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## **Information and Fears around Decision Making International Migration from Hungary**

*Abstract:* Social distances are shortening in contemporary European Union by easier and cheaper travelling, increasing language skills and as a consequence, migration rates are growing. On the other hand, despite the spreading of virtual communities, participation and activity in these communities has become more and more common in our everyday life but civic publicity is still not a part of the discourse thus it cannot have any influence on migration related decisions. Moreover, virtual communities cannot give real integrity in every aspect. We researched migration outflows from Hungary with university communities to find out whether a personal connection or a stronger cohesion could result a shift in influential mechanism of information on human attitudes. Chain migration is motivated by many reasons and in our viewpoint gathering more information about possibilities and other circumstances of migration is not enough to extend the limits on emotional level. These fears would mean the limitation of migration potential and the possibility of further growth in the future.

*Keywords:* virtual communities, network migration, international migration, chain migration, community values

### **Civic Publicity, Virtual Communities and Socio-Geographical Distance**

Modernization was often described as—or at least partly defined by—the shortening geographical distances in real or virtual societies. The development of the transportation system, for example, made it easier to work in a foreign city, thus labor markets has changed rapidly as a consequence. The phenomenon of growing temporary migration caused increasing economic output. (Blanchflower et al 2007, Dickinson 2008, Dustman et al 2010) More open and permeable labor markets cause increasing information flows naturally. It is enough to have a look at the immigration rates in the US in the past. Every greater inflow had a strengthening feedback on the source countries' societies through information channels and increased migration outflows from there: Hungarian peasants, for example, began to immigrate to the US at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century and became mostly miners. As soon as they got a job overseas they wrote letters to their family members and friends at home about chances to follow them. This was a common situation that we can describe as general migration patterns. (Boyd 1989, Tilly 1990, Puskás 2000, Poros 2001) The growing number of Mexican immigrants since the 60's roots in the antecedents known as the Bracero Program from

the 1940's. (Snodgrass 2011) Similarly, the most contemporary process: South Korean immigrants in the United States between 1970 and 2007: the number increased from 38 711 to 1 million, making them the seventh largest immigrant group in the United States after Mexican, Filipino, Indian, Chinese, Salvadoran and Vietnamese foreigners. (Terrazas 2009) Chain migration is a common phenomenon in sociology (MacDonald-MacDonald 1964, Massey et. al. 2002), Even policymakers reacted to it and accepted a part of it recently as a major way in the US and in some European countries: namely the family reunification (Tichenor 2002); but the escalation in migration volumes by these effects are usually part of a macro-economic analysis.

Information circulation is a tool of migration: reachable purposes, useful connections and skills. On the other hand—to change living place especially when it is about homeland—it is not merely a rational choice. Aptitudes, intentions and attitudes contain fears, awkwardness and many other emotions can influence these decisions. Understanding such social processes we need to consider both the information exchange and the situation of the values and the emotions of a society and the interaction among them.

The question is whether the refusal or the lack of traditional integration forms strengthen the connection within the ethnic groups or lingual, native soil connections. The lack of information flow connected to official institutional possibilities does not mean that current situation remains unutilized in every aspect. Researches proved that informal communication systems became more important in labor exchange between countries in the last decades (Portes 1997, Portes et al 1999) and our previous researches about civic publicity stated that there is a growing importance of virtual communities (Yoo 2013) and a correlation between and the emerging East-West direction migration (Koudela 2013). Different civic publicity platforms have growing importance in community formation such as forums, blogs on Internet focusing ethnicity without any ethnics. Immigrants of the same language or nativity find themselves in virtual communities like Facebook or other online groups formed on ethnic base but lacking the discourse. The goal is mostly not strengthening identity in an altered environment but to find help for practical reasons: jobs, social welfare system etc. As a non-intentional consequence, integrity increases in these groups. The origin of this can be a part of a social debate: human intention to get connected to others or to a group, social formation processes and any other theoretical context, the phenomenon clearly appears in a growing volume and the intensity of interactions inside these virtual communities and on these platforms. The question is how it works and is it enough to change the level of migration?

