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Coping with Low-Trust Situations in Eastern and Western Europe: On the Role of Justice and Corruption as Buffers of Interpersonal Distrust

Abstract: This article focuses on the impact of interpersonal distrust on the perceived locus of control of the concerned person. It is argued that distrust triggers a psychological shift of the perceived locus of control towards distrusted others — a process, which may however be slowed down or even stopped by appropriate subjective or objective buffers. E.g. reliable law enforcement may have this buffering effect as well as the instrumentalisation of the state by corrupt practices. On the bases of interview data form the European Values Study, the article first shows for a great number of Eastern and Western countries the existence of the postulated negative impact of distrust on the degree of perceived internal control. In a second step, the article also investigates the buffering effects of trustworthy law enforcement and corruption. The statistical analyses demonstrate that in Central and Eastern Europe, corruption has a much stronger buffering effect than law enforcement, whereas in Western Europe, the strengths of the two types of buffers are just the reverse.

Keywords: Interpersonal trust, corruption, law enforcement, locus of control, risk-buffering, Eastern / Western Europe

Introduction and Overview of the Research Questions

Trust in others is a scarce resource: in Europe, only some Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Sweden, and Finland) and the Netherlands have real *majorities* of citizens, who are trusting the others. For the rest of Europe, interpersonal distrust is the normal situation. This especially also holds for Eastern Europe, including e.g. Poland, where in the year 2000 only 18% were trusting their fellow citizens (see appendix, tab. 3). According to Delhey and Newton (2005), this "malaise" is probably a result of the unsatisfactory quality of political institutions and public governance in many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

Distrust in others is the expression of a *virtual conflict* of interest: the distrusting *ego* fears that *alter* follows hidden goals, which run counter the interests of ego (Hardin 2008: 18 ff.; Hardin 2002: 3 ff., 144–145). The consequences of this fear are manifold, ranging from economic to cultural and psychological effects (Cook 2001, Hardin 2002). In this paper we will study the impact of interpersonal distrust on the so-called *locus of control*, which was originally conceptualised by Rotter (1966). It corresponds to the perceived centre of control of the fate of ego on a continuum, which ranges

from an internal to an external pole, the latter being represented by a distrusted other (Lefcourt 1976). Thus, distrust in others means a shift of the locus of control to the external pole and consequently a decrease in the degree of perceived internal control of the personal situation (see fig. 1). In Western cultures with strong emphasis on personal autonomy, this is a social problem, which calls for individual or societal solutions.

One of the solutions to the problem is *law enforcement* by police and justice. These institutions are obviously made to stop attempts of deception and to revert the negative impact of deviant behaviour. In addition, law enforcing institutions are also *subjective* risk-buffers: deviant behaviour is perceived as less dangerous, if it can be stopped by reliable justice and police. Hence we hypothesise in fig. 1 that formal and informal institutional buffers are able to alleviate the negative impact of interpersonal distrust.

Fig. 1

A summary of the basic assumptions

As a matter of course, police and justice are not the only buffering institutions. A rather subjective buffer is e.g. religious faith. It is based on the belief that justice will in the end be restored by some devine principle, even if it is temporarily disturbed by distrusted others. Alternatively, and more important for this article, there is also buffering by access to *corrupt* persons. Such contacts can be used by the briber in order to instrumentalise the power of others for gaining control of a low-trust situation. Even if this access to illegitimate power is objectively not successful, it still may function as a subjective buffer of distrust, as it gives the briber the illusion of controlling the situation.

The co-existence of different buffers suggests as a *first research question* to ask about the relative and absolute strength of such buffers. How good or bad are they in the best and in the worst case? Are there e.g. differences between alternative buffers with regard to their effectiveness in alleviating the negative impact of distrust? Given the different social and political histories of Eastern and Western Europe, our *second research question* will ask about the differences between the two groups of countries with regard to the mentioned strength of buffers: are the coping strategies in Central/Eastern Europe really different from those in the West, and if so, in what respect? And finally, as a *third research problem*, how can the differences between East and

West be explained, if they really exist? Are they simply the result of *structural* variations between the East and the West, e.g. with regard to the level of corruption? Or, alternatively, are there different national cultures of coping with low-trust situations?

In order to answer these research questions, we will first formalise the diagram in fig. 1 and translate it afterwards into statistical regression models. After calibration with the interview data from the European Values Study (EVS) (1999/2000), the statistical models will be used in order to determine the buffering effects and their structural and cultural determinants. The results will finally enable us to answer in the last section of the article at least some of the previous research questions.

