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“Solidarity”—A Contribution to Social Movement Theory

Abstract: This article is an attempt to link the attributes of “Solidarity” with the movement’s place in the theory of social movements. The evolutionary paradigm has left a gap with respect to selection and systematisation of these movements. The historical approach must be adopted in order to fill in this gap. It is therefore necessary to focus on “Solidarity” as a special case in the context of the history of nation, within the framework of the totalitarian macro-formation produced by the solutions adopted after World War II. “Solidarity’s” contribution was not limited to one country only. It also helped to trigger more general transformation and globalisation processes. The rationality of “Solidarity” is rooted in systemic contingencies which required the development of an effective method—sit-in strikes—but also negotiations with the regime. However, the democratic culture rooted in national tradition was the decisive factor. In the West, the state was already being viewed as an obsolete form, whereas the lesson which was learned from the Polish experience was that the sovereign state is essential for reform and modernisation. The validity of this lesson was confirmed in practice. The author argues that “Solidarity” did not fit into the schematic distinction between “old” and “new” movements. Class interests were not a priority, neither were the interests of minorities, as they are in the West.

Keywords: “Solidarity” as a multifunctional social movement, “Solidarity” as a national independence movement, “old” social movements, “new” social movements, democratic culture, reform and modernisation

What makes the “Solidarity” movement so unique is the role which it played in tangible historical contingencies by leading to the fall of communism, one of the major barriers on the road to profound social change. Meanwhile, the dominant trend in the evolutionary paradigm is to focus on the patterns of the post-industrial age from the modernisational perspective and on the ensuing adaptive problems with which citizens are confronted.

This text puts particular emphasis on the totalitarian macro-formation, produced by the Soviet Union after World War II. Location in this macro-formation had a major impact on the situation of Poland and of other Central-Eastern European countries, becoming their destiny, whereas Western societies enjoyed the luxury of freedom of choice.

The historical approach analyses every country as a special, isolated case within its historical context. Poland’s tradition of quest for independence is a source of information on society’s struggle with the system and is also analysed from the perspective of

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the country’s difficult geopolitical situation. Many western sociologists and historians mention this in their analyses, e.g., Norman Davies, Timothy Garton Ash or Lawrence Goodwyn.

It is assumed in this article that “Solidarity” has two major incarnations: it is a social movement and a national independence movement. In the early days of the organised protests one could witness an original combination of controlled sit-in strikes and mass support from various social groups, all within the framework of ethos-based democratic culture. This strategy was successful and helped to legitimise the Independent, Self-Governing Trade Union “Solidarity” as an autonomous actor in negotiations with official authorities. It was a significant step on the road to the later transformation of the movement, whose ambition was to represent society as a whole. This objective evolved towards sovereign statehood and its inalienable functions: to ensure citizens’ right to live in freedom and democracy and to introduce modernising reforms in self-government and the economy.

In Western literature “Solidarity” was mainly discussed within the historical paradigm and hence the hopes for the renaissance or trend for this orientation. In the context of increased interest in the twenty-fifth anniversary of the birth of “Solidarity” it would be a very good thing if Western and Central-Eastern European sociologists were to share their experiences.

“Solidarity” Against the Backdrop of the Evolutionary-historical Controversy

One of the problems has to do with “Solidarity’s” place in the controversy between the evolutionists and the historians. Until recently it seemed that we were dealing with one “transformational and globalist sociology” symbolising the Western mainstream. This of course had its source in the fall of communism in Central-Eastern Europe.

The pivotal shifts in western sociology are certainly a sign of vitality. The historical approach, so fashionable in the nineteen-nineties, was obviously associated with the critique of the evolutionary paradigm because one of its cardinal features is the assumption that social phenomena are unrepeatable and contextual. The time and place in which the processes studied take place are one of the most important determinants of their specificity. The sociologist who is recognised as the most representative of the historical approach is Charles Tilly (Kolas 1991/1992: 77–82; Nowak 1991/1992: 83–93). This researcher’s comparative method was also operationally applicable to the Polish situation, probably because it was so wide-ranging. The combination of several elements, context, individualisation and variance, enables the step-by-step realisation of methodological operations. The present author’s first step was to define “Solidarity” as a specific historical case within the framework of the totalitarian macro-formation. The next step was to adequately determine the specific origins of the movement, its goals and methods. The latter were very important because they helped to point out the differences between the functioning of the “Solidarity” movement and the functioning of Western movements in terms of their basically different determinants and cultural contexts (Latoszek 2005: 10).
The American historical tendency may help to strengthen an analogous trend in Poland. The latter, however, has its own traditions, referring e.g., to Marxism, Florian Znaniecki’s school or directly to nineteenth-century and twentieth-century sociological ideas. Kazimierz Z. Sowa, when discussing coexisting trends in Polish sociology, drew attention (after Józef Chałasiński and Jan Szczepański) to the role of historical determinants, very different in the West and in Poland.

