

BARTOSZ KALISKI
Graduate School for Social Research

I National Congress of “Solidarity” Gdańsk 1981 —a contribution to analysis

Abstract: The I National Congress of Delegates of Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity [NSZZ “Solidarność”] meeting in Gdańsk in September and October, 1981 is considered the crowning achievement of the “Solidarity’s” organizational and ideological development. No serious and comprehensive monography has yet been written, historical or sociological. The lack of a complete text of the eighteen days of talks was one of the reasons. A shorthand report of the first tour which has been made available recently makes it possible to make some preliminary analyses of the Congress’ topics and dynamics, behaviour of the delegates and mechanisms of their decision-making. It also permits to describe their “union-like” way of thinking as well as understanding and practicing democracy. The author of the article recalls the basic statistics of the community of delegates—a sui generis trade union elite. He moreover poses questions regarding the scale of the secret services’ [SB] controlling the course of the Congress. The author favours the assumption that it was surprisingly negligible.

Keywords: “Solidarity,” democracy, trade union, elites, communism.

Introduction

Poland has been enjoying the benefits of parliamentary democracy for more than a dozen years. Sejm shed its façade character, typical of the Polish People’s Republic [PPR] becoming a forum for taking decisions vital for the country. The fully open and authentic legislative process is a matter of fact today. Televised Sejm debates so popular in the early ‘90s of the XX century may have lost much of their appeal. The Polish society has grown accustomed to parliamentarism. The I National Congress of Delegates of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” could draw neither on experiences of the II Republic nor the PPR Sejm or the communist party congresses. The former were too remote, the latter though contemporary, were devoid of importance, nay, they were actually very strange.

The National Congress of Delegates [KKD] was an unprecedented event, and as such also the quintessence of a unionist way of thinking, understanding and practicing union democracy. Received as an unusual development, exceptional and festive, it was the focus of attention of significant numbers of the “Solidarity” members, who

Author is Doctoral Candidate in the Graduate School for Social Research Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland; e-mail: bkaliski77@hotmail.com

monitored its progress in union periodicals or live, listening to loudspeakers outside the congress hall. A woman activist from Western Pomerania reminisced:

“The Congress was the very breath of our lives. The idea was to mark out the line to follow—we shall know at last which way to take. Once the line is there, we shall march on. There is nothing more to do—just wait. The thrill of it, the excitement... My God, I never took interest in any congresses before but this time... our people are debating” (Szejnert, Zalewski 1986: 358).

In this article, I wish to offer a short description of delegates who gathered at Gdańsk’s sports hall “Olivia” and the environment of this exceptional development, a free “Solidarity” Congress. Source materials allow me to deal with just the first tour of the Congress which met on 5–10 September 1981.¹ The second tour, of 26 September–7 October 1981, was more important in many respects, it was the crowning point of the Union’s institutional maturity. It is not my object to present achievements of both tours, suffice it to say that a volume of official documents (ie the collection of resolutions with the most important—Programme Resolution) numbers 147 pages.

The First Congress closed the founding chapter of NSZZ “Solidarity’s” existence. Its federal territorial structure was made up of 37 regions of very unequal size (ranging from several dozen thousand members to nearly 1.5 million) and some numerically smaller structures struggling for the name and rights of a region—42 organizational units in all. Since early summer, there had been union authorities at all levels established in democratic elections held by all 9.5 million members of the “Solidarity.” Delegates to the Gdańsk Congress were chosen in the same way, a representation twice as big as Polish Sejm, then and today. The second tour of the 2nd KKD appointed national Congress representations: National Commission (Komisja Krajowa) which replaced the National Coordinating Commission active from autumn, 1980, and chose Lech Wałęsa chairman of the “Solidarity.”

One could hardly find even one popular regional activist who had not been included in the Gdańsk Congress delegation. Anna Walentynowicz² was the exception, in opposition to Wałęsa from autumn of 1980, deprived of her mandate of delegate in a referendum of the Gdańsk Shipyard workers. She attended the Congress as a guest (Adamowicz 2005). Thus the 896 delegates were a body chosen and matched in a radically democratic way. Never equally authentic elections on such a large scale had been held in Poland in that epoch.

“Solidarity’s” Elite?