Theory and Hypotheses

According to the introductory section, this paper is based on three interdependent major concepts:

a) *Interpersonal distrust:* On the one hand it is based on the absence of trustworthy persons and thus points to a lack of social capital. On the other hand, interpersonal distrust presupposes the existence of virtual *conflicts of interest*, which are from the point of view of the distrusting person not really solved and thus imply the risk of being deceived by others.

b) *Perceived internal control:* It defines the place of the locus of control (Lefcourt 1976, 1981) over the fate of ego on a continuum between total autonomy of a person and total dependency on others. For European societies it is assumed that individuals strive for increasing the internal control of their personal situation.

c) *Buffering-resources:* The concept describes the amount of personal or societal resources available for reducing the subjective or objective risk of being deceived in a low-trust situation. It is assumed, that different national contexts are endowed with different *quantities* and different *types* of buffer-resources. Some buffers like law enforcement are more objective, as they really reduce the probability of deception. Others are more subjective, since they are mainly used for coping with stressful situations (Cohen & Wills 1985, Barrera 1988, Mueller 2006).

As we have seen in the previous section, the three concepts (a), (b), and (c), are strongly related each to another. The socio-psychological literature (Rotter & Hochreich 1975: 159 ff.) suggests as a *first hypothesis* that interpersonal distrust D has a negative impact on the perceived internal control C. Although this formulation implies a very general negative *monotonic* relation between the variables D and C, we will assume for the rest of this article that C is simply a *linear* function of D (see fig. 2). Thus

$$C = k + c \times D,$$

where k and c are parameters with $k > 0$, $c \leq 0$ and consequently $c/k \leq 0$.

Given the generally poor quality of social data, non-linear monotonic relations are hard to identify by statistical analysis such that the linearity assumption is a justifiable simplification. Moreover, the linearity assumption allows to derive a new concept: the

Fig. 2

The negative impact of distrust on the locus of control

relative impact c/k of distrust, which according to our theory (see fig. 2) should *never* have a *positive* sign.

Our *second hypothesis* refers to the determinants of this relative impact c/k (see fig. 3). It postulates that the more of a given type of buffering-resource B is available, the closer to zero is the relative impact c/k of distrust (Mueller 2009, Aldwin 2000: chap. 8). Stated differently in a more formal language, which uses the infinitesimal growth operator *d:*

$$d(c/k)/dB > 0, \text{ where } c/k \leq 0.$$

In the best case, buffering-resources B are so abundant that c/k gets very close to zero and the linear relation between D and C is in the previous fig. 2 a *horizontal* line. In this situation, changes in distrust D obviously have no effect on the locus of control. In the worst case, there are no buffering resources, i.e. B = 0, and consequently distrust has an extremely strong negative effect c/k = min (see fig. 3) on the locus of control.

In general, there are not only one, but several competing buffers, which can simultaneously be used for reducing the relative impact c/k of distrust in others. As fig. 3 illustrates, the buffers mainly differ by the slope d(c/k)/dB of the functional relation between B and c/k. Hence, buffer I in fig. 3 is e.g. more effective than buffer II. *Hypothesis 3* explains this difference by the amount of available buffering-resources: the higher the *availability* of buffering-resources of type I as compared to the buffering-resources of type II, the more effective is buffer I in relation to buffer II. If the *effectiveness* of a buffer is operationalised by its *slope d(c/k)/dB*, hypothesis 3 can be formalised as follows:

$$B_1 > B_2 \longrightarrow d(c/k)/dB_1 > d(c/k)/dB_2,$$

where B_1 and B_2 are the respective amounts of the available resources of the two buffers I and II.

The idea behind this hypothesis is that relatively easily available resources are cheaper than others, and consequently, rational actors will use these resources more *exhaustively*. As a consequence of this preferential use, resources with a high availability are more effective in buffering. Hence, if in Central/Eastern Europe some buffering strategies like e.g. corruption are more available than others, these strategies should also be more effective as buffers of distrust.