The mechanisms of two rationalities, the rationality of western society with its “three freedoms: political, economic and cultural” and the rationality of Polish society, “politically degraded and economically backward,” are particularly interesting in the context of the foregoing discussion. The paradigms of progress and evolutionary development fitted the rapid industrial changes and the societies which once had colonial problems very well. Because they were first plan actors, these great European powers could elevate their own problems to the rank of universal problems. Meanwhile, the Polish nation (and other Central-European nations), situated on the cultural periphery, wanted above all to regain sovereignty, and modernisation was one of the necessary conditions (Sowa 1983: 148–157; Chałasiński 1949: 17–18, 26–30; Szczepański 1971: 684–685; Kłoskowska 1996: 65; Kurczewska (ed.) 2000: 12–13; Wincławski 2002: 84–87).

The polemic which this author launched five years ago with the distinction between “old” and “new” movements was a reaction to historical simplification which did not take the “totalitarian macro-formation” into account despite the fact that this macro-formation had forced the West to adopt a confrontational strategy at the cost of economic growth or even democracy for at least half a century. In this context, to reduce the “Solidarity” movement post hoc to the role of a minor factor “in a backward age” is an example of cognitive restriction of the evolutionary paradigm (Latoszek 2001: 97–100).

It has often been said that “Solidarity” was a phenomenon in that it was extremely adaptive, both at the stage of strikes and successful organisation and at the later stage when, within the framework of its programmatic anti-politicalness, it produced ethos and made it its attractive signature as well as a bonding value. We must remember, however, that the tendency to exaggerate the untypical and unique nature of “Solidarity” may lead to the temptation to concentrate on its internal problems, in isolation from the typical social processes taking place in the integrating and globalising world. This would of course “provincialise” the movement.

The emphasis today is on “Solidarity” as a movement devoted to the struggle for state sovereignty and civic emancipation, created by the democratic revolution. Previously, the evolution of the “Solidarity” movement was portrayed against the backdrop of the decline of communist Poland and the processes of systemic transformation (Latoszek 2001: 85–100). It is worth noting that in both these works (the 2001 one and the present 2005 one), attention is paid to the specific historical context—“the situation in the macro-block” and its consequences for Poland and for the “Solidarity” movement. For methodological reasons and perhaps other reasons as well, this factor is often ignored and the evolutionary terms, industrial and post-industrial society, are used instead. This leads to con-
fusion of the two historical types of society, Western and Central-Eastern European.

Obviously each new publication brings new cognitive challenges. This applies to the present publication as well, with respect to the attempt to provide more solid theoretical foundations concerning the origins and functioning of “Solidarity” in its various dimensions. On the one hand it may seem that the scarcity of significant items in the Polish literature would make the task easier but on the other hand this also means less inspiration and less competition. So far, the paucity of sociological analyses of the problem in the Polish literature was compensated by the abundance of foreign literature, mainly American, including several fundamental contributions. This source will eventually dry out, however, as the topic goes out of fashion, just like every other phenomenon in the rapidly changing world, however significant it may be.

The Inadequacy of Social Movement Theory

The Polish literature portrays “Solidarity” as a phenomenon which eludes classification. In the days of the communist regime, for example, the political aspect of the movement was taboo. Another source of confusion was the excess of the moral factor, isolated in its spirituality from the reality of pragmatic tasks and contingencies (Tischner 1990: 111; Gavin (ed.), 2002: 177, 183).