We have detailed data regarding questionnaires answered by 891 delegates at the end of the Congress (AS 41: 218). One of the opening questions was concerned with

¹ All quotations from delegates’ statements and resolutions come from the shorthand report of the first tour of the I National Congress of Delegates (see references). In view of the specific character of this (online) publication I only mention the speaker’s name and the date of his pronouncement, leaving out the page number.

² Born in 1929. A worker at the Gdansk Shipyard, activist of Wolne Związki Zawodowe Wyrbrzeża. Her discharge from work in August, 1980 triggered a strike (Jastrun 1985; passim).

delegates' origin (at that time, it was understood as enquiring about parents' education). It turned out that 47% came from worker families, 33% of intelligentsia, 15%—peasant, and 5% had a peasant-worker or artisan background. The capacious peasant-worker category is very characteristic of Poland's social landscape in the '70s. It covered people doing wage-work in state-owned enterprises who also owned farmland (it could be their property or their parents'). They could till it in their spare time or take a number of days off at specific times (harvest, sowing etc.). Data regarding education of people who gathered at the Olivia hall are surprising. As many as 51% turned out to have higher education. A total of as many as 87% delegates had at least secondary education. The delegation from the Śląsko-Dąbrowski Region (Silesia-Dąbrowa Region) was dominated by workers—there were 71% of them there. Mazowsze (Masovia) was the most dominated by the intelligentsia, who constituted a 58% majority. The recognition in late 1980 that "Solidarity" was formed by the "new middle class" and was not a result of a mythical and ideological worker-intelligentsia alliance, surprises with its shrewdness and accuracy in the light of the data (Kurczewski 1980).

It has been established that 31% delegates came from small enterprises (with up to 500 employees), 38% from medium-sized enterprises (500–3,000) and 31 from big enterprises (more than 3,000). Only a small portion (7%) represented very big enterprises of more than 10,000 employees. Most of those assembled performed some duties in the Union at lower or higher levels of union hierarchy; as many as 51% delegates were members of regional boards. A mere 9% (77 persons) had performed no formal union activity before being chosen as delegates. It would seem that the Congress preserved the position of administrative union "apparatus" yet the apparatus was very young, having been elected democratically just a few months before the congress, in the early summer of 1981. The elections obviously strengthened the position of many leaders of Inter-Factory Founding Committees (the veterans of August 1980 strikes), which became Regional Boards. However, they also promoted many new people; this phenomenon certainly requires a deep analysis. At that time, the "Solidarity" was in no danger of bureaucratic fossilisation.

Just before the end of the 2nd tour another inquiry was held, regarding the delegates' family status (*Congress Communiqué* 1981: 4). It was filled in by 701 persons (but not always with due precision). According to the inquiry, 50% of mandate holders were below 35 years of age, 31%, 35 to 45 years old, and 17% were older, from 46 to 55 years old. The remaining 2% were older still. Although 27% and 25% were born in villages and small towns (below 50,000) respectively, as many as 74% of them were employed in towns with population over 50,000, and 28% in yet bigger ones. A mere 21% of the persons interviewed worked in village or small town enterprises. A pronounced majority (87%) were married, which does not surprise, however, the average age of contracting marriages being considerably lower in the early '80s than today. The highest percentage of delegates (43%) was employed in industrial, production or mining plants. Just 7% worked in health service, 7% in education, 6% in construction industry and 4% in transport. Needless to say, there were much less women than men among the delegates, which was quite common at that time in eligible bodies of

all kinds (from Sejm to Political Bureau to Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party).

41% of delegates had a medium-long period of work behind them (11 to 20 years). 21% worked longer, ie more than 20 years, and 28% less than that—10 years. Most respondents showed considerable employment stability: as many as 33% never changed jobs, 22% worked in no more than two places in all and 16%—in three, the rest changed jobs more often throughout their career. Only 22% were blue-collar workers (manual labour), 13% held medium supervision posts; 7% were chief mechanics and technologists (master craftsmen and foremen), and 10% were white-collar workers (half of them managers). The data are not complete and far from satisfactory to a sociologist, but that is all we have at our disposal (Kaczyńska 1982). New vistas for studying a group of delegates are opening up thanks to publication of their detailed *dossiers* prepared by the Security Service (Piotrowski 2002). These materials need to be carefully verified. Nevertheless, I wish to emphasize a few things.