Neoclassical interpretation of migration was based on an individualistic approach: calculating costs and benefits of possible migrants (Borjas 2001); but analyzing migration flows in the context of new economics considered relative deprivation and put emphasis on family ties (Stark 1991, Massey 1990). Both approaches were rather economic than those which were thinking in a wider international relationship-system. Social structures can also work as markets and migration can also work as a balancing mechanism between areas of different conditions (Portes and Walton 1981). In South Korea international marriages exceeded to a 40% in rural areas for example. Inter-

national marriages has a further influence on local society and following immigration trends (Kim 2014). Our perspective is closer to those which used the concept of path dependence. Migration can be understood less by its economic reasons or can be understood more easily with its resilience over time. People make decisions during their lifetime and the connection between these decisions have influence on chances on migration. Social networks are examples of this phenomenon (Anderson 1974, Tilly 1990, Castles 2004). In case of Hungary the situation is clearly a kind of historical shift from a relatively passive migration status to a newly emerged demographic transition. In this context Hungary is an active part of the migration cycle of Europe (Okólski 2012a, Kaczmarczyk-Lesińska & Okólski 2012).

Our previous research based on interviews with Hungarian immigrants (Koudela 2011a) in different European countries proved that virtual communities have an important role in giving a personal involvement and they have a direct social feedback on growing participation. Growing participation causes an increase of intention in two different ways: spreading horizontally and deepening personally. Spreading is clearly visible in the growing number of participants in more and more countries, and deepening results in traditional forms of integrity such as marriage but the two components effect migration together and the role of increasing migration is therefore evident in macro-economy (Gillingham 2010). The Hungarian website [www.index.hu](http://www.index.hu) operates a forum for Hungarians working in the UK; this forum began in February 2003 with an announcement to write comments. The first note was only signed two years later in January 2005. During the following six years 1 675 pages, 30 comments on each were created showing an intense usage of this forum. Similar platforms came to existence in the recent past like [www.utazas.com](http://www.utazas.com) with a forum: “Search for Hungarians in England!” since December 2004. Thousands of members joined a group on [www.iwiw.hu](http://www.iwiw.hu) (a Hungarian community site) for Hungarians in the UK and a similar on Facebook. Its importance is easily measurable by the activity of its members (Yoo 2013). After 2004, the year of the EU’s greatest enlargement, more and more forums were created for those living in the UK: [www.londonimagyarok.com](http://www.londonimagyarok.com) or [www.london.network.hu](http://www.london.network.hu) and many others suggesting a growing need for information change and a quickly responding market segment certainly with typical anomalies. But such virtual connections are rather service focused and have no real strength in integrity. Members exchange their experience or search for friends but the platform has got no limitation affect and cannot give an emotional safety (Pléh et. al. 2003).

It seems that while secular group formation could result segregation in the 80’s for Hungarians living abroad, this is not possible now because of regular domestic relations and because those communities in foreign countries have no geographical integrity. On the one hand, those who connect in only one dimension to a receiver society, namely in labor market, and do not establish local relationships will not become a real participant of this society. On the other hand, there are no local organic conditions for such an ethnic isolation, virtual world does not give adequate background because the isolation at least an ethnic segregation is needed, but does not exist, and cannot come into existence in contemporary circumstances. Without neither isolation nor integration emotional situation of immigrants is rather instable.