“Solidarity” has generally been identified as a social movement but few venture beyond this convenient conventional formula. The main systematisation is still the traditional western distinction between “old” and “new” social movements” according to the criteria of civilisational development (Latoszek 2001: 97–100). This means that societies sentenced to the deeply destructive consequences of communist totalitarianism and their defences tend to be ignored (Strzembosz 2000: 327–377). In the nineteen-forties and fifties, considerable resources of political opposition, particularly of the patriotic-independence ilk, were physically exterminated within the framework of a deliberately planned policy of terror. The method of propaganda in those days was to evoke the “resonance box effect.” This method led to the development of a tightly shut system with its typical informational void (Santori 1994: 132–135). Meanwhile, the totalitarian era “in this country” no longer whets researchers’ curiosity. If they look back at the days of the communist regime at all, they do so in the search for the sources of “learned helplessness” or the barriers which are inhibiting adjustment to “the new rules of the game.” No-one has calculated the losses caused by breaking people, and especially by destruction of the intelligentsia, depreciation of national tradition or long-term cultural trauma. It may well be that until we return to these issues in social debate we will not be able to explain the syndromes of distrust and passivity which are still afflicting Polish society.

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1 Cf. e.g., the works of Timothy Garton Ash, Arista Maria Cirtautas, Lawrence Goodwyn, Roman Laba, David Ost, Charles Tilly, Alain Touraine and others.

2 Cf. e.g., Maria Turlejska 1989. All in all, 1700 men and women were sentenced to death in 1945–1946 alone. The author believes that this figure is highly incomplete; Jan Drewnowski 1979; Krystyna Kersten 1989; Jakub Karpiński 1989.
In this article I claim that the newer theories of social movements are inadequate because they overlook the historical case of “Solidarity” which does not fit into the register of patterns of collective behaviour and identity of post-industrial society. The polemic between Alberto Melluci and Alain Touraine may shed some light on our perception of the changes which are taking place in western movements. According to “Touraine’s idea of the central movement still clings to the assumption that movements are a personnage unified actors playing out a role on the stage of history. This idea simply doesn’t correspond to present-day conditions in complex societies.” (Melluci 1989: 202). He thinks that “one cannot say that all forms of collective action are ‘inferior’ with respect to one, central social movement in a given period of history. Even if certain conflicts are (were) leading, they were only leading for a certain period and with respect to certain issues.” Hence A. Melluci’s scepticism with respect to Touraine’s model choices when he identifies the main actor with the labour movement or the antinuclear movement. “As opposed to conflict in the traditional capitalist sense, the new types of collective action in post-industrial society include the action of women, youth, immigrants and other groups defined by their social existence outside the workplace” (Melluci 1989: 203). As far as the typology of the contents of movements is concerned, Melluci’s approach does not add anything new compared with the narrow stereotype adopted by other authors. One can hardly say that “Solidarity” was a free rider because it was more like a patient passenger who kept prolonging his ticket for the train of history.

In other words, Alain Touraine’s much criticised conceptualisation reflected “Solidarity’s” situation rather well in terms of its holism, its distinctiveness compared with other movements, its attractiveness and the accumulating dissatisfaction which served as ammunition in August 1980 (Latoszek 2001: 64).

Examples of Tendencies in Social Movements in the West and in Poland

Two tendencies can be found in the analysed works. For example, in the late nineteen-eighties Alberto Melluci observed the tendency towards greater individualisation of social life. In a way, this observation was analogous to Stefan Nowak’s, who already in the nineteen-seventies noted that people were turning away from the hostile world of institutions over which they had no control. They found compensation in “various kinds of identifications in the world of primary groups concentrated in the nation” (Nowak, 1979: 158–160). A. Melluci also thought that emancipation of the life styles of ordinary people was a reaction to the deformation of authority, i.e., to various formalised mega-organisations which determined the functioning of the system. Observing a new tendency towards the development of an increasing number of social movements and to their temporal fluidity, he coined the term “nomads of the present” to emphasise their transitional nature and the fact that they could easily be substituted. In the second approach, represented by Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, the role of the state and political process are still worth mentioning. The authors point out, for example, that the boundaries between the public and private spheres are
becoming obliterated. Things which used to be an integral part of private life, e.g., physical and mental health, are no longer private and are now submitted to institutional intervention (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 57, 109, 164; Illich 1993: 122–128). If individualistically-oriented Mellucci seems to abstract programmatically from classes, religious groups or nations, Della Porta and Diani include sources of social tension relating to movements based on national identification or territorial and cultural roots in their theory of social tension.