The percentage of people with higher education was several times higher than the national average at that time. The conclusion is the undereducated members either did not wish to or could not take part in the Union's political life at its Gdańsk Constituent Assembly's level. Did it mean that the multimillion "Solidarity" regions were dominated by the intelligentsia a year after the 1980 strikes and it was those people who secured for themselves the possibility of being elected delegates? Or did it mean that participation in the Congress' conference required such a high linguistic and intellectual competence that workers shied away from offering their candidacies for the delegation at regional elections? These questions are not easily answered, there being generally no materials from that period—no protocols of electoral meetings, no registers of candidates who lost the elections etc (many union documents vanished in the martial law upheaval). This problem deserves a more thorough study. Characteristically, the social composition of meetings of delegates at regional levels, prior to the national Congress, was slightly different. We have data concerning 465 members of General Meeting of Delegates of West Pomerania Region (Pomorze Zachodnie) in June–July, 1981. Workers accounted for 36%, technical and production overseers—26.1%, officials and office workers—23.2%. Only 27% of delegates had higher education, 67% secondary education, 5.1% elementary education. Women constituted 13.1% of the members (Matuszewicz 1997: 202). The data are different from above data regarding the congress in "Olivia" hall where there were more persons with higher education (51%), and significantly less workers (22%). This points to the conclusion that it was mainly to the intelligentsia that channels of intra-organizational promotion allowed access to activity at a national level.

Noteworthy, the delegates in Gdańsk were very young. Interestingly, delegates to the 9th Congress of the Polish United Workers Party, held a few weeks earlier in Warsaw, were significantly older (Sułek 2002: 160). More than 2/3 delegates to the KKD are people below 45 years of age, most of them living in big or very big cities. Their job stability is striking, although it might not be in fact that surprising, the socialist employment system trying to pinion the worker to his workplace. The "Solidarity"

elite was certainly an elite in the double meaning of the word: due to its education and due to its address.

Democracy in the Ice-Rink³

The course of the first tour shows how difficult it was for delegates to follow an order of proceedings planned beforehand. The reader of the records (unfortunately, the author of this work was not able to attend the congress due to his age) is often amused to see the Congress Presidium's organic inability to direct the event. This revealed some "Solidarity" characteristics, seen throughout 1980–1981, ie mistrust of stiff bureaucratic procedures and legislative regulations, even those self-imposed voluntarily. The "Solidarity" revolution found it difficult to cope with self-restriction (Staniszki 1984). Numerous appeals of the National Coordination Commission (Krajowa Komisja Porozumiewawcza, KKP) not to strike were not always acknowledged by the regions; they simply acted in the name of local interests and under pressure of the grass roots. Political arguments of Wałęsa and his entourage seeking *a modus vivendi* with the communist state often fell on deaf ears in the regions. Anarchic tendencies were seen at all levels of the movement.

The National Congress Commission active before the Congress inauguration, had prepared a plan of inauguration and the first two days of discussions (Jagielski 1992: 136), but the plan did not seem to be observed.

A "Solidarity" expert wrote in his diary:

"The atmosphere in the room is typical of KKP sessions, only several times more so. Controversies over procedures, the debate discipline breaking down at times. Excited delegates often run up to the microphones, brandishing their mandates, to speak urgently. This room embodies freedom, a young freedom, and as such impetuous and rather unruly. This room is positive it is the only sovereign here and the only one to lay down the congress rules. Various proposals which have been and will be made, are often springing up not in the room but in the lobby, in the kitchen, behind the congress's scenes, but nobody can impose any of them. The congress disregards established authorities and domination. The chairman of the congress has to explain his frequent absences from the room; the presidium and the person leading the meeting are aware that a major mistake or suspicion of manipulating the room will cost them the right to lead the congress. This room bestows authority on activists and takes it back. [...] The room likes radicalism, objectivity and succinctness" (Kuczyński 2002: 169).

