a negative view of immigrants is accentuated with increased foreign population (feeling of threat), and difference (cultural) between nationals and foreigners. It also becomes more pronounced in individuals who have a vulnerable socioeconomic situation as well as with people who have a conservative political ideology.

First of all, the data shows that hostility toward immigrants has been increasing over time. While in 1997/1998 the mean anti-immigrant feeling index was 1.4, in 2003/2004 it increased to 2.1 and in 2006/2007 it rose to 2.4. These results show that Spaniards are more tolerant than other European countries (Semyonov et al., 2008), although the trend is to become as or more restrictive and intolerant as the rest of European countries (Meuleman et al., 2009; Zapata-Barrero 2009).

However, this trend cannot be explained based only on a real increase in population arriving in a short amount of time, and is only triggered by this, as a decade later there is not much difference between the feelings predicted in 1997/1998. Therefore, the feeling responds to daily discursive and/or institutionalized practices. Immigration is not built up as an invasion because of its numbers per se, but is a response to a symbolic construction, product of allocutions from political discourse and the communications media. In order to refer to the number of immigrants, these sources usually use metaphors that have little to do with the actual quantification of the inflow of immigrants. Thus the arrival of immigrants is defined as waves, avalanches, invasion, etc., words that promote the idea that there are too many and are meant to provoke hostility and fear. This is added to the fact that immigrants are becoming more and more visible as they set up their own businesses, open places of worship, and occupy public spaces, hence increasing their perception as a threat. The immigrant is thus the other, and this leads to thinking of him as different, which in some cases translates into fear of hyperforeignization. Therefore, some autonomous regions with low immigration rates show a stronger anti-immigrant feeling than others where more immigrants have their residence.

But the threat transcends the numerical and is consolidated in identitary. As we are reminded by Worchel (1998) in his text with the astonishing title, "*Written in Blood*," any kind of group identity serves as the basis of conflict, which begins the moment it is assigned an "ethnic content" based on stereotypes. Some immigrants (some more than others) go on to be conceptualized as "culturally incompatible." Cultural differences are emphasized, rather than genetic ones, through subtle prejudice. The culture is perceived as a hereditary trait which nobody can shed, or in other words, there is "a genealogical conception, and therefore racial, of culture and its transmission" (Todd,

Table 2
Effects of the independent variables on anti-immigrant feeling

	Variables	1997–1998			2003–2004			2006–2007		
		Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 4	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Threat	Real population (Percentage)	0.030***	0.002***	0.007***	0.059*	0.065*	0.066*	0.038**	0.034**	0.036**
	Perceived population (Too many)	0.190*	0.186*	0.166*	0.253*	0.245*	0.221*	0.320*	0.312*	0.288*
	Evaluation of the effects on our culture (bad)	0.170*	0.162*	0.159*	0.160*	0.154*	0.147*	0.218*	0.220*	0.215*
Insecurity	Only allow immigrants to enter when there are no Spaniards (Agree)	0.168*	0.162*	0.157*	0.132*	0.119*	0.130*	0.100*	0.098*	0.106*
	Unemployment rate	0.001***	0.002***	0.001***	-0.115*	-0.117*	-0.135*	-0.030**	-0.032**	-0.310**
	Money for immigrants (No)	0.179*	0.177*	0.172*	0.184*	0.170*	0.163*	0.377*	0.378*	0.374*
	Legalize Immigrants (Yes)	-0.082*	-0.073*	-0.083*	-0.134*	-0.133*	-0.110*	-0.103*	-0.098*	-0.100*
Intergroup Contact	Close friendship (No)	-0.004***	-0.008***	-0.012***	-0.012***	-0.008***	-0.008***	0.104*	0.107*	0.109*
	Occasional (No)	0.031***	0.026***	0.029***	0.054***	0.042**	0.051**	0.018***	0.026**	0.039**
	Contact at work (No)	-0.020***	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.024***	-0.023***	-0.023***	-0.026***	-0.026***	-0.033***
Individual	Sex (hombre)		0.031**	0.035**		0.042**	0.049**		0.044**	0.043**
	Mean age		0.097*	0.104*		0.110*	0.120*		0.023*	0.030*
	Education (university)		-0.045*	-0.041*		-0.033**	-0.041**		-0.017***	-0.020***
	Income (low)		0.028***	0.033***		0.050*	0.048*		-0.027***	-0.027***
	Activity (unemployed)		0.019*	0.021*		0.025**	0.025**		0.040**	0.038**
	Political orientation (right)		0.061*	0.058*		0.052**	0.052**		0.024**	0.047**
	Marital Status (married)		0.038**	0.032**		0.007***	0.005***		-0.005***	0.004***
	Residence (urban)		-0.010***	-0.035***		-0.017***	-0.004***		0.052**	0.045**
	Self-identification (universalist)		0.022***	0.021***		-0.036**	-0.043***		-0.035**	-0.36**
	Post/materialism index (materialist)		0.020***	0.010***		0.077**	0.061**		0.044**	0.047**
Autonomous Regions	Andalucía			-0.143*			-0.092*			0.055***
	Aragón			-0.104*			-0.043**			-0.026***
	Asturias			-0.005***			-0.061**			0.042**
	Baleares			-0.021***			-0.021***			0.028***
	Cataluña			-0.046**			-0.044**			0.072**
	Canarias			-0.068*			-0.046**			0.011***
	Cantabria			-0.056**			-0.085*			0.011***
	Castilla León			-0.116*			-0.111*			-0.031***
	Castilla la Mancha			-0.075*			-0.063*			-0.016***
	Extremadura			-0.081*			-0.082*			0.018***
	Galicia			-0.117*			-0.078*			-0.055**
	La Rioja			-0.72*			-0.018***			0.010***
	Madrid			-0.095*			-0.003***			0.022***
	Murcia			-0.064**			-0.025***			0.082*
	Navarra			-0.060***			-0.041**			0.058*
	País Vasco			-0.144*			-0.133*			0.073*
Coefficient R²		0.393	0.418	0.422	0.343	0.361	0.390	0.384	0.392	0.416