Many western sociologists, however, base their conceptualisations on assumptions other than evolutionary ones and recognise the role which “Solidarity” played in the demise of communism and promotion of democracy (Touraine 1985; Ost 1990; Laba 1991; Goodwyn 1991). In Polish sociology, Piotr Sztompka called “Solidarity” a radical movement, a value-oriented movement according to Neil J. Smelser’s terminology. “This was certainly the nature of the “Solidarity” movement which demanded complete and comprehensive change of the political, economic and cultural system. Another great twentieth-century political movement, the human rights movement in the USA which demanded equal rights for Afro-Americans, appealed to equally central values” (Sztompka 2002: 161–163). Adam Leszczyński presented a different, original albeit controversial approach. Presumably, the traditional nature of the institutions which supported “Solidarity” in its early days was a source of negative bias. This is not only a problem of the values which were retained by such institutions as the church or the family, it is also a matter of regaining state sovereignty as a vehicle of modernisation. As we remember, “Solidarity” successfully undertook the modernisation effort in the early nineteen-nineties. A. Leszczyński’s suggestion that the facts and their chronology have been sufficiently consolidated is also disputable. We must wait for the Institute of National Memory which opens a new vista in post-war Poland on the obliteration of historical white spots, and there are many of them, to produce new evidence. 3

“Medium-range” Theories and the “Solidarity” Movement

The applicability of social movement theory to “Solidarity” obviously does not boil down to putting the movement in the context of social change. It is therefore worth putting the movement to the test of “medium-range” theories and applying existing theories and concepts, even if there is no adequate frame of reference in the form of “comparable” examples with respect to civilisational contingencies and historical movements.

The structural-behavioural approach offers a new perspective on the differences between the situating of the actors and their behaviour in the Western system and in communist Poland. In the former case, as I mentioned before, individuals not only have democratic mechanisms at their disposal, they can also organise in various “spontaneous ways,” including social movements. Meanwhile, in real socialism the

3 Cf. e.g., the discussion of this issue by the historians—Jak opowiadać historię ciekawie [How to tell history in an interesting way], Więź 4, 2004.
only formal actor which kept hold of all the power and the strategic planning, was the totalitarian state (the governing nomenklatura). The offer to satisfy people’s needs on a minimal level could not suffice at a time of increasing consumerism. “Solidarity” as a movement was a school of democratic practice in the work place and on the level of regional structures and therefore it reminded people about such forgotten words as empowerment and citizenship. However, it could only succeed gradually, through a series of conflicts and sometimes dramatic tensions.

Political exchange theory offers several suggestions with respect to the institutionalisation of the movement. Once the authorities were too weak to destroy “Solidarity” and when they did not manage to co-opt it (The Patriotic Movement for National Revival—PRON, the Consulting Council etc.), it became necessary to make room for the new elite. The instrument by means of which the contract was to be finalised was the “Round Table.”

Also, the collective behaviour of “Solidarity” itself was no longer apolitical. The road to the “piece of furniture” and after led through successive transformations—from the “first Solidarity,” a mass movement, through “elite solidarity,” to the “second Solidarity” created by the 1989 elections. This process reached its apogee in the AWS—UW coalition (“Solidarity” Electoral Action and Freedom Union) which governed into the new millennium. Sacrificing the atypical resources of trust, enthusiasm and selflessness, described in terms of ethos (Latoszek 2001: 78–93; Dudek 2001: 120–125) was obviously one of the prices which had to be paid for these compromises. “Solidarity’s” attributes include: ethos, i.e., moral and ethical values; traditional revival and persistent striving to regain state sovereignty and attempts to reconcile national and civic values; resistance to any ideology which was partial to a particular group or institution; and receptivity to costly civilisational changes.

The Rationality of “Solidarity”

The main purpose of this section is not to repeat what has already been written elsewhere on the identity of the Polish syndrome and its structural elements (both in terms of co-operation and tension between the intelligentsia and the workers), the coalitions which have developed and the conflicting interests of the various factions of the opposition, the role of the church etc., but to provide an additional analysis in the context of attempts to view “Solidarity” against the backdrop of Western movements (Latoszek 2001: 64–73; Latoszek 2005: 240–250).