### Values and Fears and Changes in Migration

Everybody has an experience connected to working abroad. Those who are not personally involved know somebody who has worked in a foreign country or read about it or at least have been in an airport lounge waiting for a flight and have seen the haggard faces, have heard the complainant and tired voices. This is very easy to be attentive to these moments as well as to distinct tourists and migrant employees. If their words are not understandable their faces talk instead. But these are only impressions and human nature is to simplify things to seek knowledge without precious information. We wanted to see the potential behind the growing number of East-West migration in the European countries. These fears, emotions or even their disappearance can cause major changes in migration patterns and values in the close future. That would have been easier to say—even on a purely professional basis—that economic output influenced migration directions (Saleheen and Shadforth 2006). We know in general that labor force supply is much higher in the Western European countries than in countries affiliated in 2004 especially for highly educated professionals and for unskilled workers (Clark and Drikwater 2008, Coats 2008). The result of a conclusion chain in a traditional macro-economic context is tautological: growing output increases immigration, growing immigration increases gross output. Influencing institutions like immigration rules or offices immigrants have to meet and the balance between costs of immigration through welfare system expenses and income through higher employment do not change the main logic. This is not a positive feedback if we interpret both factors as major reasons because this system would be closed despite any effect of the participant factors and market flexibility. And we are obviously not talking about the different significant ways or reasons of immigration like asylum seekers or refugees, just about economic migration. Thus the only way to step out of a circulation of ideas is to find inner characteristics of the components especially of the immigrants or potential migrants. Components from this viewpoint are not groups or features of groups like information but individuals, because social strata would be on the same system level than society as a whole. In our approach community was not enough to interpret as a group of people feeling to belong to and in which members have the same background and possibilities (Markova and Black 2007: 8). To avoid such reductionism we analyzed individuals and their migration connected features thus we could step one level down and reach components of individuals and their features. Information about economy, labor market accommodation or even psychological support is a part of network (Poros 2001) and can be limited or hampered by individuals motivated by their emotions and values. To find the differences between information and motivations we need to create artificial situations where participants of an experiment use common information. This might be interpreted as a cultural influence process but not in a way as Massey did (Massey et al 1998). Decision making stands on a meso-level between values and information spreading in networks while Massey worked with a three level system of individual-network-economy (Massey 1998: 50). Our approach is closer to a less structural conception in which symbolic ties are well distinguished from social relations integrating symbolic communities (Faist

2000: 102). Choosing the most affected social group: highly educated migrants, or the potentially most affected migrant group: participants of higher education was a well-founded decision. Higher education means higher awareness; but does higher mean high? We could not be sure that the potential of knowing about possibilities and limits was hundred percent. This doubt also led us to research among students with and without foreign working experience.

Thus we arrived to connect two different approaches in understanding this modern phenomenon: first to eliminate information and emotions. Information is part of rational decision making but emotions are unconscious. Second: to define the gap from virtual communities without effect to ones with it. This latter goal was already researched by us and our major finding was that civic themes are not more interesting for participants than in real life. These are not embedded into online discourse yet (Yoo 2013). Nevertheless increasing activity can strengthen the integrity of a community and can cause changes of emotional attitudes without information, mediation thus creating a real community instead of an accumulation of loosely connecting individuals. In these communities civic themes would be more adequate and discussable thus really influence participants' attitudes to institutions and other environmental elements of migration. This was our main question: whether a real and personal community can cause interaction between information and emotional attitudes at all? After this we would have no other business than redefine or supplement social distance: an emotional tie to a group which has an effect on rational decisions.

### **The Background of East-West Migration in the EU**

Previous researches and the historical experience show that immigration from Eastern EU countries undergoes changes in its volume, characteristics and reasons. During the last century Poland was the largest sending country of the area to Western Europe and overseas. In contemporary UK Polish minority is more numerous than the oldest Irish community; and just like Hungary and other countries in the area Poland is a transition country for Eastern-Europeans and Asian immigrants (Iglicka and Ziolk-Skrzypczak 2010). The great influx of immigrants from newly accessed countries in 2004 caused a change in policy making of western countries' governments in 2007. Finally this year restriction of labor market in the UK was lifted since the 1 of January, but Rumanian and Bulgarian workers' numbers started to decrease (Ballinger and Katwala 2014).

Analysis of interviews with Hungarian immigrants in eight different European countries showed a very complex and changing way in interpreting life history push and pull factors in lives among those arrived in different historical circumstances to different receiving countries (Melegh-Kovács-Gödri 2009). Before 2004 circular migration mostly consisted short term and illegal activities (agriculture, catering, au-pairs) or labor force exchange by economic partnerships for example in construction industry. These part of migration was dominant in Hungary and fits perfectly to the concept of incomplete migration (Okólski 2012b). Their occupational status were low but weren't part of one exact strata of the society. Permanent migrants were

mostly those using their special professional skills or those who had familiar relations abroad. Nowadays the easier and faster travel opportunities and the widening of the labor market possibilities and the recognition of it, especially since 2007, have induced a broad, legal, medium-term and differentiated immigration employment in Germany, Austria and the UK (Bauere et al 2007). We can state that beside the traditional German speaking countries, the UK, Ireland and even Spain, Finland have become more important targets for East-European migration outflows. As long as Hungarian emigration targeted mostly the USA until 1921, the most important destination countries became Germany and Austria since those Exclusion Acts overseas. The rates of migration outflows from Hungary shows a very similar picture but changes in its composition by target countries started to change since 2004.