Fig. 3

The buffering of the impact of distrust

Testing Hypothesis 1: The Impact of Distrust

Hypothesis 1 postulates that interpersonal distrust has a *negative impact* on the locus of control. Obviously, this is a hypothesis, which has to be tested with data referring to individuals. However, since we are also interested in context-effects, e.g. when testing hypothesis 2 about the impact of context specific buffers, we need an international data-set, which can be split by the citizenship of the respondents. The European Values Study (EVS) (1999/2000) offers such a multinational data-set with standardised interviews, which have been conducted in a similar way in many different European countries. Among others, variable V67 of this data-set measures for 33 European countries the locus of control on a 10-point-scale, ranging from 1 to 10. Here it is used as an operationalisation of the perceived *internal control C*. Moreover, there is in the EVS-dataset also a variable V66, which measures on a 2-point-scale, whether others

can be trusted (value 1) or not (value 2). After a simple transformation, which replaces V66 by V66-1, this variable becomes a valid operationalisation of the *distrust D*.

The formalised version of hypothesis 1 (see previous section) suggests to interpret the formula

$$C = k + c \times D$$

as a linear *regression* equation (Weisberg 2005), where
C = V67 (see EVS-file) is the dependent variable,
D = V66-1 (see EVS-file) is the independent variable,
k and c are unknown parameters to be estimated from the data.

If the proposed regression analysis is done for each country *separately*, country specific values for c and k can be extracted from the data. They allow to derive the *relative* impact c/k of distrust D. The variable describes the *share* of internal control that is lost by not trusting the others. If hypothesis 1 were correct, c/k should be equal to *zero* or have a *negative* sign.

Fig. 4

Frequency distribution of the estimated relative impact c/k

Std. Dev = .05
Mean = −.048
N = 32.00

Rel. impact of distrust = c/k

Sample: Countries participating in the European Values Survey 1999/2000, excl. Greece due to sampling problems (Halman 2001: 351 ff.)

Fig. 4 presents the histogram of the distribution of the empirical c/k-values, which have been calculated just in the way suggested before. The impact of distrust on

the locus of control is on the average about -5%. Although this is not very much, it nevertheless confirms our hypothesis 1: For 91% of the analysed countries, the hypothesised inequality $c/k \leq 0$ holds true, and for 72% of the countries, the negative value of c is even statistically *significant* (see appendix, tab. 3). This is much higher than 50% negative c/k-values, which are expected for a symmetrical normal distribution with mean value $c/k = 0$. The exceptions with *positive* c/k-values are Turkey, Spain, and Portugal, where the first two countries have statistically insignificant c-values and thus are not really falsifying hypothesis 1. Nevertheless, since the theory to be tested presupposes that c/k-values are *not positive*, all three countries are excluded from the following empirical tests of hypotheses 2 and 3.

Testing Hypothesis 2: The Effects of the Buffers of Distrust

Hypothesis 2 postulates that the more of a given type of buffering-resource B_i is available, the closer to zero is the relative impact c/k of distrust. In order to test, whether the relation $d(c/k) / dB_i > 0$ really holds, one has to determine the functional relation between c/k and B_i. The difficulty in reaching this goal is that there are generally several types of competing buffers, which first have to be *selected* and then *joined* in an appropriate formal way.

Regarding the *selection* problem, we are concentrating here on three major buffer-resources: *police*, *justice*, and *corruption.* Their common feature is that they are all supplied by the *state*. The law enforcing institutions police and justice can be instrumentalised for stopping attempts of deception and thus objectively buffer the negative impact of deviant behaviour of others (Raiser et al. 2004). Corruption gives the briber the possibility of controlling the situation by instrumentalising the functionaries of the state as well as the agents of private companies for his/her own illegal purposes. Bribes may however also work as incentives, which motivate the corrupted person to follow the normal procedures in a faster and/or more reliable way (Rose-Ackerman 2006: chap. 1). Finally, bribes are sometimes also considered as "gifts," which establish mutual *long-term* obligations (Rose-Ackerman 2006: chap. 6). In the theoretical context of this article, such long-term obligations are insofar important, as they make the corrupted environment of the briber more predictable and thus buffer the general arbitrariness of low-trust situations.

An obvious solution to the problem of studying the *joint effects* of the mentioned resources is to enter them as independent variables into a multiple linear regression equation (Weisberg 2005), which explains as the dependent variable the impact c/k. Hence, in what follows, we will analyse the regression equation

$$c/k = b_0 + b_1 \times CPI + b_2 \times TRUST\_J + b_3 \times TRUST\_P$$

where

c/k = Relative impact of distrust on the internal control, as estimated for testing hypothesis 1.