Even the criteria used to distinguish social movements are somewhat inconsistent. On the one hand they lack formalisation but on the other hand they are goal-directed, suggesting that they were deliberately designed. This latter eventuality is hard to reconcile with spontaneous behaviour unless we assume that “the goal is historically stamped” (Sztompka 2002: 58). In Western civilisations industrial problems were resolved by democratic means. The social movement theorists associate the nineteen-eighties and nineties with the increasing importance of participation which began to count more than formal democracy, i.e., procedures and hence the claim
of grass-roots “enrichment.” However, if we look at the student strikes or at various campaigns and manifestations, this is by no means always obvious (Johnson 1992: 867; Bloom 1997: 373–379).

As far as Soviet-type societies are concerned, the problem sequence had to be different. Development of national independence movements whose goal was to regain state sovereignty became an essential condition for the triggering of capitalist reform. Increasing social discontent was rooted in the repressive welfare state, increasing civilizational backwardness and awareness that the system was immune to reform.

According to Della Porta and Diani, the new middle class in the West was now a programmatically contesting class, mainly for world-view reasons. Professional, intellectual and moral issues were combined into one standard (Della Porta and Diani 1999: 57, 109, 164, 576). In communist Poland the new middle-class movements did not involve “cross-sectional class, stratum or socio-occupational” divisions because the civilizational and generational determinants of such divisions—movement inspired by social change and the moral revolution—were absent. Neither can we ignore the fact that the new movements may not have found appropriate space in which to act.

Jacek Kurczewski’s concept of a new middle class was quite timely. Kurczewski assumed that this formation consisted of both white collar workers and highly qualified blue collar workers. Obliteration of the boundaries between the types of activity was less important than self-definition in terms of the commonality of the working world rather than in terms of separating class interests (Kurczewski, 1989: 19). “Solidarity” concentrated on opposition against the communist system and had no need to produce new conflict potential vis-`a-vis experiments with new existential forms which Lawrence Goodwyn called “not very revolutionary and programmatically sloppy” (Goodwyn, 1992: 407, 414, 551).

Women played an important part in August 1980, both on the mass scale and as a leading structural element in the family where they offered support to their striking husbands and sons. It is believed that the firing of Free Trade Union activist Anna Walentynowicz was “the spark which triggered the detonator to the accumulated gunpowder.” Alina Piekowska, Henryka Krzywonos, Joanna Duda-Gwiazda and many other distinguished participants of the shipyard protests are now part of the history of the effort to keep the strike going when its fate was swaying. Of course both sexes determined the future of the crisis and its transformation into a national strike. Women were also active in oppositional organisations and various protest campaigns. In other words, the women’s issue as a source of tension or struggle over “new interests” was not salient within the “Solidarity” movement. There was no question, for example, of anti-abortion movements in the context of “Solidarity” manifestations. Emergence of the “feminist issue” in later publications is probably the effect of a cliché of the contemporary perspective (Kondratowicz, 2001). Ecological or anti-war movements, in turn, were compromised in the Pole’s awareness due to the fact that they enjoyed the protection of Moscow’s umbrella (Ash, 1989: 214–216).

What is important here is the difference in the structurally determined distribution of accents. In the West, movements organise themselves in opposition to the state, large bureaucratic organisations etc. and therefore the term “opponent” is perfectly legitimate, even if it means “the entire social order.” Although these movements sometimes exert pressure aggressively, the aggression is under control and reduced to the level of ideological discourse. The situation in communist Poland was different. Here the other side forced “Solidarity” to take a confrontational stance and blocked change (Micewski, 1987: 49, 270, 277, 279–280). Hence it would be more adequate to use the term “enemy” rather than “opponent” because the communist system was the enemy of “Solidarity,” which was elevated to the role of actor. This legitimised the movement’s willingness to draw upon national and religious symbols. Donnatela Della Porta and Mario Diani observed a similar tendency to produce symbols in the Orthodox Church in the oppressed Baltic republics.

Many new data suggest that from the very start, the regime was playing a game aimed at liquidating “Solidarity”. The logic of the situation showed quite clearly that the two cultures, democratic and totalitarian, could not possibly coexist. The social movement—wrote Goodwyn—was a powerful form of organisation of impressive numbers and support but it could not capture power and therefore did not try to do so. According to this writer, “Solidarity” was a political movement nevertheless, as expressed in the fact that it swayed the foundations of power and therefore rocked the entire system (Goodwyn 1992: 404–405).