Table 1

**Hungarian Immigrants in different European Countries and the USA, country of birth**

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Germany	17 411	18 574	18 654	22 175	25 151	25 258	29 220	41 136	—	—
Austria	3 220	3 502	3 673	4 482	5 133	5 768	6 351	9 072	12 275	13 615
United Kingdom	4 062	5 844	6 640	8 476	10 800	8 323	9 454	—	—	—
Netherlands	565	594	571	975	1 721	1 668	1 820	1 904	2 173	—
Ireland	—	—	2 008	1 571	912	794	714	725	743	—
Italy	602	545	613	1 409	1 144	1 054	921	871	853	—
Sweden	228	269	462	776	1 018	893	770	706	857	—
Switzerland	391	359	485	751	1 073	1 140	1 194	1 751	1 819	—
USA	1 272	1 567	1 704	1 266	1 127	1 314	1 022	1 044	1 054	1 052

Sources: Eurostat, Destatis, Statcube, UK Government Statistics, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics: 2013.

In our research we conducted an experiment with students in a Hungarian University College thus we concentrated on Hungary as an environment. The two major questions at the beginning were the following. Beside the dominant English and German languages spoken in Hungary, is there a growing role of other languages or is there a chance of using English in non-English countries? The second was, how the length of period spent abroad influences the return to homeland? The general experience is that it decreases its rate and as a consequence increases permanent settlement. Certainly we cannot foresee this. Since the end of the communism Hungarian migration studies showed that the rate of those planning to work or permanently settle abroad has tripled among adult population in Hungary (Sík 2013). It was only 5% who planned emigration in 1993, but 10% in 2001 and 15% had similar intention in 2011. In 2012 the rate has reached its peak during the last two decades with 19% and has fallen down to 16% in 2013 and only 6% planned permanent settlement. The target countries of the planned emigration are a slightly different from the real migrations' destinations: Austria, Germany and the UK are the same but there is also the US and Canada in people's mind. The rate of traditional destinations are extremely high among those planned circular emigration. In case of short term employment 60% plans travelling to the first three countries mentioned above. The risk factors by social groups show a traditional picture in Hungary: male (22%), youth (48% of

those under 30), underprivileged groups like unemployed, gypsy minority and those have higher education especially students (56%) are overrepresented in emigration planning population.

The rate of those planning emigration has increased with 90% compared to value the 10 years earlier and increased almost four-fold compared to the value twenty years ago. Comparing de facto emigrants is much more difficult because of lacking reliable data. Those by the Hungarian Statistical Office are evidently not suitable in recent years (Gödri 2009) and it is questionable if they are applicable for the earlier periods. In the last couple of years, mirror statistics (target countries' immigration data) clearly showed that migration outflows were much higher than recorded by the Hungarian Statistical Office. For example 29 220 immigrated to Germany from Hungary in 2010. In the same year 20 425 left Germany which result net 8795 permanent immigrants. Hungarians became the fourth highest immigrant group in Germany in that year behind Poland, Bulgaria and Turkey (Statistisches 2012: 40–49). Compared to the 16 900 immigrants in 2000 this was a 73% increase during ten years. It seems that in case of the leading target countries the rate of factually emigrating people increased less than the rate of those planned emigration. But we have to take into consideration that Germany's significance decreased after 2004 when the labor markets of the UK and Ireland were opened for the A8 countries, and after 2006 when countries like Finland, Greece, Spain, Portugal and Italy became accessible labor markets for those coming from affiliating countries. In 2007 Luxemburg and the Netherlands, in 2008 France, in 2009 Belgium and Denmark uplifted their restrictions. This effect was remarkable regarding its dominance in emigration from Hungary in 2000 and even before. Germany received many Hungarians by bilateral agreements in the construction industry or by family reuniting, thus in the years before Hungary's accession to the EU the number of immigrants in Germany got over 10 thousand every year (Salt 2005). Germany's opening took place in May 2011 but that year immigration fell short (Berufsausweis 2011) while immigration started to increase again in 2012. Austria also led A8 workers to its labor market in the same year. Austria has a less important but emerging role in emigration from Hungary, 4500 Hungarian immigrants arrived in 2007 and 5200 in 2008 continuing the increase since 2000 when 2800 immigrants travelled to Austria from Hungary. In 2012 immigration escalated, 12 275 Hungary-born emigrated to Austria and 6355 left the country thus in net migration Hungary (5920) became the second in Austria just behind Germany (International 2013). About 1000 persons emigrate annually from Hungary to the US and only 281 emigrated to Canada in 2011 and the highest number of the previous decade was 685 in 2004 (Facts and Figures 2011).