Table 1

Parameter estimates of the buffering effects in Eastern and Western Europe

Explanatory variables	Eastern Europe		Western Europe		
	Full model	Final model	Full model	Final model A	Final model B
Constant	[0.0084]	[0.0031]	[−0.0732]	−0.142**	−0.185***
CPI	−0.0150*	−0.0157*	[−0.0029]	-.--	-.--
TRUST_J	[0.0107]	-.--	[0.0998]	0.0533*	0.0843***
TRUST_P	[−0.0160]	-.--	[−0.0615]	-.--	-.--
F of model	[1.735]	6.219*	[1.414]	4.563*	15.617***
Fit of model r^2_{adj}	0.155	0.303	0.094	0.203	0.529
N of cases	13	13	15	15	14

Legend: *Dependent variable:* Rel. impact of distrust = c/k (see fig. 2). *Independent variables:* CPI = Absence of corruption = Corruption Perceptions Index 2001 of Transparency International (2006); TRUST_J = Trustworthiness of justice = 4 − national mean value of variable V212 of the European Values Study (1999/2000); TRUST_P = Trustworthiness of police = 4 − national mean value of variable V205 of the European Values Study (1999/2000). *Models:* Final model A: incl. Denmark; Final model B: *excl.* Denmark. *Sample:* Countries participating in the European Values Survey (1999/2000), excluding Greece, due to sampling problems (Halman 2001: 351ff.) and excl. Spain, Portugal, and Turkey with c/k > 0. *Significances* (one-tailed tests): ***: $p \leq 0.001$; **: $p \leq 0.01$; *: $p \leq 0.05$; [ ]: n.s.; -.- -: not in the equation.

CPI = Corruption Perceptions Index 2001 of Transparency International (2006), as a measure of the *absence* of corruption. For further details, see legend of tab. 1.

TRUST_J = Trustworthiness of *justice*, based on the mean judgement of the national population in the EVS-interviews. Thus, the national population is considered as the expert of its own justice-system. For technical details, see legend of tab. 1.

TRUST_P = Trustworthiness of *police*, based on the mean judgement of the national population in the EVS-interviews. Thus, also here, the national population is considered as the expert of its own law enforcement system. For technical details, see legend of tab. 1.

b_0, …, b_3 = Parameters to be estimated from the data by means of OLS-regression.

Here, the units of statistical analysis are of course *countries* with separate political systems and cultures. Their names and data are shown in tab. 3 (see appendix). Due to our special interest in differences between Eastern and Western Europe, the parameters b_0, … , b_3 have been estimated separately for the East and the West. The results of this estimation process are presented in tab. 1.

Both, for the East and the West, we started with a *full model*, which included all three buffers. For *Eastern* Europe, this full model turned out to be statistically insignificant. The global *Fit of model* r^2_{adj} as well as the regression coefficients of the variables TRUST_J and TRUST_P were not really different from zero. After removing TRUST_J and TRUSP_P, the model became significant and increased its explanatory power from 15.5% to 30.3% (see tab. 1, final model). Thus, the only remaining variable of the final model is CPI, the Corruption Perceptions Index, which has a negative regression coefficient −0.0157. As fig. 5a shows, the higher the

Fig. 5a

The buffering effects of corruption in Eastern Europe

c/k = Rel. impact of distrust

CPI = Absence of corruption

Sample: East European countries participating in the European Values Study 1999/2000: 16 = Estonia, 17 = Latvia, 18 = Lithuania, 19 = Poland, 20 = Czech Rep., 21 = Slovakia, 22 = Hungary, 23 = Romania, 24 = Bulgaria, 25 = Croatia, 27 = Russia, 30 = Slovenia, 31 = Ukraine.

buffer variable CPI, the more negative is the impact c/k. At first, this seems to be in contradiction with hypothesis 2. However, since CPI has an inverse polarity and stands for the *absence* of corruption, the result *confirms* hypothesis 2 for Eastern Europe: here, corruption helps indeed to buffer distrust, what is obviously *not* the case for law enforcement by justice and police.

For *Western* Europe, the parameter estimation was even more problematic than for the Eastern countries. In the initial model, none of the buffers had a significant influence on the impact c/k (see tab. 1). After removing the least significant variables, we got a *final model A*, which has just one explanatory factor: TRUST_J, the trust-worthiness of justice. The sign of the associated regression coefficient is *positive*, as predicted by hypothesis 2. Similarly, also the scatter-plot in fig. 5b corresponds to the theoretical expectations, previously depicted in fig. 3. The higher the trustworthiness of the justice of a Western country, the closer is the negative impact c/k to zero. However, the scatter-plot in fig. 5b also shows an outlier: the data-point no. 10, which represents *Denmark*. Maybe that Denmark's role as a statistical outlier is influenced by the fact, that it is the country with the highest trust in others (see appendix, tab. 3). The exclusion of Denmark from the parameter estimation strongly increases the ex-