In the West “new movements” operate within the framework of democracy, choose an “opponent” and adopt the offensive tactic. In communist Poland, “Solidarity” was rationed by the whole communist system which drew its hostility towards the movement from e.g., its inability to coexist and reform. “Solidarity” was rational because it did not adapt the suggestion of the new Western Left to reject traditional institutions and substitute them with counter-cultural movements. The workers were quite resistant to such external inspirations because they were aware of the dangers of provocation, were the situation to run out of control.

National Independence Movements and the Global Movement

Social movements could not exist in the Soviet system because that system exercised police control over society. Grassroots pressure, so natural in the reality of the democratic system, was therefore impossible. Because of Poland’s specific situation as a nation deprived of sovereign statehood within the confines of an ethnically homogeneous society, strong national traditions and rich resources of national and religious symbols, “Solidarity” may be identified as a national independence movement. In this sense the formula of the movement was very broad because it was not limited by any historical framework. As it has been repeatedly demonstrated, such movements are adequate both in industrial societies and in post-industrial societies. The historian, on the other hand, will easily find traces of such movements in the distant past in, for example, peasant or religious movements etc. Differences in the development of con-
tinents and countries as well as the different histories of conquests, especially those
which have involved the experience of totalitarianism, have led to the emergence of
national independence movements in various periods in history.

In the eighties, “Solidarity’s” goal was not to modify capitalism, even by introduc-
ing some variant of the “third way.” “Solidarity’s” affair with self-governance suggests
that it accepted the search for new solutions within the macro-block framework (as we
remember, Yugoslavia was most advanced as far as the consideration of such solutions
is concerned). The fact that the leaders opened the trade union umbrella over the
capitalist reforms when “it was all over” shows how pragmatic they were but it also
shows that they failed to make sure that the reforms would move in the right direction
when the “Solidarity” elite began to regroup. The “Solidarity” movement was quite
unique at the decline of socialism in that it focused on the struggle for human and
civil rights. The foresight it demonstrated when it sent its ideological messages to the
workers of Eastern Europe and to the Polish Diaspora world-wide in 1981 now attests
to the fact that “Solidarity” was ahead of its time in its effort to clear the way to open
society, despite earlier disputes as to whether this form of activity remained within the
bounds of the real politik canon.

“Solidarity” can hardly be called an utopia because it formulated specific goals, was
organisationally efficient, was sensitive to the limits of risk, but above all passed the
test even when it ceased to be a leading actor—and that was the most difficult test of all
because it was concerned with neutralisation of workers’ sense of entitlement. Arista
Maria Cirtautas was right when she said, “As far as its goal is concerned, “Solidarity”
was a vehicle of protest against the communist party state and fell prey to the need to
strive through transformation to develop the liberal capitalist state” (Cirtautas 1997:
ix). Certain facts attest to “Solidarity’s” contribution to general history. One of them
was probably Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution,” which drew from this model but that
remains to be demonstrated empirically. Perhaps the contribution would have been
greater if the transformation in Poland had been more profound in every dimension.

Social Movement versus National Independence Movement—
the Two Incarnations of “Solidarity”

Social movement theory adopts the processual perspective, i.e., the entirety of the dy-
namics of such movements, including “Solidarity,” with special emphasis on the chal-
lenges of the contemporary world, in the context of social change and its main vehicles,
transformation and globalisation. There are many conceptualisations of change but
three dimensions are usually indicated: the technological-economic dimension, the
political-legal dimension and the moral dimension. Social movements are reaction to
processes which take place at the level of large institutions and organisations, in their
numerous interactions. They produce spectacular forms of “adjustment.” The most
typical social movements are the antiglobalist, peace or ecological movements. The
“moral issue,” so amplified by the market and the media, is concerned with individual
choices and the search for new identities on the one hand and attempts to maintain
existing forms on the other hand. It is often believed that these collective behaviours polarise depending on the “centre” and the “periphery.” It is also universally believed that the support which individuals gleaned from traditional communities—nation, church and family—is now wearing out and no other form of emotional compensation is taking its place. Trade unions in Germany, France or Italy are powerful forces but their power is limited largely to occasional street “entitlement” campaigns in defence of social services. Campaigners often have heterogeneous goals including those which are articulated by minorities.