But not only the EU enlargement influenced the rates of emigration from Hungary. The first cheap air flight company started to operate in 2003. Airport Ferihegy 1 was rebuilt in 2005 and the traffic rate has grown by 46% from the year 2004 to 2005 because of the cheap ticket prices (Repülőtér 2005). Finally, with the bankruptcy of the Hungarian airways Malév in 2011 price competition became more unlimited and air transport turned into everyday occurrence. This change in aviation influenced the rate of migration especially circular migration but this is not the only effect. Simplier

travelling revolutionized the connection between countries in East and West. A trip to another country is not associated with lifelong decisions like it was in the past, it is not even a serious decision. Circular migration has increased since and the difference between circular and long term migration is characterized in different way. Since the mid 2000's periodical working extended to a very wide range of the labor market. Circular migration depends on previous experiences and self-interests. Understanding these numbers economically is the following. The propensity to emigrate is influenced by the level of unemployment in the home country and the percentage of the working population in the receiving country. Gilpin identifies a very clear relationship between these factors. (Gilpin et al 2006) The principal reason for emigration is the belief that employment prospects are better and living standards are higher in the host country. In other words, the largest number of migrants comes from countries where unemployment is high and relative incomes are low. Indeed, Lithuanians (with the highest unemployment and the lowest GDP per head) are the most likely to emigrate of all A8 citizens (Coats 2008: 31). But composition of migrants has changed. Greater human capital translates into better opportunities in the labor market and easier entry into the host society's economic mainstream. That, in part, is why migration of professionals is seldom seen as a problem in the host societies. On the contrary, flows composed of poorly-educated workers can have a more durable impact because of their initial ignorance of the host language and culture and the tendency, especially among migrants from rural origin, to adhere closely to their customs (Portes-Rumbaut 2006). New target countries since 2004 show clear examples to understand this process. For example, on the basis of the age at which individuals left full-time education, immigrants, especially new immigrants, generally appear to be more skilled than those born in the United Kingdom. (Saleheen-Shadforth 2006) 66 per cent of the UK-born population has completed secondary school while 17 per cent have a degree. A smaller part of recent migrants but not just A8 migrants, 52 percent, have a secondary school qualification but a much higher proportion (36%) have degrees. We have empirical evidence indicating that limited language usage restrains migrant workers to find jobs at their most productive level in the economy. (Koudela 2011b) This means over-qualified workers are competing with low skilled UK-born workers, which may lead to displacement as well as the underutilization of migrants' skills (Dickson 2008: 13). 31.5 per cent of A8 migrants are reported to have language difficulties in finding or keeping a job—compared to the 25 per cent of all migrants (Clark—Drinkwater 2008).

Considering these above, the change in spoken languages in the last decades seems more important than before.

Table 2  
Command of Languages in Hungary

	1990	2001	2011
English	228 956	941 139	1 356 307
German	416 215	957 289	923 423

Source: Censuses Hungary.

The number of those who speaks German in Hungary doubled in the last twenty years but the number of English speakers are almost six times higher, thus the latter took place of the former as a leading spoken foreign language in Hungary. The fact itself causes changes in migration destinations as we have seen in the growing role of the UK and Ireland of A8 emigration (Koudela 2013). But the spread of speaking foreign languages has made it easier to travel, to get a job, to settle down or to create new connections. Thus we have to calculate with not only the increase because of the abilities but with a growing and changing pattern in migration chains. Family and local communities had the leading role to achieve possibilities in the past but now new communication forms create new virtual and real communities and connection networks such as the very first forums appeared on internet after foreign employment emerged since 2004. Hungarians eagerly searched for information and help; those who had some experience shared it (Koudela 2011a). The difference between the Hungarian Club in London organized by György Krassó<sup>1</sup> in the 80's and a Facebook group of Hungarians in the UK is more than only a difference between the numbers of their members. This can be interpreted as a leap in integration forms and migration context. We found that shortening social distances like increasing language skills and easier travelling contributed to changing migration just like the new community forms did.