Fig. 5b

The buffering effects of justice in Western Europe

c/k = Rel. impact of distrust

Sample: West European countries participating in the European Values Study 1999/2000, excl. Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey, due to reasons presented in the previous sections. 1 = France, 2 = UK, 3 = Germany, 4 = Austria, 5 = Italy, 8 = Netherlands, 9 = Belgium, *10 = Denmark*, 11 = Sweden, 12 = Finland, 13 = Iceland, 14 = N.-Ireland, 15 = Ireland, 28 = Malta, 29 = Luxemburg.

planatory power of the model from 20.3% to 52.9%. Consequently, we consider the *final model B* of tab. 1 as the most relevant one, to which we refer in the remaining sections of this article. According to this model, Western Europe has only one buffer, the already mentioned *justice*. Corruption is *not* instrumental for buffering distrust, nor is trustworthy police. The latter result is insofar unexpected, as police is like justice part of the Western law enforcement system. Maybe that also in Western Europe, police is by the citizen's day-to-day experience an institution, which is *perceived* as mainly punishing the own person and less the law-breaking distrusted others.

Testing Hypothesis 3: The Effectiveness of Buffers in East and West

Hypothesis 3 refers to the effectiveness of buffers. It postulates that resources with a high availability are more effective buffers than resources with a lower availability. In order to test this hypothesis, we assume that

a) in *Eastern* Europe *corruption* is more available than law enforcement by justice and police;

b) in *Western* Europe *law enforcement* by justice and police is more available than corruption.

This is equivalent to the assumptions that
1) the *East* has with regard to *corruption* higher rankings than the West;
2) the *West* has with regard to the trustworthiness of *justice* and *police* higher rankings than the East.

Under these assumptions, we expect on the basis of hypothesis 3 that
i) the effectiveness of *corruption* for buffering distrust is in *Eastern* Europe higher than in Western Europe;
ii) the corresponding effectiveness of *law enforcement* by justice and police is in *Western Europe* higher than in Eastern Europe.

   With the information we extracted so far from the original data, the assumptions (1), and (2) as well as the implications (i) and (ii) can easily be tested. Tab. 2 displays the results of the analysis. It shows that our assumptions about the differential availabilities of buffer-resources in East and West are correct. Consequently, *corruption* should be more effective in the East than in the West. According to tab. 2, this seems indeed to be true and thus confirms hypothesis 3. Inversely we expect for *law enforcement* higher effectiveness in the West than in the East. As tab. 2 shows, this implication only holds true for *justice*, but not for *police*, such that hypothesis 3 is only partially confirmed. Hence, for reasons already mentioned in the discussion of tab. 1, police is not really a buffer of distrust, neither in Eastern nor in Western Europe.

Table 2

Availabilities and effectiveness of buffers in Eastern and Western Europe

Buffers	Mean availability			Effectiveness	
	East	West	Diff.	East	West
CPI	18.9 >	6.6	−12.3***	0.601* >	0.000
TRUST_J	9.4 <	19.6	10.2***	0.000 <	0.752***
TRUST_P	7.6 <	21.4	13.8***	0.000 =	0.000
N of cases	13–14	12–14		13	14

Legend: CPI = Corruption Perceptions Index. TRUST_J = Trustworthiness of justice. TRUST_P = Trustworthiness of police. Mean availability = Mean rank of buffer-values, with *inverse* ranking for CPI. Effectiveness = Abs. *beta*-coefficients of the final models of tab. 1. Samples and significances: see tab. 1.

Answers to the Initial Research Questions

This paper started with three initial research questions regarding
a) the strength of buffers for coping with low-trust situations,
b) the differences between Eastern and Western Europe with regard to this strength,
c) the explanation of these differences between Eastern and Western Europe.

   In order to answer the *first* of these questions, fig. 6 gives on the basis of tab. 1 a synoptic overview of the functional relations between buffer-resources and the

impact c/k of distrust on the locus of control. As we know from the previous sections, trust in police has *no effect*. The strengths of the other two buffers, i.e. corruption and law enforcement by justice, are comparable: If resources are at minimum (see fig. 6, Min. West and Min. East), the negative impact c/k is about −0.09. If resources are at maximum (see fig. 6, Max. West and Max. East), the impact c/k is buffered to ca. −0.03. At the theoretical endpoints of the resource-scales, i.e. CPI = 1 and TRUST_J = 3, the negative impact of distrust nearly disappears for both buffers such that c/k is very close to zero (see fig. 6).