Analyses have revealed that, for various reasons, Western versions of social movement theory are inadequate as far as “Solidarity” is concerned. First, social movement theory does not account for, or even outright ignores, a large portion of world history, i.e., the Soviet totalitarian macro-formation, as an actor in 1944–1989 (and one which previously co-operated with Nazi totalitarianism). In this context the “Solidarity” social movement, as a national independence movement, made sense only against the backdrop of historical processes within the macro-blocks, in its function of mass trade union organisation and as a quasi-political social movement. If these dimensions are ignored, we will fail to recognise the resources from which the movement drew and which were a source of mobilisation. We will also overlook the way its organisational forms provided a frame of reference for the process of dynamic strike socialisation and underground activity. The applicability of the “obligatory evolutionist doctrine” to the reflection on communist deformation and its consequences is very limited indeed. Neither did it pass the test earlier. This was obviously the case with the convergence theory which used to be popular in the West, either with respect to the alleged likening of health systems, or from a broader perspective, with respect to the gradual integration of the two economic-political systems.

Additionally, social movement theory does not provide a space for comparison which would allow us to identify developmental similarities in similar cases with respect to various nations. It seems as if the civilisational factor, despite its uniformity, would not be a sufficient selection criterion because it does not ensure cultural similarity, particularly vis-à-vis the experience of coercion. One proposal worth considering is Adam Leszczyński’s intriguing suggestion that we build an a-historical model which “cross-sections” civilisational divisions. Leszczyński defines the attributes of the “Solidarity” movement as an “agglomeration” of three historical types: agrarian, industrial and post-industrial (Leszczyński 2003: 76–78).

Perhaps a refreshed version of Florian Znaniecki’s expansiveness versus exclusiveness of nations (Znaniecki 1935: 49) which is similar to Aleksander Gella’s conceptual distinction, could be useful for the comparative analysis of Central-Eastern European countries because of the similarity of experience of partition and occupation and, more recently, civilisational backwardness (Gella 1987: 25–36, 112).

What exactly was the relation between social movement and national independence movement, the two main incarnations of “Solidarity”? The social movement originated with the intention of legally coercing the regime into reforms just as the Polish Peasant Party, the democratic opposition in the nineteen-forties, had tried to do, but in both cases the totalitarian communist system curtailed their efforts. It is
hard to agree with the “legalists” who claim that “Solidarity” failed with respect to the self-restriction formula because what was at stake was the cost. “Solidarity” would have to renounce its identity, even if it had to do so “bit by bit.” The crux of the problem lies in the fact that the formula of the state and the state administration in communist Poland, basically mono-centric, was still shut in the “ideological cage” of communist culture and was therefore incapable of coexisting with self-organising society and democratic culture. The main interest of the party-police apparatus, i.e., to keep hold of its priorities, indivisible control and privilege, lingered in the background.

In the days of martial law “Solidarity” was forced to make an “unofficial” metamorphosis into a national independence movement and initiate a peaceful uprising, lasting from 1981 to 1989, so as to return once again to the social movement formula at the threshold of the Third Republic but this time not only in its trade union version but also in its explicitly political version. Under various guises, “Solidarity” took part in the parliamentary interplay and the process of governance. Hence the movement had the opportunity to demonstrate its ability to undergo continual transformation, i.e., its multi-functionality. Such a movement did not fit the description of “old” movements because class interests were not its priority. Neither was it a “new” movement because it did not represent minority interests as they do in the West.

“Solidarity” therefore remains undefined in the foregoing terms. Yet it was definitely a civic movement because it was, after all, a school of democracy in the dictatorial context. It also opted for accession to the European Union.

One more issue which needs to be mentioned has to do with the reasons why Western intellectuals have ignored the “Solidarity” movement. It would be most convenient to assume that they are not interested in Poland because it is civilisationally backward. In this case the intellectual motive would burn down to the opinion that at its present stage of development the movement is a banal case which sheds no new light on contemporary changes. Meanwhile, one cannot ignore the ideological context relating or not to past unfulfilled hopes regarding the socialist formation and the USSR or the formula of the New Left. Zdzisław Krasnodębski discusses this in the context of his polemic with Jurgen Habermas (Krasnodębski 1991).

**Reforms and the Sovereign State**

Theodore Abel revives the “dusty classics” for the convenience of sociological theory. Let us take as our point of departure Werner Stark’s sociology of knowledge. Stark was interested in “the study of logical relations between society’s predominating ideas and its value system,” i.e., the social “a priori” (Abel 1977: 157–158, 174).