An undercover collaborator of the secret service [SB] (pseudonym "Albert") reported in a similar spirit later on:

"There are frantic discussions about whose reasons are right. There is no unanimity. For example: a chap comes unto the platform and says something, then another replaces him and says his predecessor is making a fool of himself, and a third speaker defends the first one. Delegates in the audience often mock the speaker."⁴

The first day of the Congress, 5 September, was taken up by bickering about procedures and voting on some more questions of order, many of which were in

³ Jean-Yves Potel, a French researcher, observer and friend of the "Solidarity" gave this title to his much reprinted article on the Congress.

⁴ Information TW "Albert" of 27 September 1981, IPN Archives Gdańsk, 003/166, t. 24, k. 48. I cordially thank Grzegorz Majchrzak from IPN in Warsaw for making available this and other documents.

fact concerned with the merits. Telegrams supporting the “Solidarity” were read out and received with stormy applause, guests from foreign trade union boards made speeches. The Congress presidium, Statutory Commission (preparing changes in the Statute) and Programme Commission were elected, but the first two days saw no discussion of concrete issues. Getting ready to step down, the “Solidarity” “authorities,” ie the National Coordination Commission, presented a report on the Union’s activities during the first year since its foundation. There were hardly any programme statements and delegates engaged in polemics over secondary issues. The congress was like a noisy beehive. The delegates sat on straight chairs in sectors, with one or two regions in one sector. Operating staff were circling between the sectors, there were media representatives from all over the world in the lobby. Some of those present in the room kept moving about, therefore there were several suggestions to close the canteen and calls on the colleagues for ordered behaviour and return to the congress room (a quorum was always there anyway, in line with the principle: “Delegates will attend the debates”). The first day saw rivalry over formal motions, eg. ways of tabling formal motions. Today one cannot fully read in the records the atmosphere of tension which overwhelmed the room at that time. An unorganized presidium and easy-going delegates who made speeches for any old reason obstructed the proceedings, also fanning fears of manipulation. The word “manipulation” would make a career during the second tour, but even during the first the accusation of manipulating the room was voiced, which was as absurd as it was destructive. Regional congresses held that summer also coped with similar problems (Matusiewicz 1997: 204–5).

A one-page satirical periodical “Manipulo,” representing an absurd sense of humour, which was distributed among delegates at the “Olivia” hall, was a way of dealing with the mass neurosis of suspicions. The fun-loving face of the social movement, evident from its very beginning, made itself seen in this way.

The general atmosphere in the country in early September, 1981 did not invite calm discussions and cool tactical calculation regarding the Union’s future. The public prosecutor’s office had just discontinued proceedings against persons responsible for causing the Bydgoszcz crisis in March, 1981. Let us remember that local “Solidarity” activists with popular and radical Jan Rulewski, an engineer-designer and a regional activist from Bydgoszcz, were beaten up in a police raid on a public building. This event shocked the whole “Solidarity,” a national warning strike was held. The Bydgoszcz crisis was a moment of great tension and extraordinary mobilization of the Union members. The prosecutor’s decision showed that the “Solidarity” could not secure the postulate of law and order on the part of state authorities, which it had demanded since its earliest days. A mutiny of prisoners remanded in custody in Bydgoszcz was another factor to influence the course of the first tour. The biggest since the World War II concentration of the Soviet fleet took place in the Baltic Sea and great military manouvres were held in Belorussia. Also, a relentless propaganda campaign against the “Solidarity” had been on since early August. Hunger strikes held in July in several towns showed the depth of the country’s economic crisis.

There were impatient calls for clear, rapid and concrete decision. Delegate Jan Golis from the Lower Silesia (Dolny Śląsk) region: “I categorically demand to close

this discussion. We shall discuss till we drop dead and the result will be nil." The first day was also marked by wrangling over changes in agenda regulations, and finally K. Jagielski from the Western Pomerania region came up with the proposal: "I suggest to cancel the congress regulations because each formal motion that follows systematically deprives the regulations of all sense. We shall save a lot of our time and energy doing it at one go." A characteristic moment came on the second day, when the possibility of celebrating a Catholic Mass at 8am in the congress hall, before the conference (it started at 9pm) was put to vote. The motion was rejected (222 were against and 206 for). But immediately a delegate (nameless) mounted the rostrum to resume the Mass issue and he began his speech in this characteristic way: "I understand it has been voted down but...." Making out a case for a second voting, he generally repeated his predecessor's arguments (a Mass in the Olivia hall would make things easier for people not living Gdańsk, who do not know the town and cannot find a church). A characteristic exchange occurred:

"Tadeusz Syryjczyk (leading the congress):

Ladies and gentlemen, the issue has been voted down. It was put to vote because a motion was tabled, and colleagues wished to settle it in this way and no other. Consequently, the matter has been concluded.