But in the last years other things changed, too. Crossing borders, getting jobs, travelling are easier and studying is also easier. The number of students in Western-European countries are still growing. The total number of A8 students in Higher Education in the UK has increased each year since the accession. In the years between 2007–2010 this increase was occurring at a slower rate than immediately after the accession. There were about 17 000 students in Higher Education who were previously resident in an A8 country in the academic year 2008/09; this made up less than 1 percent of the total student numbers in the UK (0.7 per cent in 2008/09 compared to 0.2 per cent in 2004/05). (Gillingham 2010: 13) But reforming higher education in Hungary the number of candidates coming to Hungary decreased dramatically. The Hungarian government reformed generally the financial support of higher education in 2011 and since the following year the number of courses free of charges decreased greatly. Especially those fields were effected which were not considered market-oriented by the political leadership such as arts and humanities. Because of these restrictions numbers of candidates to higher education has fallen during the following years in Hungary, influencing tendencies to start studies in foreign universities where English or German courses are reachable, e.g. in Poland, Denmark but mainly in Germany, Austria and the UK.

Considering all above we can state that general change occurred in the deep structure of migration. From one side we can interpret as the unification process of the EU: labor markets and borders are more permeable but from the other side cultural, language, economic differences still identify countries as independent places. Thus potentials in labor markets are still important factors of economic growth. Emigrating

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<sup>1</sup> Hungarian refugee working for BBC in the 1980's.

Table 3

**Number of Applicants to Higher Education in Hungary**

2011	2012	2013	2014
141 000	110 000	95 000	116 000

Source: felvi.hu

groups can still be characterized by those in the past: younger, more economically active, more educated in general. As internal migration drift away does not help a region's or a city's economic life, international migration outflows do not help the economy of a country. But as long as migration is based on pure economic reasons and can be connected to depressions and conjunctures the situation is quite simple: despite the decreasing number of potential labor force caused by the decrease in economic potential there are many other factors like natural forces to explore, financial agreements and investments etc. to help economic growth. As long as economy is based on labor force of agriculture and industry with uneducated, poor workers' migration is a compulsion of the circumstances and does not generally reduce the supply in labor market. Today the structural differences between labor markets and social stratification lead to anomalies and dysfunctions of economics. For example, in case of the UK there is anxiety that there is a brain drain, whereby workers are being trained in their home countries resulting high costs for those governments, but their skills and talents are not being used in the domestic economy. This is often related to specific skills or sectors. In Hungary, for example, between 1 May 2004 and 31 December 2005, 2.2 percent of all doctors applied for the diploma notification and this proportion was even higher (seven to eight percent) among anesthetists, pulmonologists and plastic surgeons. (Clark-Hardy 2011: 19)

**Fears and the Role of Education**

One of the most important factors of changes in migration is about education. Intentions to emigrate have been measured for decades and in 2012 was its peak. During the last two decades the rate of those who want to emigrate and settle down in a foreign country has tripled within the Hungarian adult population and the highest rate was among students. (Sík 2013) Emigrational aims can be also experienced among students' applications for admissions to foreign universities. Despite that, there is no systematical data for every country but the directors of the leading secondary schools reported that 20–25% of their graduating students sent in 2013 their application only to foreign universities (Ivanyos 2013). In Austria, the growing number of Hungarian students is measured every year by the Hungarian Student Association (Verein Ungarischer Studierender). The number of Hungarian students almost doubled: 1141 in 2004 and 1916 in 2012. The number of students boosted in the UK from the last year.

In the year of the highest migration aims and the introduction of the tuition fee in higher education in Hungary we made a quasi-experiment. (Campbell-Stanley 1966,

Table 4  
**Students from Hungary in the UK**

	2008	2012	2013
Applications	310	519	719
Admissions	192	329	422

Source: HSAUK.