Fig. 6

Buffering distrust in Eastern and Western Europe: a synoptical overview

Legend: Min., Max., Mean: Observed minimum, maximum, and mean values on the horizontal axes, representing the buffer resources CPI and TRUST_J.

Regarding the *second* research question, there are indeed differences between the countries in East and West: as we know from the test of hypothesis 2, buffering by corruption only works in the East, but not in the West. Inversely, buffering by trust in justice only works in West, but not in the East. The effectiveness of the country-specific buffering is however for both groups of countries quite similar, i.e. between 0.60 and 0.75 (see tab. 2).

The test of hypothesis 3 has probably given an answer to the *third* question about the causes of these differences between the two groups of countries. At least in the past around the year 2000, when the data of this paper were collected, there were

differences between the East and the West with regard to the availabilities of corruption and trustworthy justice (see fig. 6, Mean East and Mean West). In accordance with hypothesis 3, the observed utilization and effectiveness of the different buffers just corresponds to the observed differences in the availabilities of their resources. The real test of hypothesis 3 is probably ahead in the future: if in Eastern Europe the institutional reforms proposed by Kornai (2004a, 2004b) and others will make corruption more expensive and law enforcement more trustworthy, we should probably observe for the countries in the East a shift in the preferred buffering strategies from corruption to law enforcement by justice and police.

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Appendix

Table 3

Country data used for statistical analyses

Country	% with trust in others	Rel. impact c/k	Corruption index CPI	Trustworthiness	
				Justice	Police
Austria	33%	−0.020	7.80	1.78	1.93
Belarus	42%	−0.101*	-.--	1.44	1.28
Belgium	29%	−0.067*	6.60	1.19	1.51
Bulgaria	27%	−0.055*	3.90	1.07	1.41
Croatia	21%	−0.051*	3.90	1.15	1.41
Czech Rep.	25%	−0.091*	3.90	1.09	1.28
Denmark	67%	−0.085*	9.50	1.92	2.16
Estonia	23%	−0.108*	5.60	1.21	1.24
Finland	57%	−0.051*	9.90	1.74	2.19
France	21%	−0.051*	6.70	1.32	1.70
Germany	38%	−0.057*	7.40	1.58	1.77
Greece	24%	−0.025	4.20	1.33	1.08
Hungary	22%	−0.042	5.30	1.33	1.33
Iceland	41%	−0.010	9.20	1.88	2.03
Ireland	36%	−0.067*	7.50	1.62	2.19
Italy	33%	−0.096*	5.50	1.18	1.77
Latvia	17%	−0.037	3.40	1.40	1.27
Lithuania	26%	−0.044*	4.80	0.93	1.12
Luxemburg	25%	−0.056*	8.70	1.62	1.79
Malta	21%	−0.092*	-.--	1.34	1.77
Netherlands	60%	−0.080*	8.80	1.45	1.70
Northern Ireland	39%	−0.071*	-.--	1.43	1.73
Poland	18%	−0.050*	4.10	1.39	1.64
Portugal	12%	[+0.071]	6.30	1.28	1.73
Romania	10%	−0.034	2.80	1.30	1.40
Russia	24%	−0.018	2.30	1.16	1.03
Slovakia	16%	−0.063*	3.70	1.19	1.34
Slovenia	22%	−0.115*	5.20	1.40	1.51
Spain	39%	[+0.013]	7.00	1.37	1.54
Sweden	66%	−0.048*	9.00	1.64	1.86
Turkey	7%	[+0.118]	3.60	1.57	1.84
United Kingdom	29%	−0.042*	8.30	1.42	1.80
Ukraine	27%	−0.053*	2.10	1.10	1.07

Legend: *% with trust in others* = % of national population with value V66 = 1 in the European Values Study (EVS) (1999/2000). *Rel. impact c/k* = Ratio of regression coefficients calculated in section 3. ([ ]: Not used for further analysis, due to pos. sign; *: Neg. c-value statistically significant at level ≤ 5%). *Corruption index CPI* = Absence of corruption = Corruption Perceptions Index 2001 of Transparency International (2006). *Trustworthiness of justice* = TRUST_J = 4 − national mean value of variable V212 of the EVS (1999/2000). *Trustworthiness of police* = TRUST_P = 4 − national mean value of variable V205 of the EVS (1999/2000).

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