NN (proposer of the motion):

Are the procedures going to finish us off?! Somebody came up with such proposal, but there is another now, more logical to my thinking—does this mean that voting is sacrosanct and never to be cancelled?!"

The leader of the meeting *nolens volens* put to vote the question of having a Mass in the conference hall prior to the conference itself. This time delegates voted for the permission as one man. There were no "sacrosanct" procedures. It was this strange argument which did appeal to them, and not the fact that probably most people who assembled there were nominally Catholics. It was an anti-bureaucratic argument that won. There were many such situations at the Congress.

Access offered to investigators to archives of the communist security service allows to define the character and direction of operations targeting the "Solidarity." The First Congress was obviously their object. It follows from security service data that the delegates were infiltrated by 36 undercover collaborators (Cenckiewicz 2004: 490); the data are not explicit, there were certainly no more of them during the first tour. They were expected to reveal and publish facts showing that groups not belonging to the "Solidarity" (eg KOR, the Committee of Workers Defence and KPN, the Confederation of Independent Poland) were trying to exert pressure on the Congress and steer its course. The security service tried to trigger a mass fear of manipulation and to influence voting results (particularly in the second tour when the National Commission was chosen). Not only the conference hall but also meeting places of subject commissions and problem groups—even the Gdańsk Oliwa cathedral—were under technological control (bugging devices); as SB estimated it inspired 17 "positive speeches" during the first tour—also surprisingly very small number.⁵ The security service [SB] attempted to control the process of the Union formation. One of the

⁵ Data according to: G. Majchrzak, *Operacje "Sejmik" i "Debata"* [Operation "Sejmik" and "Debate"] typescript, p. 73 (I thank for making it available to the author).

secret service targets was “detection and operative counteracting the smuggling of politically destructive conceptions and undertakings into the Union’s programme, and annihilation of attempts to bring the NSZZ “Solidarity” on an anti-socialist platform.”⁶ One can hardly say, however, that the congress atmosphere was marked with fear of secret services. A show made by one of the congress leaders of tearing to pieces of a SB-planted leaflet did not result in SB activities being discussed at a plenary session. Openness was a powerful weapon, the delegates had nothing to conceal. It follows from the shorthand notes that most apprehended were not SB influences but rather eg Wałęsa’s alleged autocratic ambitions. There was a tendency to play down and scorn the impact of secret services. Apart from one extreme development (a row over a resolution of thanks for KOR people during the second tour, unleashed by Mazowsze region delegates evidently cooperating with SB—an open secret at that time) one can hardly find examples of SB operations producing impediments to the agenda. If we knew exactly which delegates were undercover SB collaborators, then by analysing the course of the meetings we could try to evaluate the actual impact of the Ministry of Internal Affairs people. I think, however, that it would turn out to be very slight if any. Confronted with the scale of means and forces that SB employed for operative control of the Congress, one must be surprised at its meagre results (eg the famous revolutionary “Message to the Working People of Eastern Europe,” an object of propaganda attacks of the Eastern bloc countries, was adopted very smoothly, without endless procedural obstacles).

As I tried to show above, organizational weakness of the first days of the first tour of the National Congress of Delegates was due to the “Solidarity’s” organic characteristics as a social movement. Even a secret SB collaborator endowed with exceptional oratorical skills would not have been able to make delegates take decisions harmful to the “Solidarity.” A plan of operations targeting the Congress, prepared at the highest level of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW], featured not only restriction of influence of opposition groups (the Committee of Social Self-Defence “KOR,” the Confederation of Independent Poland and others), but also urged what the MSW slang called “individual sources of information” to mount the platforms. The speeches were to focus on substitute questions like palsied organization and regional anarchy, oversize union administration, faulty finance management and excessive influence of non-union opposition groups like Committee of Social Self-Defence “KOR.”⁷ Paradoxically, the register of allegedly substitute questions did tally with actual problems of this great social movement which was seeking its place in the state and shaping its organizational framework. Even the issue of KOR members’ impact on the “Solidarity’s” current activity was not as absurd as it might seem, eg decisions made by Lech Wałęsa were far from clear. These questions would have been tackled anyway. They were to be addressed by secret collaborators not interested in gaining high places

⁶ The plan of operational and physical security at I National Congress of NSZZ Delegates in Gdańsk (signed by Deputy Commander of Voivodship Civic Police for Security Service in Gdańsk, Col. S. Paszkiewicz), 31 August 1981, IPN Archives Gdańsk, 003/166, t. 19, k. 43.