Rossi et al. 2004, Gribbons-Herman 1997, Shadish et al 2002, Robson et al. 2001) Our goal was to measure the confusion, the available information and associational field of the students: the most relevant population of forthcoming emigrational changes. As part of the experiment we asked 281 students of Kodolányi János University College by a questionnaire. The students were made of three independent but well integrated personal groups mostly divided by their specialization (International Relations, Communication and Social Work). As an incidental circumstance, they were all familiar with the different community groups like Facebook and it is important to mention that they all had well-developed and controlled knowledge about the EU, its labor policy and the situation of Hungary in the EU. Most of them (205) were 18 to 25 years old, women's participation were 75% which is quite close to the average of 71% in higher education in social sciences in Hungary (Veroszta 2007: 3). 6.4% of the participants had already foreign educational experience, they were first and second-year students, and 16% answered yes to working experience in another country. The average value of the answers on a 1–5 scale about the question if there is a chance to work in a foreign country after their diploma was 3.09.

As we suggested above, there are less and less difficulty in circumstances to change homeland and as a consequence the volume of migration outflows increased. But there is still other potentials we wanted to reveal. We supposed that there are limitations, barriers in the people's mind. Values, reactions do not change as fast as material or institutional circumstances, adaptation to environment is slow. Thus we wanted to know about these obstacles in people's mind. Our first question was a free association to migration. We asked only one question in a common situation: at the beginning of a lecture, from those who know one another well, on a test-like paper we used to write. Any other question about their intentions would have disturbed the sign of their deepest feelings appearing in their association with migration so we posed demographic question, and about their experiences on migration, studies behind the first association. After sixteen such questions we came to the next point of the experiment: if they have fears of emigration. We asked three final questions: first they had to guess the price of the cheapest flight from Budapest to London (at any time or airways), second we listed ten EU countries and they had to underline those in which a Hungarian could get a job without restrictions. The question even instructed them that any could be underlined, and of course, in fact free employment was in all at that time. The last such question was to find out if it was able to get a job in Spain without speaking Spanish. We thought that the answers were obvious especially for those we taught about that. It was assumed that wrong answers, the underestimates,

came from the fear of the unknown rather than the missing knowledge. The first of them about the prices searched for fears about their financial limits. We supposed that the sign of a high value means a high risk factor of this: the highest price is the biggest fear that one cannot afford. Ticking a high price does not mean missing money but the fear of that can restrain people to go and buy. Since 2003 tickets have got cheap, in people's mind the travel by airplane does not mean something exclusive and expensive method. Thus the results were not very surprising even though the cheapest price was that time under 10 000 HUF.

Table 5

**Answers for the question: "How much does the cheapest flight ticket cost from Budapest to London and back at any time and by any company?"**

Options	No answer/ doesn't know	1 10 000 Ft.	2 25 000 Ft.	3 50 000 Ft.	4 75 000 Ft.	5 100 000 Ft. or more	Together
Number of answers	1	55	137	53	26	9	281

Only 55 of 281 ticked the correct answer most of them put a sign to a value a bit higher than the average cost of an evening or morning ticket at the more expensive airways. Despite the average prices with Easy Jet and Wizzair around 20–25 000 HUF they got even cheaper anyway. 31% of the answers were much higher than real prices after the breakdown of the nation airways Malév. From our viewpoint the 31% of the answers showed great apprehension and 80% of them only the lack of information.

The next question was rather like a test: tick the correct answers where can a Hungarian get job without restrictions? The situation was like an exam despite them did not write their names on it and there were no instruction about score reduction because of wrong answers but we were their professors, we were in the largest auditorium. Scarce of ticking wrong answers was embedded to the situation but it is not when they fill application documents to study or work abroad?

Table 6

**Answers to the question about free employment in EU countries**

Options	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Together
Answers	5	6	24	29	55	49	33	31	18	14	17	281

We can consider the lack of any underlining as a refusal to answer or as an answer: "I don't know" but this shows doubtfulness anyway. In any other case the scale measures not the grade of lack of information but the presence of fears and doubts. We knew it anyway, for example from their previous tests, that they are very well informed about these questions. Excluding zero underlines the average is 5.3 and 5.2 including them. Correct answer would have been 10 but only 17 ticked so and the modus was only 4.

Table 7

**Answers to the question about free employment in EU countries  
among those had working experiences abroad**

Options	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Together
Answers	—	—	3	2	9	8	3	7	9	1	3	45

45 of the participant students had already working experiences abroad, filtering them the situation is the following.