Source: ASEP database.

*P ≤ 0.01;   **P < 0.05;   ***P < 0.200

1996: 343). They face open rejection or subordinate "integration," since the beliefs of others are almost always seen as components of fundamentalism, which is equivalent to points of conflict or clash, especially when they are Muslims who are taken as immigration's archetype. This is why the best response to this situation is cultural assimilation and negation of full citizenship rights, even by those who do not consider themselves racists.

Thus, Spaniards think that the continual arrival of foreign populations affects nationals negatively and that funds should not be allotted to their integration, nor should they be legalized. Moreover, in the discourse of some political parties, semantic structures emphasize the *difference* in appearance, culture and behavior, or the *deviation* from norms and values, which take shape in slogans such as "defend your identity" and "defend your rights." All this is fed by an ethnic-based nationalist conscience (Schöpflin 1993; 2000). They demand of others what the nationals themselves do not even have. The Spanish identity has been configured in opposition to the "other" and defined based on abstract symbolic dimensions more than on quality.

The feeling of threat is complemented by one of competition for limited resources, such as employment, housing, health-care, etc., which also magnifies the presence of immigrants. Hence, most Spaniards think that foreigners should only be admitted when there are no nationals to do the work. As mentioned above, economic insecurity is accentuated in times of crisis, since possibilities in the labor market are supposedly reduced and job quality is lowered. Nevertheless, in our case, we have found that this situation is secondary in showing a negative feeling toward the out-group, as in 1997, Spain was undergoing an economic crisis that led to unheard of unemployment rates and the lowest percentage of foreigners in the EU-15. However, there was less xenophobia than in the other two later periods, especially in the two years from 2006–2007 in which economic growth was highest and unemployment rates were the lowest in history, but, on the contrary, the immigration rate surpassed 10% of the population, the highest rate in all the OECD countries.

This reality is ratified by the real unemployment rate in the first period, which is not statistically significant in predicting variability in anti-immigrant feelings, although it is in the other two periods. The individual unemployment variable is also more important in periods of economic expansion and higher immigration rates. In the beginning this was because the labor markets where immigrants were working (mainly agriculture and construction) were complementary to those where natives were working. Inequality in employment even allowed natives to have access to jobs for which they originally were not qualified. However, over time, immigrants have been occupying labor niches (service sector) which are in competition with the national population, especially with those nationals that are more disadvantages (for example, low education).

Moreover, the national population also perceives competition in the benefits of the Welfare State, housing, education and health-care, so only a minority would allot funds for integration of immigrants or for their legalization.

The "problematization" of immigration has one of its roots in political parties, through the continual legislative changes in the law on Aliens and their legalization.

When these matters are approached, especially when it comes to legalization, the CIS barometers show that immigration has become one of the major problems in the country. It is what Zapata (2009) calls the *governance hypothesis*. If the government faced integration of immigrants inclusively, offering civic citizenship instead of credentialist, or stopped transmitting its efforts to control the influx to the population, the negative feeling toward the out-group would be even higher.

Finally, attitudes toward the out-group are based on prejudice and stereotypes that are built up and consolidated due to a lack of inter-group contact. The results have shown that in Spain, although they have increased, relations are few, either affective or occasional contact. This absence is not due so much to the lack of common space as it is due to the instrumentalization of the immigrant as a degrading agent.

Conclusions

According to public perceptions of immigrants, there are definitely three "ideal types" of people in Spain: utilitarist, differentialist and pluralist. The utilitarist reflects an instrumental and economic conception of migration. Immigrants are perceived only as a work force that must be used whenever there is no national population to perform the activities. The differentialist accentuates cultural matters, that is, he does not understand immigrants without their ethnic content, the response to which is a marked ethnocentrism and an attack on uniformity. Finally, the pluralists, who are more and more in the minority, are tolerant and acknowledge the foreign population.

Obviously, in societies that are more and more multiethnic, an effort must be made to strengthen the pluralist viewpoint, which can only happen if the communications media and political discourse change their strategies completely. Otherwise, as many have recently witnessed, there will continue to be xenophobic acts committed toward groups and individuals of immigrant populations.

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