⁷ The plan of security operations in targeting I National Congress of NSZZ “Solidarity.” Department III of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 28 August 1981, IPN Archives Gdansk, 003/166, t. 1, k. 161–163.

within the Union, which was meant to boost their credibility. Even though based on some knowledge of sociotechnique and crowd psychology, the impressive detailed plans of "securing" the course of the congress could not guarantee any concrete Congress results which the Ministry of Internal Affairs had hopefully mapped out. It was for a majority to decide, a minority was suspicious by definition. The majority enjoyed absolute authority, it was nearly sacred (Kowalski 1990: 90). The delegates were well aware of this, protecting the "Solidarity's" endangered unity. J. Kurkowski from Silesia-Dąbrowa region said on the second day: "[...] the multiplicity of interests and attitudes is the strength of the Union's unity. However, the Union cannot allow that authentic exchange of ideas and activities of the grass-root Union members and activists should be used for faction struggle."

Unity can be best seen during voting, and delegates voted by raising their mandates. This seems to explain the secret of successful vote on above mentioned "Message" on 8 September (Resolution No 17/81). It was received by a rapt audience in first reading. The leader of the meeting wanted to postpone the vote as lunch time was coming but was criticized for his attitude towards motions. With the "Message" being much applauded, activist Andrzej Gwiazda from Gdańsk proposed once more that it be put to the vote. Kuczyński wrote later:

"There were no objections coming from the room even though quite a few people considered "The Message" to be politically incorrect. Such voices were heard in the lobby after it was over. The room was, however, either overwhelmed with emotion or would not incur displeasure of those present there after that enthusiastic applause" (2002: 172).

Final Remarks

The Congress in Gdańsk was held in an atmosphere extremely unfavourable to the authorities, which switched on a mechanism of political emulation radicalizing the whole movement (Kuczyński 2002: 170), and yet produced unexpectedly sound results. Even prior to forming its programme, the "Solidarity" considered itself to be a social movement which, faced with an indolent communist party, tried to take over some responsibility for the country and economic reform. It stopped pretending it was just a trade union (Staniszki 1981: 2). This ideological volte-face can be seen *in statu nascendi* particularly at the first tour of the Congress.⁸ It finds its expression not only in the "Message" but also in some very important resolutions adopted at that time. A resolution on workers' self-government (No 16/81) attacked state policies denying the right of joining the "Solidarity" to civil employees of two so-called power sectors ("The Congress believes that the specific character of the Ministry of Internal

⁸ The first tour was dedicated to changes in the Statutes of the Union (regions adopted them between the tours) regulating their federative character; the second tour was dedicated to elections to the 107-member National Commission and competition for the "Solidarity" chairmanship. There was no one to defy Wałęsa (he obtained 55% votes). The second tour produced the adoption of comprehensive "Programme" at last, offering views lacking consistence on some economic issues, yet it was axiologically compact in principle, expressing faith in the ideals of solidarity and freedom, the movement's guiding principles since its first days. I think that resolutions adopted by the first tour provided foundations for decisions made at the second tour.

Affairs and the Ministry of Defence provides no basis for restricting the right of activity of any trade union existing in this country”). Another resolution—on People’s Councils (No 25/81), ie local organs of quasi-self-government—voiced protest against supporting the National Unity Front’s monopoly in providing candidates for People’s Councils. The same document demanded that “the public opinion of towns and rural districts regarding administrative division should be respected” (in 1975, an administrative reform was performed at the instance of superior authorities ignoring historical and traditional links existing between the regions, which had caused much displeasure). These four resolutions were of utmost importance.