In the communist days predominant ideas belonged to the repertory enforced by the repressive state. They largely remained predominant at the level of propaganda only because society rejected them, preferring to accept the value system ensuing from tradition, culture and the teaching of the church. Following the partial pacification of society in Stalinist days, the regime tried to gain control of individuals and their thoughts, which practice immediately brings to mind associations with Orwell. The
goal—to secure complete, coercive co-operation—was part of the canon of communist culture but was completely at odds with the principles of democratic culture and hence was in fact part of the utopian social project.

The Gomułka period, i.e., the nineteen-fifties and sixties, initiated the process of change of governance perspective (and the Gierek years, i.e., the nineteen-seventies, reinforced it) from the “long distance” perspective—the belief that the world can be subordinated to communism—to the short-distance perspective—the regime’s focus on positions and immediate interests. The formula of perfection of the socialist system following Czechoslovakia’s genuine attempt to do just that in 1968 was renounced in practice, with the exception perhaps of Kadar’s Hungary, but it was still maintained as a priority by communist propaganda, first for the sake of “the reformist wing of the party” and later also for the sake of the “reasonable opposition” (Steiner 1993: 19–23, 42–58). Obviously by the end of the seventies this was an empty slogan and those who were at the wheel knew it. This is when the formula became a mantra of mass propaganda.

The regime’s functionaries were unable to follow through with the reforms because of the contrast between two factors: communist culture for which the reforms were dysfunctional because they could not be reconciled with the interests of the party apparatus, and democratic culture with its orientation on Western values. A lot of time had to pass, however, before it became evident that “the king was naked.” The reform slogan was eventually substituted by “the evident argument of the stick” when society was explicitly threatened with Soviet intervention.

The communist system in Poland was incapable of reform. All it could offer was a poor substitute. The system had to be abolished before a new spirit of capitalism and democracy could be breathed into society. Polish practice and then the practice in entire Central-Eastern Europe have demonstrated that reforms can only be triggered when the sovereign state is regained and can act as the agent of reform. Therefore the order had to be reversed: first the independent state in the role of decision maker and only then reform programmed by that independent state. All this was related to democratic culture which was realised via the social movement—which in this case was a national independence movement—according to the formula adopted by “Solidarity.” We can also take it for granted that the tradition of uprisings was rooted in this culture by means of such factors as historical continuity, the institutions of the underground state and transmission of tradition which united various social groups and classes. There was room in this culture for various concepts—Mochnacki’s ideas concerning the need for more and better organised uprisings, Aleksander Gella’s critique balanced by profits or Norman Davies’s apt observations concerning the warning which the Warsaw Uprising conveyed to potential Soviet interventionists (Mochnacki 1984: 51–54; Gella 1987: 187–190; Davies 2004: 286–287, 293). By net balance, the culture of the Polish uprisings was definitely functional.

The independent state was a necessary condition for the return to normality whereas its lack prolonged the dependent existence. The reforms were part of a rational strategy whereas maintenance of the communist system was not. The hopes for a revived state rose when faith in regained sovereignty became more and more
widespread as did the hope that the norms of democracy and capitalist culture within a positive international economic setting would be reinstated. It was at this moment that the breakthrough in the process of abolishing the artificial inconsistency between the previous version of repressive welfare state and freedom took place.

As we progress further in our attempt to capture the evolutionary vector of contemporary societies we should not leave the extremely significant processes taking place in Central-Eastern Europe unattended—processes which led to the destruction of the communist system and prepared the ground for integration and globalization. On the other hand, if the “Solidarity” revolution is to be a model for other revolutions in the region, we must not forget the historical context in our comparative research (Mokrzycki 1980: 243–244, 250). The temptation to make flashy analogies does not always help.

Poland’s example justifies the claim that the road to reform sometimes leads via the state but the reverse is by no means true, as would seem to follow from the convergence premises within the wider framework of evolutionism.

This article tangibly explains why “Solidarity” did not coexist with counter-culture movements and why it did not join the moral evolution ideology bandwagon. When oppressed, the struggle with the regime to lift the repression and loosen the bonds restricting national sovereignty was more important than the feminist issue. The ecological and peace movements also looked quite different from the Polish perspective. Whereas these movements livened up the public scene in the West, they could hardly hope to be popular in Poland for the simple reason that they co-operated with the Soviet Union.

References


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