It seemed like experiences did not influence informations and answers very much. It is possible that someone having worked in Germany did not know about other countries' limitations or the lack of limitations and have a great chance to go there and work again or even settle in Germany. After all, we think that the lack of informations limits the options of making decisions but this is not evident if there is connection between information and fears, and if there is, which way.

The last question about fears was if Spanish is needed to get a good job in Spain or not. The correct answer is not evident at all. We know some people being employed in Spain from different countries without Spanish for a competitive salary and there are examples for employment without language knowledge from Hungary—for example the case of those 120 Hungarian miners working in Spain since 2001 is very well-known—but we suppose that with language it is much easier. But it is not the point of this question why there were no option for “I don't know.” This was not likely that anyone knew or had any experience. We only wanted to know about their uncertainty or the rate of it. 61% of them answered no, there is no chance, but considering only males, the rate is only 50%. Lack of working experience decrease the rate to 58%, lack of working experience abroad to 55%. This is hard to interpret this result: half full or half empty glass? The fact that to enter employment is much easier with the command of language—in the UK, for example, almost impossible without—is not sure how influences the answers. The media is full of this information and many know of it from their own experience. At least it comes from the difference between the rates above. But this was our goal to see how fear of the unknown limits the decision-making. We could presume that experience generally increases braveness and openness despite knowing a country's limits. But the result proved that to learn how difficult it is without a fluent language of the receiving country leads to believe that the situation is similar everywhere. Analogical deduction is stronger based on negative experiences than to suppose the opposite even if it is auspicious. Answers in a semi-official, stressed situation are considered to be signs of those limits that can be found deep inside, thus results can be interpreted as a picture of the inner limits or burdens of emigration.

### **Virtual communities, Civic Publicity and the Information vs. Fears**

This is clearly visible that shortening social distances like easier travelling or opening labor markets, effect on growing migration and can be interpreted on a mere economic

level. Although virtual communities created by forums, Facebook groups, websites couldn't produce such a force which can help migration, at least not more than the reachable information in general. In such cases the increasing volume of information is directly proportional to migration growth but has no effect on deeper limitations. On the other hand, increasing activity, participation does not bring alive a civic publicity in virtual communities which would liberate those inhibitions that can be triggered in any official situation like employment abroad. These fears and awkwardness still exist and this effect on them would become multiplicative and would represent a potential to change society and migration side by side but it has not happened yet. Interpretation in another context would say that incomplete migration (Okólski 2012b) wasn't finished by the change of participating strata in circular migration. These students have some similar features to those underemployed from the viewpoint of their inner potential for migration. Despite of it, they have less chance to find attractive jobs than those circular migrants before 2004 and those working in agrarian sector after 2004 have no real chance to find an adequate job. They are willing to travel abroad but they have less expectations than it would be in the current labor market context. In a real and personally integrated community like we researched information could not effect these emotions despite all member knew each other, had personal connection and as a second layer were joint members of virtual communities. And what is more, they had a direct information about that questions we taught them, read from books and made successful exams of them. Thus we can conclude that neither information nor community integration had influence on fears. The future can show weather social processes will lead to communities without limitations generating another effect on migration. This would feedback naturally on modernization and the growing role of virtual groups, would strengthen it and start up an escalation.

We needed to clearly eliminate information and fears because they are not on the same level. The lack of information can be recognized and become conscious followed by a rational decision, this can be part of it, and we can aspire to recover it. We even do not know about our fears, and those might not even be fears, just uncertainties. The other distinction is between virtual communities like forums or Facebook groups and virtual groups of real effects. I ask questions in vain on forums I register my membership to a group unnecessarily, even if I have familiar associates within, my membership will not be real, will not give a feeling of belonging. In contrast, a real-time interaction aggregation would give such feeling and can rebuild and reinterpret itself. The difference is not only quantitative but also qualitative, even in case of similar appearance forms. Both can be existing groups but not active, one does not create a new a level of group formation.

Comparing our findings to those about emigration from Central and Eastern Europe it seems that not only changing economic and institutional circumstances influences patterns of migration but changing patterns themselves are part of a transformation or shift in European migration cycle. After the fall of communism integral migration system between previous socialist countries declined (Moldikova 2008). Russia became a net immigration center for Eastern European and Asian countries but newly integrated EU member states gained new position in global migration system.

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