The shunting is clear and rapid, accompanied by controversies over the Union’s organizational form and institutional framework of activity and over the need for bureaucratic regulations. The first tour yielded 28 resolutions which show that it is not the framework of regional structures that constitutes the most important organizational structure of the “Solidarity” but rather the boundaries of ethical community including all people of good will, particularly those down-trodden and in need (Stawrowski 2002: 109). The last declaration adopted by the first tour (No 28/81), the one called “The Declaration,” said that the object of the NSZZ “Solidarity” was “life free from poverty, exploitation, fear and lies in a democratically organized and legally governed society.”

References

Trade Union Publications

1981. “The Congress Communiqué.” *Solidarność Jeleniogórska*. October 8/9.
 1981. *AS. Biuletyn pism związkowych i zakładowych Agencji Solidarności*, No 41.

References

- Adamowicz, P. 2006. “Anna Walentynowicz,” in: J. Skórzyński (ed.), *Opozycja w PRL. Słownik biograficzny 1956–89. Vol. 3* [Opposition in Polish People’s Republic. Biographical Dictionary 1956–1989. Vol. 3]. Warszawa: Karta.
- Cenciekiewicz, S. 2004. *Oczami bezpieki. Szkice i materiały dziejów aparatu bezpieczeństwa PRL* [In the eyes of Secret Services. Scetches and Materials from PRL]. Kraków: Arcana.
- Jagielski, K. 1992. *Za burtą legendy* [Outside the Legend]. Szczecin: Punkt.
- Jastrun, T. 1985. *Życie Anny Walentynowicz* [The Life of Anna Walentynowicz]. Warszawa: NOWA.
- Kaczyńska, E. 1982. “Les candidats et les élus au Congrès de Solidarité 1981. Aspects démographiques.” *Sociologie du travail*, 3.
- Kowalski, S. 1990. *Krytyka solidarnościowego rozumu. Studium z socjologii myślenia potocznego* [Critique of solidarity’s mind. Study from sociology of common reflection]. Warszawa: PEN.
- Kuczyński, W. 2002. *Burza nad Wisłą. Dziennik 1980–1981* [A Storm over Vistula. Diary 1980–1981]. Warszawa: Iskry.
- Kurczewski, J. 1980. “Dawny ustrój i rewolucja” [Ancien Régime and Revolution]. *Res Publica*, No 7.
- Majchrzak, G., Owsiniński, M. (eds.). 2004. *I Krajowy Zjazd Delegatów NSZZ “Solidarność.” Pierwsza tura 5–10 września 1981. Stenogram obrad* [I National Congress of Delegates of Independent Self-Governed Trade Union “Solidarity,” First tour 5–10 September 1981]. Warszawa: Stowarzyszenie “Archiwum Solidarności” (www.archsol.pl).
- Matusewicz, Z. 1977. *Szczecin 1980–1981. Rewolucja “Solidarności”* [Szczecin 1980–1981. Revolution of “Solidarity”]. Szczecin: Uniwersytet Szczeciński.

- Piotrowski, M. (ed.) 2002. *Ludzie "Solidarności."* Informator o delegatach na I Krajowy Zjazd NSZZ "Solidarność"—MSW Biuro "C" [People of "Solidarity" . Information on Delegates on I National Congress of "Solidarity"—Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW], Bureau "C"], Lublin.
- Staniszkis, J. 1981. "Program Związku" [Program of Trade Union]. *Niezależność*, No 129, September 16, p. 2.
- Staniszkis, J. 1984. *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution* (co-ed. J. T. Gross), Princetown.
- Stawrowski, Z. 2002. "Doświadczenie 'Solidarności' jako wspólnoty etycznej" [Experience of "Solidarity" as Ethical Community], in: D. Gawin (ed.), *Lekcja Sierpnia. Dziedzictwo "Solidarności" po dwudziestu latach* [Lesson of August. Heritage of "Solidarity" after Twenty Years]. Warszawa: IFiS PAN, pp. 103–122.
- Sułek, A. 2002. *Ogród metodologii socjologicznej* [Garden of Sociological Methodology]. Warszawa: Scholar.
- Szejnert, M., Zalewski, T. 1986. *Szczecin. Grudzień, sierpień, grudzień* [Szczecin. December, August, December]. Londyn: Aneks.